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NOTES

TO

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BY

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P R E F A C E.

IT is not my purpose in this edition to set forth a complete system of moral philosophy, or to compare and reconcile different views, but simply to assist the student of the *Ethics* in understanding Aristotle's meaning, and in following his arguments in the book before us. There is, indeed, scarcely a page of the work which might not have served as a peg on which to hang a dissertation on some point of the theory and practice of morals; but to do so would have interfered with, rather than furthered, my main aim: and I have therefore abstained from general disquisitions, and have neither referred to ancient systems of philosophy, except where Aristotle's meaning would have been obscure without such reference; nor to modern views, except where they directly illustrate, in more familiar language, and thus enable us more completely to apprehend what Aristotle meant to say. And this was the less necessary, as I believe what I have left undone will be performed by able hands. I wish rather to guide students, as far as I am able, to an understanding of what Aristotle says, before they proceed to compare him with, or judge him by, what has been advanced by those who went before or came after him. I am sure that he who carefully and patiently studies his ethical writings, (in which I would include the *Rhetoric*,) will gain a knowledge of many of the secrets of man's nature, as it practically exists, and of men as they practically act, which will be found of great service, as well in the abstract study of the subject, as in practical dealing with, or guidance of, men. For Aristotle, looking with a curious and careful eye on the realities of human life, saw the elements of man's nature, the motives and springs of action,

and the manner of their working, far more distinctly and accurately than any other philosopher, ancient or modern. He may not have had the brilliant imagination of Plato; but his wonderful powers of discernment, of analysis, of comparison, of combination, of distinction, of sifting the wheat from the chaff, enabled him to arrive at conclusions which, as far as they go, are wonderfully in harmony with the fuller and deeper knowledge which is vouchsafed to us. If I were called upon to rest Aristotle's fame on one part of his manifold wisdom, it would be on the patient confidence with which he believes that nature has worked, and does work, for the best; and that true moral philosophy consists, not in dogmatising on what man ought to be, or what he would be, had he been created otherwise than he is, but in seeing what he was intended to be as he is; on the patient skill with which, in accordance with this principle, taking man as he is, and the world as it is, he has worked out the nature, the functions, the perfection, the true happiness of such a being placed in such a world. If it may with truth be said that Socrates drew morality from heaven, it is not less true to say that Aristotle found it on earth.

Aristotle's fame undoubtedly rests rather on his logical and moral writings than on his physical, though it is hardly fair to form an unfavourable judgment of his whole natural philosophy from what remains to us. The names of several of his lost works might lead us to suppose that he treated the subject more completely and truly than is sometimes supposed; but without taking this into account, physical science was then undoubtedly in its infancy. Observations and experiment could not, in the nature of things, have given the same variety of data as the moderns possess; and, it may be, our treasury of facts will seem to future enquirers to be but scantily filled. Physical science is always cradled in time, the giant of one generation is but the infant of the next; so that it is no detraction from Aristotle's powers as a philosopher, if his physical science seems a dwarf by the side of our own: but in whatever regards that on which time has nothing new to reveal,—the powers and laws of thought and

action,—Aristotle's data were as ample as, though not more so than, our own, and therefore his logical, ethical, and political writings maintain the place which was assigned them two thousand years ago: they have informed and guided the wisest men in succeeding generations; and especially in our own language, the arms of the truest and deepest philosophers bear undoubted marks of the armoury in which they were forged.

The keystone of Aristotle's philosophy, which enabled him thus to construct a stable system out of the shifting materials he had, is *οὐθὲν ἡ φύσις μάτην ποιεῖ*: while in Ethics he was led to truth by taking a true view of man as a compound being, made up of reason and passions, each of which had their function in the formation of his moral character and the development of moral action. This view of man as a compound being is discernible in his Rhetoric as well as his Ethics.

The data which Aristotle uses will be found to be either the opinions of men, expressed or implied, or the facts of nature, as seen either in the general laws and principles which philosophy had been able to detect, or common sense to recognise; or in the facts of daily life, as discernible by our senses or reason. Most philosophers of his age rejected the one, while they asserted the claims of the other. Aristotle uses the one or the other as they come most readily to hand, (see bk. i. notes 58, 61,) and, if possible, both, so as to shew the agreement which ought to exist, and, when both are carefully examined, does exist, between them.

Again, in the examination of philosophic or popular opinions, and he does not throw aside a dogma, or even a proverb, without care: he extracts from the very dross whatever gold may be in it; and pointing out where each has fallen short of, or exceeded the limits of truth, confirms his own opinion by shewing how it agrees with the truth, while he corrects the errors of others. And thus one great lesson to be learnt from the study of Aristotle is, that where contrary opinions are held by honest men, with a fair show of argument on each side, or have obtained in popular opinion of different ages or

countries, each is true with limitations or additions: where one says "it is wholly this," and another, "it is wholly that," the truth lies hid in the fact that both are partially, neither wholly, right.

As for the treatise itself, enough is said from time to time in the notes on the general object and nature of its several parts and of it as a whole, to render it unnecessary to go over the same ground here. I had some thoughts, at one time, of prefixing an Analysis or Conspectus, such as that of Michelet's; but on consideration, I think there is sufficient help given in the notes to enable the student to do it for himself, with far more benefit than if he had it ready made to his hands; and I should be doing more harm than good if I superseded useful labour, instead of merely guiding and assisting it. I have directed some blank pages to be left in the beginning of the first volume for this purpose, and I subjoin an analysis of one chapter very much on Michelet's plan, as a specimen of the way in which I should recommend such work to be done. Suffice it to say, that I believe the *Ethics* to have been written by Aristotle as a scientific proof that moral virtue was the perfection of man, a compound being, placed in the world in which we find him; and hence that his happiness, the production and preservation of which ought to be the aim of the science of social life, is to be found in the faithful discharge of his duties as a citizen and a man. Of course there is much practical information and explanation given throughout, but I do not agree with those who cannot see in the *Ethics* a distinct point to be proved, and a distinct line of argument to prove it. It is a scientific enquiry into and proof of the practical nature of human virtue and happiness,—not merely a barren speculation into its abstract nature, with no aim or result beyond speculation, but with a view to practice, and the attainment of something beyond itself. (See bk. ii. note 13.)

The reading given is almost invariably that of Bekker's: The duodecimo text has been printed in an octavo page, so as to leave room for a running abstract or observations which may strike the student as he reads; thus giving all the ad-

vantage of an interleaved book, without being interleaved. And I have not loaded the text or notes with various readings, but have contented myself with merely giving those which seemed to affect the sense. Not that I would be supposed to undervalue various readings; they afford scope for the exercise and development of a very useful mental faculty; but I think they belong rather to the poets than to the philosophers. In the former the taste is chiefly called into play, and therefore it is right that scope should be found for the occasional exercise of the critical faculties side by side with the other, in comparing and judging of authorities and probabilities. In the latter there is sufficient scope for the critical faculty in the subject and the arguments, and the introduction of unimportant and formal points of criticism would rather call off the judgment from its more important sphere in the contents of the book itself.

In some, if not many passages, the conciseness of the style, so different from that of Plato, renders the reasoning at first sight obscure and difficult; but these, even where the general line and conclusion of the argument are clear enough, may not be neglected or slurred over. It is no fruitless mental exercise to follow such a mind as Aristotle's even where the path is rugged, and where we think we see a short cut. Whoever declines this labour will fail to master many forms of thought and argument which would have made his own powers of thought and argument more varied and available. This important result will be obtained, and the treatise more thoroughly mastered, by following out the connection and arguments as closely as possible,—searching into the force of illative conjunctions, (such as *γὰρ*, *οὖν*, &c.), and the way in which one clause is connected with another. This requires much labour and patience,—but it will not be labour and patience misspent; and I would warn beginners against supposing that they have got all that the Ethics has to offer when they have read it once over, or when they have mastered the details. These, of course, must be mastered first, but these are not all. The Ethics is an inexhaustible mine;—I am afraid to say how often I have read it over, but I am not

afraid to say that every time I have read it I have found something worth knowing which had not struck me before.

I would warn the student also against careless construing of Greek words into inadequate English; such, for instance, as always construing *καλόν* "*honourable*," or *αἰσχρόν* "*disgraceful*;" or, what is still more common, rendering a whole sentence into English words without mastering the notion which the Greek is meant to convey.

It is not necessary for me to bring forward here the leading and essential points in the book; but among the points which occur incidentally, I would call especial attention to Aristotle's opinion of, and use of, induction,—to the way in which he speaks of the gods, —and the reverential and even affectionate way in which he speaks of Plato; these being some among the many points in which Aristotle has been misrepresented and misused.

Those who are acquainted with Michelet's Commentary will not fail to observe that I am occasionally indebted to him for explanations or references, which I have not hesitated to adopt without acknowledging them in each case.

There are, of course, a few trifling misprints: those which I have myself detected are in the accents; one especially, of the class which, to use a forcible expression of the late Dean of Christ Church, sets one's teeth on edge,—a *pro-proparoxyton*, *ἄοριστος*. But I must add, that this arose from my correcting the press at a distance, which made me, sometimes, in order to save time, let the sheets be printed off without seeing with my own eyes that the final corrections had been made.

I will only add, that I shall be much gratified if it should turn out that my labours assist others in the study of a work from which I feel that I have myself obtained much, and of which, the more thoroughly it is studied, the more will the value and benefits be felt.

CAERDEON, Jan. 1856.

Specimen of Analysis.

Book i. ch. 6.—Plato's notion of the *ἰδέα* does not give us the true nature of good.

1. Apology for opposing Plato, 1.
2. Why his doctrine wrong, 2 to the end.
 - a. Good is predicated in Priority and Posteriority, 2.
 - β. Goods are predicated in different categories, 3.
 - γ. There is no one science of good, 4.
 - δ. The doctrine unintelligible and unpractical, 5—7.
 - a. No real difference between the supposed *ἰδέα* and concrete goods, 5.
 - b. Supposed eternity of abstract *ἰδέα* no argument to the contrary, 6.
 - c. Testimony of Speusippus, 7.
 - ε. The doctrine not tenable on the theory of distinction between goods dependent and independent, 8, 12.
 - aa. Supposed division of goods, 8, 9.
 - bb. Difficulty of distinguishing between them, 10.
 - cc. Dilemma arising from different notions of dependent and independent goods.
 - aa. If only the *ἰδέα* independent, then no reality in concrete, 10.
 - ββ. If others also, then all should fall under one definition, 11.
 - dd. Why called by common name of "good," 12.
 - ζ. Even if true, not practical or attainable, 13—16.
1. Argument of Platonists that it would serve as a model, 14.
2. Disproved by practice of men in general, 15.
3. By the practical sciences.

NOTES.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

- (1.) 1. IN this chapter Aristotle is laying down definitions or characteristics of the good, preparatory to drawing the conclusion in chapter ii., that the τέλος πρακτῶν is the ἀγαθόν of man. The syllogisms stand thus :—

1. ὃ πάντα ἐφίεται is the τὰγαθόν of man (*opinions of men*).

τέλος πρακτῶν is οὐ πάντα ἐφίεται.

τέλος πρακτῶν is τὰγαθόν of man.

2. The ἔργον of all other ἐνέργειαι is τὰγαθόν of man (*constitution of nature*).

τέλος πρακτῶν is the ἔργον of all other ἐνέργειαι.

τέλος πρακτῶν is τὰγαθόν of man.

- (2.) 1. πᾶσα κ.τ.λ. All human action as it usually exists in the world. τέχνη, systems of contrivance, with a view to production. μέθοδος (ἕξις ὁδοποιητικὴ μετὰ λόγου), systems of rules, with a view to the proper regulation of our intellectual, social, or moral faculties, such as logic, politics. πράξεις, actions in moral life. προαίρεσις, acts of choice.

- (2.) 3. δοκεῖ. This word points to the opinions of men. πέφυκε, is *by nature*. ἐστὶ, simply *is*. φαίνεται, *evidently is*. So in this chapter δοκεῖ is used in the premiss embodying the opinions of men: "Whatever all desire is rightly defined to be *the good*." πέφυκε is used where the argument is drawn from the constitution of nature; so βέλτιον πέφυκε, "the ἔργον of all ἐνέργειαι is *by nature* the good."

- (4.) 2. Διαφορά δέ τις κ.τ.λ. difference in value. Aristotle is not here merely setting forth a distinction between ἐνέργειαι and ἔργα, but he is doing so with a view to their relation to *the good*; that one is a greater good than the other—βέλτιον = ἀγαθώτερον. By noticing this, the connection between this

proposition and the main question is preserved. Observe that the comparative of *good* is in most, if not in all languages, irregular: there are, properly speaking, no degrees of good, though there are approaches towards it, which seem to be its degrees.

- (5.) 2. It is evident that Aristotle is here not merely giving us a piece of information, as it is commonly explained (see Harris on Happiness); laying down a mere abstract difference between the *ἐνέργεια* and *ἔργον*, one signifying the operations which lead to a production, the other the thing produced. This may be a true distinction, but it is not what he has in view here, for he says immediately below that an *ἐνέργεια* may be an *ἔργον*; he is laying down a difference of value between them, with a view to the strict argument he is working out.
- (6.) 4. He lays down that in human actions and systems there is a subordination; that there are some subordinate to those above them, and these again to some one highest of all; that this highest is more an object of choice than those below it: and thus by implication he gives the minor to each of the above major premisses. This, to which all else are subordinate and tend, (i.e. *τέλος πρακτῶν*), is most οὐ πάντα ἐφίεται, and also is the *ἔργον* of all other *ἐνέργειαι*.
- (7.) 3. *ἐπιστήμη*, a collection of abstract *laws*. *τέχνη*, the same applied to practice as *rules*.
- (8.) 4. *ὑπό* refers rather to the constitution of nature, whereby one is placed in subjection to another; the same notion often exists in the word *κύριος*.—*αἰρετώτερα*. Observe that this word always has reference to the opinions of men.
- (9.) 5. *διαφέρει δὲ οὐδέν*. An *ἐνέργεια* may be itself an *ἔργον*: and it is not less a good, or *the good*, for that. It was necessary to lay this down, as the *ἔργον* of man is an *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*. Met. viii. 8. p. 186. Ed. Tauchnitz. See also Eth. vii. 12. 3; vii. 13. 2.
- (10.) 5. *παρὰ ταύτας*. Besides and beyond the *ἐνέργειαι*.
- (11.) 5. *ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν*. *ἐπιστήμη* is here used loosely for *systems* or *arts*, such as *ναυπηγική*, *ιατρική*, &c.

CHAPTER II.

- (12.) He here draws his conclusion from the premisses advanced in the last chapter, that the τέλος πρακτῶν, whatever it may be, is the αγαθόν of man.
- (13.) 1. The leading notion in Aristotle's mind is *that man's own nature, with its tendencies and powers, would lead him to happiness*; and this is what he practically states when he says that it is τέλος πρακτῶν. The πρακτά of man are really only the development and exhibition of man's nature and tendencies; and the very presence of these tendencies (δρεξις) implies some τέλος towards which they tend; and the τέλος would be that which most fully comprehended and developed that nature and its δρεξις: hence the leading proposition of his moral system is *that the full and complete development of man's nature is his happiness*. He believed man not only designed by nature to be happy, but contrived for happiness; and that his own constitution would lead him to it, if he would honestly follow it. "This is what the Schoolmen mean when, in their way of expression, they say, *That the will is carried towards happiness not simply as will, but as nature*." Leighton's Lectures on Happiness, II. vol. iv. p. 190, ed. 1830.
- (14.) 1. Εἰ δὴ. δὴ very frequently marks a conclusion in the Ethics. See Grammar, 721, 1.
- (15.) 1. προέσει κ.τ.λ. If the elenchus on which this argument rests be worked out, it will bring us to the key-stone of Aristotle's philosophy: οὐθὲν ἢ φύσις μάτην ποιεῖ. It is always worth while to work out compressed arguments of this sort, as well for the mental exercise, as for the sake of the principles up to which they lead us.
- (16.) 1. κενήν, *empty in itself*; ματαίαν, *without result*.
- (17.) 1. αγαθόν καὶ ἀριστον, the good and the *bravest*, as we say; the same thing (*summum bonum*) viewed under different aspects.
- (18.) 1. δρεξιν. For the senses of δρεξις, see the note 40 on book iii. chap. ii.
- (19.) 2. ἡ γνώσις αὐτοῦ. Mark the word γνώσις, and compare book x. chap. 9. 1, where he speaks of the result of all the

preceding part of his treatise as τὸ γνῶναι. The Ethics is not a mere practical exposition of virtue, and the way to attain to it, but also, and rather, a search after it, and a proof of what it is in its practical, not its speculative, nature. By such expressions as “τέλος οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πράξις,” on which so much stress is laid, it is meant that the Ethics is not a speculative enquiry into the abstract essence of virtue or happiness, without any further object; but a moral enquiry into their *practical* nature as they exist in action, and with a view to it.

- (20.) 3. τύπη γε, at least in an outline, or sketch.
- (21.) 3. τί ποτ' ἐστὶ, *what its nature is*.
- (22.) 3. τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων, to what science or system it belongs. ἐπιστήμη is here both a science and a scientific art, with a definite subject-matter, such as politics, ethics, &c.; δύναμις, an organic art, such as logic or rhetoric, which supplies formulæ, more or less abstract, for any subject-matter. Of course, to whatever system, whether scientific or formal, the good belongs, the knowledge of that science is necessary to its comprehension, and an enquiry into it is necessary to the completeness of that science. Hence πολιτικὴ includes ethics, and ethics is πολιτικὴ τις, a branch of the grand science of politics.
- (23.) 4. Δόξειε δ', *would be held, or allowed, to be*.
- (24.) 4. κυριωτάτης, that to which most authority is given by nature. ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς, that which is most practically directive.
- (25.) 5. φαίνεται, *evidently is*.
- (26.) 5. διατάσσει and ὑπὸ ταύτην refer to κυριωτάτης: χρομύνης and περιέχει ἀντὰ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. —Cf. Pol. 1. 1.
- (27.) 7. τοῦτ' ἀντὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. The ἀγαθόν of man belongs to the science of politics, inasmuch as the end of this science embraces all other ends under it, and therefore is practically the τέλος τῶν πρακτῶν.
- (28.) 8. εἰ γάρ κ.τ.λ. This is one of the instances of omission of the sentence to which γάρ refers, which produces so much difficulty in following Aristotle's arguments. The sentence

must be worked out from the context, and supplied, before the bearing of the reasoning can be perceived. It might have been expected that the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν would belong to ἀνθρωπίνη ἐπιστήμη, and not πολιτική: but this is not so, for in reality ἀνθρωπίνη ἐπιστήμη is the same as πολιτική, and ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν as πολιτικόν ἀγαθόν, being different views of the same thing; but πολιτική is higher than ἀνθρωπίνη, as the πόλις is higher than the individual, resting on higher grounds and aiming at higher results (cf. Eth., bk. vi. 8. 1); and therefore the good may be viewed either as πολιτικῆς τέλος, or πρακτῶν τέλος.

- (29.) 9. τοῦτων, either ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν (= πρακτῶν τέλος,) and πολιτικῆς τέλος (= πολιτικόν ἀγαθόν), or referring back to section 3, τίποτε ἔστι, καὶ τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἡ δυνάμειον. Looking to the beginning of chap. iv., it is probably the former of these.
- (30.) 9. πολιτικὴ τις οὔσα. Being thus connected with politics, and a necessary branch of that science which aims at the happiness of the state, or, in other words, the ἀγαθόν of the individuals composing it, the good of man belongs to the province of politics, and the knowledge of the former is necessary to the completeness of the latter. The Ethics is the accidence of the Politics.

CHAPTER III.

- (31.) Having now laid it down that the ἀγαθόν of man is πρακτῶν τέλος, and that it belongs to the science of politics, he would naturally proceed to the enquiry as to what this πρακτῶν τέλος may be; but he first guards himself against those who would object to his system that it is not demonstrative, and to those who object that it is above their comprehension. The one class would be of the philosophic, the other of the self-indulgent, careless sort.
- (32.) 1. κατὰ, proportionably to.
- (33.) 1. δημιουργουμένοις, works of art. The perfection required differs according to the material, &c.
- (34.) 2. καλὰ καὶ δίκαια, the principles of moral and social right.

- (35.) 2. διαφοράν, difference in different nations. πλάνην, vagueness, even where agreed upon in the general. From this statement we may deduce (parfly) the influence of oracles, whereby the Greek endeavoured to supply the want of some certain standard and guide, and the necessity of revelation to correct and steady false, shifting views.
- (36.) 2. δοκεῖν νόμῳ μὲν εἶναι φύσει δὲ μῆ. The Sophists are here generally alluded to, though, strictly speaking, they held that some καλά were φύσει, others νόμῳ: but that all δίκαια were νόμῳ, and none φύσει. Plato, Legg. 889. As a school, however, they practically get rid of the reality of all natural right and wrong.
- (37.) 3. καὶ τὰ ἀγαθά, the principles and views of human good.
- (38.) 4. περὶ τοιοῦτων, on such subject-matter. ἐκ τοιοῦτων, from such premisses. παχυλῶς, roughly. τοιαῦτα, sc. τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ.
- (39.) 5. ἀκοδέχεσθαι, to listen to the proof: we must, in probable matters, be content with *probability*.
- (40.) 5. πεπειδευμένου. The man of a highly trained mind has the power not only of discerning truth when it is put before him, but of discerning how far truth is attainable: so he only will see that the proofs which Aristotle is about to bring forward give all the proof of which the subject is capable.
- (41.) 6. κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει. This faculty answers to *σύνεσις* in morals. See bk. vi. c. x.
- (42.) 6. ἀπλῶς. The generic sense of ἀπλῶς is "keeping out of sight the circumstances mentioned in the context;" here it is *generally*, leaving out τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.
- (43.) 7. οἰκείος, the proper; the most suitable.
- (44.) 7. τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, moral action.
- (45.) 7. ἑταῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The self-indulgent man will not comprehend the real force of moral reasoning: he may listen to it, and possibly apprehend it with his reason, but it will be ματαίως and ἀνωφελῶς, because it will produce no effect on his practice.
- (46.) 7. ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος κ.τ.λ. It is not implied in these

words that the Ethics is a mere practical exposition of virtue, and how to become virtuous. He does not say that he is not going to pursue the subject of morals with a view to the (as far as may be) scientific knowledge of virtue, but merely that he does not mean his treatise to end in mere knowledge, but in knowledge with a view to action. See last chapter, note 19, and also below, where *εἰδέναι* is spoken of as profitable to those who know how to use it.

(47.) 8. *παρὰ χρόνον*, from time. Gr. Gr. 637. 3, c.

CHAPTER IV.

- (48.) *Resumption of subject.* If there is any agreement among men as to the good, whether viewed as *ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν* or *πολιτικὸς τέλος*, then the question is settled, and Aristotle might at once have proceeded to politics proper, or the consideration of the most perfect way of developing and securing this *ἀγαθόν* by legislation and government; but such agreement does not exist.
- (49.) 1. *ἀναλαβόντες*, *resuming the subject*, after the digression in the last chapter.
- (50.) 1. *γνώσις* refers to *πολιτική*: *προαίρεσις* to *πάντων ἀρότατον τῶν ἀγαθῶν*.
- (51.) 2. *εὐδαιμονία*. Observe the notion implied in this word: compare it with Latin *fortuna*, from *fors*, and our *happiness*, from *hap*.
- (52.) 2. *χαρίεντες*, *the educated*. See Lidd. and Scott.
- (53.) 2. *εὖ ζῆν* refers to abundance of good things; *εὖ πράττειν*, to success and good fortune.
- (54.) 2. *ὑπολαμβάνουσι*, *conceive of*. This is its usual meaning in the Ethics.
- (55.) 3. *ἀποδιδάσκειν*, *explain it*.
- (56.) 3. *παρὰ ταῦτα*, *besides and beyond*. The Platonic Idea is here alluded to.
- (57.) 4. *ἐπιπολαζούσας*, *most popular*. Lidd. and Scott; literally, on the surface.

- (58.) 5. μὴ λαμβάνειτω. It is not to be supposed that Aristotle introduces this passage in the middle of his subject to give us a piece of information which belongs rather to logic, or possibly found a place in his *Methodica*; but being about to examine human opinions as a possible source of truth, it was necessary to vindicate their right to be thus considered, as Plato and his school would look upon such materials as unsound foundations, and inadmissible in the endeavour to build up truth. Aristotle therefore lays down the principle of the analytical and synthetical methods, and claims for each its proper position in true philosophy, quoting Plato himself as an evidence of the existence of both methods. The opinions of mankind are among the phenomena of the world, and a system based on them would be analytical, i.e. analyzing a confused (τὰ συγκεχυμένα: see *Phys.* i. 1. 2.) mass of facts, in order to arrive at the truth implied in them. The words *analytical* and *synthetical* are explained by the Schoolmen, and after them by Aldrich, in a different sense. This is only noticed to prevent students from confusing themselves by trying to explain this passage by what Aldrich says.
- (59.) 5. ἀρχή in the *Ethics* signifies a *starting-point*, whether in reasoning, scientific or moral,—or in action or choice,—or in his treatise.
- (60.) 5. ἀρκτεῖον οὖν—ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡμῖν ἔστω. He claims the right to proceed from ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, from whatever presents itself as γνώριμον, whether matters of human experience, observation, opinion; or ἀπλῶς, abstract principles, prior to and independent of such experience, &c.; that is, whether *à priori* or *à posteriori*. For the difference between γνώριμα ἀπλῶς and γνώριμα ἡμῖν, see *Phys.* i. 1. 2; *Anal. Post.* i. 2. 10.
- (61.) 5. ἴσως οὖν κ.τ.λ. The more usual, because the most accessible, sources of enquiry will be γνώριμα ἡμῖν, τὰ ἐγγύτερα τῆς αἰσθήσεως. The facts of moral life—whether these be the facts of our constitution, or the facts of life, as discernible in the actions, the opinions, language, habits of men, set forth either by the οἱ πολλοί, or the φρόνιμος or σπουδαῖος, or πολιτικός, or πολιτική—all may be bases of truth, and furnish sound ground for further systems. The characteristic of Aristotle's method is that he claims the right to use both methods, as they may be within his reach. When he draws his arguments

from the abstract constitution of nature he uses the former, but when from opinions of men, the latter; but he usually uses the analytical, because most suited to his subject. It is hardly worth while to enquire at length whether the whole of his treatise is one or the other: perhaps, as he begins with the abstract principle of nature that the ἀγαθόν of every thing is in its ἔργον, and proceeds to shew that ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ does perform the ἔργον, he may be in a certain sense synthetical; but we may remark that he seldom or never brings forward an abstract principle without confirming it by experience.

- (62.) 6. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθουσιν. As facts form the groundwork of moral science, and as moral facts are appreciable only by men of good morals, hence a right moral education is absolutely necessary for the profitable study of moral or social subjects, or, to speak generally, of politics.
- (63.) 7. ὁ τοιοῦτος, sc. ὁ καλῶς τοῖς ἔθουσιν ἡγούμενος.

CHAPTER V.

- (64.) He now examines the opinions of men on the subject, to see if they can give a satisfactory answer to his question.
- (65.) 1. ἔθεν, see end of sec. 4, last chapter.—γάρ refers to the difference among the opinions which the last chapter mentions.
- (66.) 2. ὑπολαμβάνειν, *conceive of; form their notions of*.—ἐκ τῶν βίων, *from the different sorts of life*.—φορτικώτατος, *the vulgar*. See Lidd. and Scott ad v.
- (67.) 3. τυγχάνουσι δι' λόγου, *but they obtain consideration, or have a show of reason*.
- (68.) 4. ἐπιπολαϊότερον, *too superficial; too uncertain*.
- (69.) 4. μαντεύμεθα, *we feel*: without going into the reason and proof, we have a sort of instinct about it.
- (70.) 5. γοῦν introduces the proof of a foregoing statement. See Gr. Gr. 737, c.
- (71.) 5. παρ' οἷς, sc. παρὰ τοῖσιν οἷς, *before those by whom, &c.* See Gr. Gr. 822, obs. 1.

- (72.) 6. *θείσις διαφυλάττων*, *maintaining a paradox*. Top. i. 9. 5, p. 107.
- (73.) 6. *ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίσις*. *In my treatise on general subjects*. See Lidd. and Scott ad v. Probably general questions on morals. These were two books of *προβλήματα ἐγκύκλια*, a passage from which is quoted by Aulus Gellius, xx. 4; and from the character of this passage it seems probable that these are the treatises referred to here. See Fabr. Bibl. Græc. iii. p. 392.
- (74.) 7. *ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις*. The next chapter is devoted to a more particular consideration of the supposed *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν*, which is the aim and result of the *βίος θεωρητικός* with respect to the supposed science of happiness. These words are commonly supposed to refer to the discussion in the tenth book; but first, as the doctrine of the *ἰδέα*, which is the principle of speculative philosophy or *βίος θεωρητικός*, is, as a matter of fact, considered in the next chapter, it seems difficult to give any reason why these words should not refer to that chapter. Next, if we take the passages in which the words *ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις* occur, we shall find that they denote a more real and actual connection than between the first and last book of a treatise. Where he refers to some distant part of his book (as in Rhet. i. 10. 5), he generally gives a more distinct description of the part referred to.
- (75.) 8. *τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα*, sc. *ἡδονή—τιμὴ—ἀρετή*.
- (76.) 8. *καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι κ.τ.λ.* The other reading is *καί*, which would mean that Aristotle had wasted many words on them; and as this could hardly be said to be true, therefore *καίτοι* is the better reading. *But even these do not appear to be final; and yet much reasoning has been spent with regard to them, i.e. to prove them to be τέλη*,—not by himself, but by others.

CHAPTER VI.

- (77.) He now examines the opinions of those who look for the good in the *θεωρητικός βίος*, and hold that the only true happiness consists in, and is gained by, the mental realisation of the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν*,—by the science of the good. It would be beside our purpose to go at length into an account of the

Platonic theory of ideas: it is enough to say that the leading feature of it seems to be, that there existed in the Divine mind certain archetypal forms or qualities, which being communicated to, or at least present in, things visible, gave them these qualities, (Phædo, 100, cf. Arist. Met. xii. 5, pp. 269, 270); and that these archetypal ideas being also impressed on the mind of men, were called out by mental exercise; and when they were thus called out, the true qualities of visible things were recognised in their several shapes and forms of existence. Thus a visible thing was good by virtue of the presence in it of the idea of good, and the mind could recognise and enjoy that good only by virtue of the mental development and realisation of the corresponding idea.

- (78.) 1. καθόλου, sc. the Platonic idea, (Met. vi. 13, p. 155); called καθόλου, from its being the result of the highest abstraction. It may be observed that in the Physics, l. i., καθόλου has exactly an opposite meaning, viz. the whole fully exhibited in its details and phenomena.
- (79.) 1. τὰ εἴδη. Here the ἰδέαι, or abstract ideas: when opposed to ἰδέαι, as below, section 10, it seems to mean the concrete to which the ἰδέαι by its presence gives form and quality.
- (80.) 1. ὁσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. This passage probably gave rise to the Latinised saying attributed to Aristotle, "Amicus Plato, amicus Socrates, sed magis amica veritas." Whenever Plato is spoken of, even when his theories are opposed, it is always with respect, and almost affection.
- (81.) 2. There are five ways in which Aristotle meets the doctrine of the ἰδέαι:—
1. By taking some abstract principles of the speculative school, (2—4).
 2. By calling on them to define the difference between the αὐτὸ ἑκαστον and the thing itself, (5—7).
 3. By shewing that their distinction between good independent and good dependent does not help them, (8—11).
 4. By shewing that the common name of "good" does not necessarily imply a common idea, (12).
 5. By shewing that it would be of no practical use, (13—end).

- (82.) 2. He takes as a major premiss, one of the Platonic dogmas, and proves from it that there can be no one abstract idea of good. It would be quite waste of time to enquire either into the meaning of the Platonic dogma, or how far it is true. Aristotle allows, for the purpose of his argument, that it is true, and we may do the same. The argument is a simple negative syllogism in the first figure, and, as well as the other arguments in this chapter, should be worked out in full.
- (83.) 2. *κομίσαντες*. This may be translated *entertaining*. See Lidd. and Scott ad v.
- (84.) 2. *λέγεται*, is *predicated in*; that is, may, as a predicate, express substance or quality, &c.
- (85.) 2. *ἡ οὐσία*. The category of substance. For the other meanings of it,—the essence, the universal, the genus,—see Met. vi. 3, p. 130, where substance is also termed *ὑποκείμενον*: see also Categ. c. 2, and 3, Met. iv. 8, p. 98.—*καθ' αὐτό*. The other categories can only exist *ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ*: they have no independent existence; wherefore *καθ' αὐτό* is a characteristic of *οὐσία*.
- (86.) 2. *παράφυαδι*, *offshoot*; *συμβεβηκότι*, *property*. See Met. iv. 30, p. 119; see also iii. 4, p. 70.
- (87.) 3. *ἡ ἡσυχία λέγεται*, sc. it is predicated in all the Categories. A thing may be spoken of as good in respect of its relation to the end, or the time or place when and where it happened, and so on through the rest. Refer to the end of the second chapter of the Categories.
- (88.) 3. *καιρός*, *opportunity*. This argument is an hypothetical destructive.
- (89.) 4. *ἢ ν ἄν*, sc. if there is an idea of good.
- (90.) 5. An argument to shew that, waiving the question of there being such a thing as *αὐτοῖς ἑκάστων*, the difference between it and the *ἑκάστων* itself is unreal, a mere play upon words; that the Platonists themselves cannot define them in different terms.
- (91.) 5. *καί* is emphatic: how they *even* wish to define, &c.
- (92.) 5. *ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος*. *ἄνθρωπος* and *αὐτοῖς ἄνθρωπος* are defined by the same terms.

- (93.) 6. This is an answer to the argument drawn from the eternity of the αὐτὸ ἕκαστον. The essence of the thing is not altered by its greater or less permanence; that which is white for an instant is as white as that which is white for a thousand years. It may, however, be answered, that permanence being itself a good, a thing which is good for an instant is not so good as that which is so for a thousand years.
- (94.) 7. Σπείσιππος. The nephew and successor of Plato in the Academy, whom Aristotle represents as abandoning, in part at least, the Platonic theory, by making unity an exhibition or phase of good, rather than good a development and phase of unity. See Met. vi. 2, p. 129.
- (95.) 7. ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ. This συστοιχία was a sort of catalogue, or double list, in which ten sorts of good and their corresponding evils were placed over against each other; such as πείρας—ἄπειρον. περιττὸν—ἄρτιον. ἐν—πλήθος. κ.τ.λ. See Met. i. 5, p. 15.
- (96.) 8. τοῖς δι' ἐλεγχέεισι, sc. the arguments adduced by Aristotle. He now takes a modified form of the Platonic theory, which distinguishes between independent and dependent good, and applies the ἰδέα only to the former.
- (97.) 8. καθ' ἐν εἶδος, in one sort.
- (98.) 10. If the goods mentioned above are not independent goods, there can be none such, except the idea; but then the εἶδος, or concrete, in which the form of good seems to reside, is a delusion,—has no reality: and therefore these are goods. (The argument is a sort of elenchus, whereby the consequent is denied, as ἄρτιον): and if these are all goods, properly so called, then the former argument is applicable, that there should be identity of predication. The passage is a sort of hypothetical sorites, depending on a *reductio ad absurdum*.
- (99.) 12. The identity of name, though predicated in different categories, furnishes an argument in favour of there being an ἰδέα of good. Why, if goods thus differ, is the common name "good" applied to each and all? The three reasons given correspond to the later systems of the Realists, Conceptualists, Nominalists. τῷ ᾧ ἐνὸς εἶναι, by virtue of all proceeding

from one, gives that of the Realists; τῷ πρὸς ἐν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, that of the Conceptualists; ἡ μᾶλλον καθ' ἀναλογίαν, that of the Nominalists: and the words ἡ μᾶλλον mark that Aristotle took the last of the three. Of the three systems there is a short, but not on that account a worse, account in Magee on the Atonement, vol. ii. p. 25, note.

(100.) 12. ὁμωνύμοις, Cat. i.

(101.) 15. ἐπιστημαίς, scientific arts; the arts and sciences, as we see from the word τεχνίτας below.

(102.) 15. τὸ ἐνδεές, that which is wanting to their perfection.

(103.) 16. τῇ ὑγίειαν, health in the abstract.

CHAPTER VII.

Having thus in vain sought for a correct notion of the ἀγαθόν in the practical and speculative views of men on the subject, he now proceeds to discover it for himself; and his mode of proceeding of course forms the characteristic feature of his treatise. Instead of imitating former philosophers, who, forming abstract notions of what happiness was, tried to find out what sort of life afforded the widest and surest sphere for it, Aristotle proceeds by stating *what will lead to it*, viz. *that it will be the development of the ἔργον, i.e. of the best and highest tendency or principle of man's nature.*

(105.) 2. μεταβαλὼν, *changing its ground; by a different mode of proof.* In the first chapter the conclusion that πρακτῶν τέλος is the τῶν ἀγαθῶν was arrived at by referring syllogistically to major premisses; here by induction and analogy.

(106.) 3. He now gives some characteristics of the good, whereby εὐδαιμονία is identified with it among the various τέλη in life, as being permanently τέλειον and ἀταρκεῖς, which latter is also a sign of the former; and the conclusion he comes to is that εὐδαιμονία is *perfect*, perfectly developed in itself; *self-contained*, requiring nothing external to complete it; and the highest end of human action.

(107.) 4. διὰ τοῦθ' αἰρετόν. τοῦτο, sc. τὸ μηδέποτε διὰ ἄλλο. There are three divisions:—1. Things sought for their own sake

alone. 2. Things sought only for the sake of something else. 3. Things sought both for their own sake and for that of something else.

- (108.) 5. *δργανα*, *instrumental goods*; which are valuable only as leading to some end.—*νοῦν*, *intellectual power, talent*.

- (108.) 6. τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν, the same result, viz. that εὐδαιμονία is τέλειον, and therefore the good.

- (109.) 6. ἐπεὶ δὲ φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος. Observe this principle, which is the keystone of Aristotle's moral philosophy.

- (110.) 7. τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις, some bound must be placed to these sympathies.

- (111.) 7. εἰσαυθίς, see ch. 11.

- (112.) 8. πάντων αἰρετωτάτην. The highest object of choice, in its own essence, even when in its lowest degree, without any adventitious additions, as compared with anything else; and yet αἰρετωτέραν, in its higher degrees, when increased not in essence or kind, but in degree, by the addition of acknowledged blessings, as compared with itself before those additions. The change produced by the addition of external goods is in degree, not in kind.—μὴ συναριθμουμένην, not reckoned as joined with anything else; *by itself*. The word is used again Rhet. i. 7.

- (113.) 9. λέγειν. This word shews that what he has been doing in the preceding sections is to identify that which is called εὐδαιμονία with the ἀγαθόν.

- (114.) 10. It having been laid down that εὐδαιμονία will be attained by the development of the highest tendency of human nature, it is necessary to discover the ἔργον of man, as this will be the development of his highest and best tendencies; and in it, by a general law of nature, the εἶ of man will be found. We here get at one of the major premisses of the Ethics,—whatever develops the ἔργον, or highest principle or function, of man will be his ἀγαθόν.

- (115.) 10. The terms ἔργον, τέλος, εἶ, δρετὴ, ἀγαθόν, only present different views of the same state. ἔργον, the proper development of the proper nature; τέλος, the same state viewed as in its accomplishment; εἶ, viewed as a simple

excellence; ἀρετή, with the additional notion of obligation or the corresponding one of good desert; ἀγαθόν, with a further notion of good or happiness resulting from it.

- (116.) 10. ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ. We have here again Aristotle's recognition of the wise benevolence of nature, which has provided that everything and being shall find its ἀγαθόν in the due performance of the function assigned to it by its constitution and position; and thus human nature, rightly understood, will lead to human happiness.
- (116.) 11. ἀργόν sc. ἀεργόν, without an ἔργον.
- (117.) 11. πότερον οὖν τέκτονος, argument from analogy.
- (119.) 11. ἡ κάθ' ἅπερ, argument *à fortiori*. If each of the parts has an ἔργον, much more the whole.
- (120.) 12. ζωή is not the same as βίος, *life without*, or *living*, but a *principle of life within*: so the ζωή of man is afterwards stated to be ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια. It may be translated *nature*, in the sense of a principle or part of *nature*; and of course the ἔργον of man will arise from his peculiar ζωή.
- (121.) 12. θρεπτική. In bk. vi. c. 12. 6, he calls θρεπτική the τέταρτον μέρος: the other three being, the intellectual, the moral, and the αἰσθητική.
- (122.) 13. λείπεται marks the conclusion of a disjunctive syllogism, which is implied in what goes before, though not actually stated.
- (123.) 13. πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος, *the life of a rational agent*. It does not mean here *practical*, as opposed to intellectual, nor a life of moral virtue and activity, as opposed to one of contemplation, for in the subdivision of πρακτικὴ ζωή we find the intellectual energies included. It is opposed to θρεπτική and αἰσθητική, and not to διανοητική. It is necessary to observe this, for it was long the fashion to construe this word *practical*, and to make it the link between ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ and εὐδαιμονία.
- (124.) 13. τούτου δι, sc. τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. Of the rational agent one part is receptive of reason, the other is the state and energy of it. ὥς, *as being*.
- (125.) 13. καὶ ταύτης agrees with ζωῆς τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ διανοον-

μένου, implied in the context: since the intellect may exist in a passive state (ἔχον, ἔξις), or as an active energy, διανοούμενον; the ἐνέργεια is preferred to the ἔξις.

- (126.) 13. κυριώτερον. *More properly and essentially* termed the πρακτικὴ ζωὴ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. The word λέγεσθαι is something more than merely spoken of,—rather predicated as a definition; and therefore representing more or less accurately the essence.

- (127.) 14. κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἀνευ λόγου. He does not here choose to define the exact proportion which λόγος holds in this ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς: it may be the governing and directing principle, or it may be merely an ingredient. Below he adds the words μετὰ λόγου.

- (128.) 15. κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν, in accordance with—according to—the excellence proper to and resulting from its nature. It must be observed that ἀρετή here does not mean virtue in its technical sense of *moral virtue*, (for we find it afterwards divided into moral and intellectual,) but *excellence*, whatever it may be.

- (129.) 15. εἰ πλείους κ.τ.λ. The great object, then, of his treatise is to discover what is the highest (ἀρίστη) and most perfectly developed (τελειοτάτη) ἀρετή of man. This furnishes us with the major premiss of the syllogism: "Whatever is the τελειοτάτη ἀρετή develops the ἔργον of man."—τελειοτάτη, that which most perfectly develops the ἔργον. See Met. iv. 16, p. 110.

- (131.) 16. ἐν βίῳ τελεσιώ, implying both sufficiency of time and sufficiency of means, (see below, note 175,) though the pro-verb immediately following applies only to the former.

- (132.) 17. περιγεγράφθω, *be sketched*. ἀναγράφαι, *fill in*. δοξεῖ δ' ἂν παντός κ.τ.λ. *It would seem to be every one's duty, &c.*

- (133.) 18. He now repeats his caution as to the contingent character of his subject, and of the sources whence his phenomena and principles are drawn.

- (134.) 19. ὁρθόν, either γωνίαν, or γραμμήν.

- (135.) 20. τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. In the discussion of first principles the ὅτι is sufficient, for this is itself the

starting-point, beyond which it is not possible to go, and which it is not possible to demonstrate, or to require an *αἰτία* for it; it has its own evidence in itself. See book vi. 6.

- (136). 21. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν κ.τ.λ. Of the various ways in which these generalised facts (*ᾄτι*) are apprehended, Aristotle specifies three which depend more immediately on our senses.

a. αἰσθησις, an immediate perception of, and assent to, a general principle, as soon as suggested to us by the phenomena of nature, or the facts of life, or presented to us by others, (*evidentia*.) to deny which we feel (*μηνενόμεθα*) would be a contradiction of our very reason, or instincts; not the same as, but analogous to, the perception of things by the eye. (Book vi. 8. 9. αἰσθησις οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' ὅτε αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν μαθηματικοῖς ἴσχατον τριγώνον,) hence termed αἰσθησις; such as in mathematics, "Things that are equal to the same are equal to one another." In morals, apart, of course, from religion, the generalised facts thus perceived are, from our inability to see clearly into human nature and human life, but few, and these comparatively uncertain, not in themselves, but in our convictions of them.

Whether these principles are innate and called out by the intellectual energies, or whether they are matters of experience, it is beside our purpose to enquire; it may suffice to say, that the difficulties started by the partisans of each of these theories against the opposite ones, may be disposed of by supposing, what really seems to be the case, that we have innate powers of receiving them from nature, and that nature is fitted to convey them to us; so that wherever the intellect or the heart is in a right state, they are universally received and held, though not themselves innate.

β. ἐπαγωγή. Where the principles are not self-evident, but are the result of experience, or at least require experiment and comparison to confirm them, such as "the ἀγαθόν of everything is contained in its ἔργον." It would be beside our purpose to go into the question of induction.

ἔθισμός, an acquired αἰσθησις, the result of experience and practice, as where an experienced chymist detects laws and properties which escape other men's notice; or as a man accustomed to measurements judges of distance almost instinctively; or where an experienced lawyer sees at a

glance the real point in a case. The (more or less) slow process of induction is superseded and supplied by this acquired power. There is a sort of intuitive and instantaneous induction.—*ἄμα ἐπαγόμενος*. Post. Anal. i. 5, book vi. 8. 9. —*ἡ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς συνήθεια*. See Topics, i. 12. 5.

- (137.) 21. *ἀλλὰ δ' ἀλλως*. This would include all those principles which do not come to us through the medium of *αἰσθησις*, (if any such there be,) but are developed by the reflexive power of the mind in itself, or are deduced from principles already formed, or by analogy; all, in short, where *αἰσθησις* does not directly and immediately come in. It was not necessary for Aristotle to specify these, and claim his right to use them, as Plato would not deny their authority as sources of truth, which he would do in the case of those which depended on *αἰσθησις*. See Phædo, 65, A, sq.; 66, A.
- (138.) 21. *μετείνειν δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Observe the practical wisdom of Aristotle, who does not, on abstract grounds, shut himself out from any sources of truth, but recognises the great principle, that truths are to be sought after according to the nature of their subject-matter. In the Topics, i. 12. 5, p. 110, he gives three heads of *προτάσεις*: *ἡθικαί—φυσικαί—λογικαί*. It is clear that the *ἀρχαί* in these three are not to be sought for in exactly the same way. Much confusion would have been avoided if writers on philosophy had imbibed from Aristotle a little of his comprehensiveness of mind.
- (139.) 21. *ῥησθῶσι, be set out clearly*,—as well in thought as in terms.

CHAPTER VIII.

- (140.) The notions of *εὐδαιμονία* were arrived at in the last chapter from the constitutions of nature, deductively (*ἐκ τοῦ συμπέρασματος καὶ ἐξ ἧν ὁ λόγος*) from the general law that the good of everything consists in the development of its *ἔργον*, and from the particular facts of human nature. He now proceeds (according to his usual practice of combining both the sources of proof, where possible), to shew that the opi-

nions of men agree with what he has laid down. The principal opinions of men are all combined in Aristotle's definition :—

1. Happiness resides in the soul = *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*.

2. Happiness is *ἀρετή* = κατ' ἀρετήν.

3. *ἐκτός εὐημερία* = ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.

4. *ἡδονή* naturally arises from this *ἐνέργεια*.

(141.) 2. *τρεῖς* ἤ. Plat. Legg. 697, B.

(142.) 2. *καλῶς ἂν λείγοιτο*, our definition would hold good.

(143.) 3. οὕτω γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It would belong to the soul, for *πρᾶξις* implies both *ἔργον* (without), and *προαίρεσις* (within),—it is not only an *act*, but an *action*.

(144.) 5. *ἐπιζητούμενα περὶ τὴν κ.τ.λ.* The further questions raised on happiness. The more particular requirements, as distinguished from the more general notions of τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν, or τὰ ἐκτός.

(145.) 5. *τῷ λεχθέντι*, sc. his definition.

(146.) 7. οὐδέτερος κ.τ.λ. The principle here laid down seems to be the true rule in cases where there are two or more different views, each supported by more or less of sound reasoning,—both are true in some points, both wrong in others. It differs from eclecticism, inasmuch as truth is not compromised, but only sifted and harmonised.

(147.) 8. *ταύτης γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* For to this (virtue) belongs the energy according to it.

(148.) 9. *ἐπολαμβάνειν*, to conceive of.

(149.) 9. *ἐξηργηκότες*, in a torpid state.

(150.) 9. οἱ *πράττοντες*, those who are active,—opposed to those who are *ἐξηργηκότες*.

(151.) 10. *τῶν ψυχικῶν*. Pleasure is an affection of the soul, and will arise on all energies thereof, according to the disposition of the agent.

(151.) 11. τὰ *ἡδέα μάχεται*, their pleasures are inconsistent.

(152.) 11. *διὰ τὸ μὴ κ.τ.λ.* Work out the major premiss implied here.

- (153.) 12. *περιάπτου τινός*, as it were an appendage. Lidd. and Scott.
- (154.) 13. *εἰ δ' οὕτω κ.τ.λ.* From *πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις* to *ἄλλων* is in a parenthesis, so that *οὕτω* refers to *ἔχει ἡδονὴν ἐν αὐτῷ*.
- (155.) 13. *ἀλλὰ μὲν καὶ*, further.—*σπουδαῖος*: properly a man who is in earnest,—a man who regards life seriously; hence a good man.
- (156.) 13. *κρίνει ὡς εἶπομεν*: sc. that they are *ἀγαθαὶ καὶ καλαί*. The argument is a simple constructive hypothetical: the hypothetical premiss being, "if the good man judges truly, they are what he judges them;" and the minor depending on a *reductio ad absurdum*, viz., *ἀγαθαὶ καὶ καλαί*, "if he does not judge rightly, who can do so?"
- (157.) 14. *διώρισται*, are not separated from each other.
- (158.) 15. *φαίνεται*, evidently is. He now turns to the opinion of those who hold *ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ* to be happiness.
- (159.) 16. *ᾗθεν*. From this opinion, that *ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ* are happiness, and that the want of these impair it, some identify it with *εὐτυχία*, while others insist on its being *ἀρετή*, intellectual or moral, whereby, as they think, *εὐδαιμονία* is placed above the accidents of life.

CHAPTER IX.

- (160.) 1. *ᾗθεν*. From these two opinions arises a further question as to its attainment. Those who hold it to be intellectual virtue (*σοφία*), say it is *μαθητόν*. Those who hold it to be moral virtue, say it is *ἐθιστόν*, or *ἀσκητόν*. They who hold it to be *εὐτυχία*, say it is *διὰ θείαν μοῖραν*, or *τύχην*.
- (161.) 1. *μαθητόν*. See Plato, Meno 1. In more than one of his dialogues, such as the Protagoras, Euthydemus, &c., Plato holds this opinion. The conclusion to which he comes in the Meno seems to be meant as a piece of irony against the Sophists. See Stallb. Pref. ad Menon.
- (162.) 1. *παράγινεται*, springs up, as it were spontaneously.



- (163.) 4. πολὺκοινωνον, *open to most*; those only excluded who were πεπηρωμένοι πρὸς ἀρετήν.
- (164.) 5. εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν. Observe the reverential belief in the wisdom and benevolence of nature here laid down. τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, the productions of nature. τὰ κατὰ τέχνην, those things which are in the province of art, or any other productive or directive cause (πᾶσαν αἰτίαν), are also produced in the best way (ὁμοίως).
- (165.) 6. πλημμελές, *contrary to analogy*; out of tune with the rest of the creation.
- (166.) 7. ἐκ τοῦ λόγου κ.τ.λ. The question raised, i.e. how far happiness is matter of τύχη, is solved by what has been said; for it has been stated that in its essence it is a mental energy of a certain sort (ποία τις), according to virtue; while of external goods, some only exist, as adjuncts, (τοῖς προσδεῖσθαι τῆς τῶν αὐτῆς εὐημερίας, chap. xi. 17), and others only are of the nature of instruments to it (chap. ix. sect. 15); and if ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖαι κατ' ἀρετήν do not come from τύχη, neither can εὐδαιμονία.
- (167.) 8. τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ, *to what was said at the beginning of the treatise*. This is an argument drawn from the opinions of men, as seen in their practical legislation. The force of the argument lies in ποιῆσαι ἀγαθούς, as shewing that ἀρετή does not come from τύχη.
- (168.) 9. εἰκότως. An argument from the opinions of men, as seen in their modes of speaking of animals and children.
- (169.) 10. The difference between εὐδαίμων and μακάριος seems to be, that in the former the mental state of the person spoken of is the leading notion, his being in possession of that which constitutes happiness; in the latter, it is rather his happiness externally, so to say, in its relation to gods and men,—favoured by the gods, and envied by men. In Rhet. i. 9. 34, μακαρισμός and εὐδαιμονισμός are said to be in themselves the same, but to differ inasmuch as εὐδαιμονισμός implies the possession of ἀρετή, as comprehending ἔπαινος and ἐγκώμιον: and this seems to lead us to the above distinction between μακάριος and εὐδαίμων, which the words *blessed* and *happy* in some degree represent. The distinction, however, naturally enough, is not always observed, and they are often

used indifferently, when it is not required to bring out the proper notion of either one or the other. This will obviate some difficulties from the use of this word in the next chapter.

- (170.) 10. *δεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* The reason of what has just been said is, that the elements of happiness are its essence, *ἀρετὴ τελεία*, and its adjuncts *βίος τέλειος*: for which see the next chapter.
- (171.) 11. *πολλὰ γάρ.* It requires *βίος τέλειος*, for a man's life may change, and, in the opinion of men, his happiness would, under great calamities, change with it.
- (172.) 11. *εὐδαιμονίζει.* This introduces the opinions discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER X.

- (173.) The common feeling of men, to which Solon gave utterance, demands investigation. As the opinions of men were to Aristotle, generally speaking, tests of truth, he had to shew how far, and in what sense, it was true that happiness was not attainable in this life.
- (174.) 1. The questions or difficulties started are:—
1. Are we unable to say that a man is happy as long as he lives?
 2. If so, is he happy when he is dead?—*ἀπορία*; "Happiness is an energy."
 3. Or is it only meant that we can safely say that he is happy when he is dead?
 4. But supposing this, are the events which happen after death to have no influence on his happiness? *ἀπορία*. "But this is contrary to the opinion of men," (*δοκεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*)
 5. But if they have such influence, then the dead man would be at one time *ἀθλιος*, at another *εὐδαίμων*.
- (175.) 6. The three first questions practically resolve themselves into another,—how far external reverses destroy happiness?

This may be solved by observing that εὐδαιμονία consists of its *essence* (ἀρετὴ τελεία), and its adjuncts (βίος τέλειος). The later means a life which has performed or arrived at the end for which it was given, (Met. iv. 16, p. 110); and this evidently is when the energies of happiness are exercised without let or hindrance, (bk. vii. 13. 2, οἰδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη κ.τ.λ.); and to this end we require both sufficiency of time, (μῆκος βίου τελείου, bk. x. 7. 7,) for the development and formation of the intellectual and moral energies, and sufficiency of whatever is necessary or conducive to their exercise; both the presence of those things which are necessary to the calm and continuous exercise of the energies, and the absence of whatever may distract or impede their operation. βίος τέλειος then includes both of these,—sufficiency of *time*, and sufficiency of *external goods*; but these destructible things are not the essence (κύριαι), but only the adjuncts, of happiness, and are necessary, because the world is what it is (πρὸ σδείται δ' αὐτῶν ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος); and therefore they do not affect its real essential existence. Happiness, in its essence, ἀρετὴ τελεία, is indestructible, unless some great blow (Πριαμική τις τύχη) should paralyse the powers and destroy the balance of mind in which ἀρετὴ consists; and where this is the case, a sufficient length of time is required for the restoration of what has been destroyed, before happiness can be re-established. If misfortune takes away χορηγία, happiness, though mutilated and hindered, is not destroyed. Questions four and five may be answered by observing that, as in personal happiness, only the greater fortunes have any influence, so the fortunes of relations are not such as to destroy the happiness of the dead.

- (176.) 1. It is perhaps needless to refer to Herod. i. 32. Solon's opinion, or perhaps the opinions of those who held it in an exaggerated form, are answered by shewing the ἀτοπία which follow, that is, by a *reductio ad absurdum*.
- (177.) 3. εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγομεν,—not λέγομεν. He means, that he does not allow it to be true.
- (178.) 3. μὴ αἰσθανομένην, sc. τῷ ζῶντι.
- (179.) 4. ἀποστήμασι, *removes, generations*.
- (180.) 5. ἀτοπον: that is, supposing that a man cannot be said to be happy till he is dead.

- (181.) 5. τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθεῖν, sc. whether a man cannot be happy as long as he is alive.—τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον, how far the fortunes of descendants influence the happiness of the dead.
- (182.) 7. τὰς τύχας ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι, *the wheel of fortune revolves*.
- (183.) 9. προσδεῖται. Observe the πρόσ, i.e. as adjuncts.—ἀνθρώπινος βίος, the circumstances of human life,—not the ζωὴ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. We might suppose a state where ἀρετὴ τελεία would produce happiness, independently of these accidents.
- (184.) 9. κύριαι, *are the essence*.
- (185.) 9. αἱ ἐναντίαι. The energies of vice are the essence of human misery, (see sect. 13, οὐδεὶς δὲ γένοιτο, κ.τ.λ.) Whenever these compressed forms of opposition occur, it is important to work them fully out, not being contented with carelessly construing ἐναντίον *contrary*, but substituting for it the opposed notion which it represents.
- (186.) 10. τῷ λογῷ, our definition of happiness.
- (187.) 10. ἐνέργειας τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν. It must be recollected that Aristotle is not speaking necessarily of "moral virtue," but the excellence of man, whatever it is.
- (188.) 11. τὸ ζητούμενον, sc. βεβαίότης.
- (189.) 11. ἐμμελῶς, *suitably, gracefully*. See Lidd. and Scott.
- (190.) 12. μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον, i.e. his external life.
- (191.) 12. τὸ μακάριον signifies the state as it is viewed by men externally, without any prominent notion of the ἐνέργεια ἀρετῆς, in which it really consists, though of course it implies these: it is εὐδαίμων viewed from another point. See above, note, 169.
- (192.) 12. τὸ καλόν, the instinctive sense of right,—the principle of ἀρετὴ, and therefore the test of its presence. In the Greek mind, and hence in their language, there was a strong connection between the physically and morally beautiful: so χάρις.
- (193.) 13. τῇς ζωῇς,—not τοῦ βίου,—but the internal life of hap-

piness.—μισσητά, *things of bad desert*. Æschylus has expressed something of the same sentiment, Eum. 550.

- (194.) 14. οὐδείς ἂν γένοιτο κ.τ.λ. τὸ μακάριον implies both the essence and the adjuncts, and therefore, of course, ceases when the adjuncts cease. The εὐδαίμων continues so long as the essence remains, even though the adjuncts be removed: he will not cease to be εὐδαίμων until the essence is destroyed, i. e. until the balance of mind is disordered by some overwhelming calamity, and the inner man becomes incapacitated for the ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι.
- (195.) 14. τελείῳ. βίος τέλειος includes, as stated above, both length of time and sufficiency of means: here it evidently means the former.
- (196.) 15. τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν. He now turns from the point, how far a man is happy while he is alive, to the question how far he may be *called* so.
- (197.) 16. μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπους, happy as men; as far as human life admits.

CHAPTER XI.

- (198.) Having thus settled the first point, by saying that he who has ἀρετὴν τελείαν and βίον τέλειον may be called happy, (always bearing in mind the uncertainty of human things,) he goes to the second question which arises from this, viz. whether the fortunes of descendants or friends affect this happiness and thus prevent our speaking of a man as happy.
- (199.) 1. ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον. This explains why he enters upon this seemingly impractical question. If these δόξαι were right, then happiness would be a shifting unreality, and no man could be secure of attaining to it.
- (199.) 4. διαφέρει. There is much more difference between a calamity happening to a living or to a dead person, than there is on the stage between the actual acting of horrors and the relating them as past.—πρὸ ὕπαρχειν, *be represented as past*. Hor. Ars Poet. 182.

- (200.) 5. ταύτη, i.e. *this difference must be concluded upon in this way, and perhaps still more decidedly* (μᾶλλον ἴσως) *the question whether the dead are sensible of good or evil*, al. ταύτην, which does not make such good sense.—ἐκ ταύτων, *from what has been said*.
- (201.) 5. ἀπὸς, *in themselves*.—ἡ ἐκείνους, or relatively to the circumstances of the dead person;—a great loss of money would not be great if a man had died very rich.
- (202.) 5. εἰ δὲ μὴ: if it is heavy, then, nevertheless, it only touches them (διῶκεῖται, supplied from above,) in such a kind and degree, &c.
- (203.) 6. μὴτ' ἄλλο τῶν ταιαύτων, sc. ἐνπραξιῶν ἢ δυσπραξιῶν τῶν φίλων.—μὴ δὲν, sc. φαίνεται συμβᾶλλεσθαι κ.τ.λ.

CHAPTER XII.

- (204.) 1. Having thus disposed of the current opinion that happiness was unattainable, he now shews that it does not depend on human opinion, (ἐπαινετόν,) but has an independent value and existence (τίμιον). It was necessary that he should do this at once, for it would have been useless for him to have disproved the popular opinion about it, if, in its own nature and existence, it depended on popular opinion. We must every now and then remember, that what may be termed the philosophical cant of the day obliged Aristotle to enter on questions and to use reasoning of which we do not see the necessity or the force: such men he was obliged to meet on their own ground, and argue with them from the positions and dogmas which they admitted. At first sight it would seem as if this characteristic of εὐδαιμονία would have been discussed most properly in the sixth chapter, with τέλειον, αὐταρκές, &c.; but what is said above shews that there is a reason for its occupying this place.
- (205.) 1. δυνάμεων, things merely instrumental to good or evil; which have no definite character, but may be either good or bad. It must either exist as a good subjectively,

(ἐπαινεῖν), or as a good objectively, (τίμω); for it is not one of those things which may be either good or bad as it is directed by *δρεξεις* or *προαίρεσις*. See Met. viii. 5, p. 180, *ἐκείναι δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων κ.τ.λ.*; and xi. 2, p. 241, *τὴν ὕλην δυναμένην ἀμφω κ.τ.λ.*

- (206.) 5. Eudoxus (who in Aristotle represents the Epicurean philosophy) argued as follows:—Whatever, being a good, is not praised, is the highest good. Pleasure, being a good, is not praised: pleasure is the highest good.
- (207.) 5. *συνηγορῆσαι*, to act as advocate for; to plead in favour of.
- (208.) 7. *τοῖς πεπονημένοις περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια*, those who have laboured on the subject of encomium. *πεπονῆσθαι*: see next chap. sect. 2.
- (209.) 8. *ἀρχήν*. The final cause is in one sense the starting-point of action.
- (210.) 8. *ταύτης γὰρ χάριν κ.τ.λ.* Observe this principle.

CHAPTER XIII.

- (211.) There are not many difficulties which require explanation or remark in this chapter.
- (212.) 5. *κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν*: our purpose at the beginning of our book, which was not merely *ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν*, but also *πολιτικῆς τέλος*.
- (213.) 9. *ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις*. Aristotle's treatises in general have been sometimes divided into *ἐσωτερικοί* and *ἐξωτερικοί*, and certain subjects placed in the one division, and others in the other; but the difference lay not so much in the *subject-matter*, as in the way of treating it. *Οἱ ἐξωτερικοί* λόγοι treated it in a familiar, popular way, and were probably used by Aristotle in his more public disquisitions; while the *ἐσωτερικοί* λόγοι went more into the realities and principles of things, and were used by Aristotle in his exposition to his more select circle of disciples. And that Aristotle had a twofold way of treating the same subject,—one a superficial,

popular method, the other more mysterious and deep,—may be gathered from the correspondence with Alexander, (Aulus Gell. bk. xx. 5;) where Aristotle, being reproached by Alexander with having divulged to the world the mysteries of his philosophy, answers that what he had said would only be understood by those who had heard his more secret expositions. The passage in Aulus Gellius should be referred to.

(214.) 10. τῶ λόγῳ, *nominally*.

(215.) 12. οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη, not peculiar to man, *quoad* man.

(216.) 13. πλὴν εἰ πῃ κτλ. Mark his notion of the origin of dreams,—as if they were the vibrations of our waking feelings.

(217.) 13. τυχόντων, *ordinary men*.

(218.) 15. ἀτεχνῶς καθάπερ: so the Platonic ἀτεχνῶς ὡσπερ, *just like*. See Lidd. and Scott ad v.

(219.) 17. σώφρωνος καὶ ἀνδρείου: these are mentioned as being the most important virtues; one being of the concupiscible, the other of the irascible, part of the διλογον.

(220.) 18. ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικόν: ὀρεκτικόν would include the impulses of the irascible as well as the concupiscible part.

(221.) 18. τῶν μαθηματικῶν: as we apply the terms εἶχεν λόγον to the intellectual energies of a scientific man. This is an argument drawn from language.

(222.) 19. κυρίως, *in a proper sense*.

(223.) 20. τῶν εἰσέων τὰς ἐπαινετάς κτλ. This is a property of virtue, and a test of it,—not part of its essence, but joined to it; and this is a good instance of a definition τοῦ διορίζειν, as distinguished from one τοῦ δεικνύναι οὐσίαν. The standard of obligation—that whereby obligation and actions were to be weighed was in Aristotle's system εἰπαινος,—not the mere praise and blame of a fickle multitude, the whim of the moment, the mere passing breath of a mob, but the sentence of the collective conscience of mankind; and as, in Aristotle's system, obligation was owing to man in a social state (πόλις), so it followed that the collective voice of man should be the standard of obligation; just as conscience, or the voice of Him to whom our obligation is due, is to us the standard of actions.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

IN this book he discusses the nature of human virtue generally, and, with the exception of the first section, the practical nature of moral virtue; proving it to be a *μεσότης* or *μείση ἔξις*, preparatory to shewing that it develops the *ἔργον* of man as a social being.

- (1.) 1. Of neither part of the soul is the perfection given us by nature, but it is the result of our own exertions and training.
- (2.) 2. *ἐξ ἰθούς*. An argument from the opinions of men expressed by etymology; so also *σωφροσύνην*, i. e. *σώζωσαν τὴν φρόνησιν*, bk. vi. 5. 5. *δίκαιος*, from *δίχα*, v. 4. 9.
- (3.) 2. It is worth while to work out these arguments syllogistically. The first is in the second figure, with the major premiss supported by some of the particulars of the induction, which it implies, stated as examples.
- (4.) 3. *παρὰ φύσιν*, contrary to nature. *πεφυκόσι*, fitted by nature for it. So Cicero uses *natus*. This fitness consists in the *φυσικὴ ἀρετή*, which will be treated of more at length in bk. vi. chap. 13. So Cicero, *Tusc. Quest.* iii. 1, *semina virtutum*. The passage is worth referring to.
- (5.) 4. *ἔτι ὅσα κ.τ.λ.* Another syllogism in the second figure.—*κομίζομεθα*, we enjoy.
- (6.) 5. Argument from the opinions of men, as expressed in legislation.—*καὶ διαφέρει κ.τ.λ.* Observe this test of a good constitution and government.—*ἐθίζοντες*, gerundial participle—by habituating them.
- (7.) 6. *ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.*, from the same source, (viz. *πάθη*, &c.) and by similar means, (viz. actions). An argument consisting of a simple statement of a fact, supported by the analogy of the arts.
- (8.) 6. *φθείρεται*, i. e. *πᾶσα γίνεται κακία*. This word is used because the notion in Aristotle's mind was the destruction of

φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ, or the ἀρχή of right action. See bk. vii. chap. 8, sect. 4.

- (9.) 7. *δργαί*. The *δργαί*, though coming under *θυμοεῖδες*, (see Top. iii. 7. p. 133,) are to be distinguished from *θυμός*, which has *κίνδυνος* for its object, the principle or source of bravery, in its various shapes; while *δργαί* are those emotions of resentment which have *δλιγωρία* for their object, and are the sources of *πράτης*: *θυμός* is rather opposed to *ἡδονή* or *ἐπιθυμία*—see chap. iii. 10,—*δργή* to *φιλία* or *πράτης*.
- (10.) 7. *δμοίως*: similar, that is, to the energies of the habit itself.
- (11.) 8. *κατὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*, i. e. for on different energies different habits result.

CHAPTER II.

- (12.) Moral virtue being thus the result of action, it is necessary to find out the rule of action wherein the virtue consists; and this as well in order that we may find out the practical nature of virtue, as that we may learn how to become virtuous.
- (13.) 1. *παροῦσα πραγματεία, the present treatise*.—*οὐ θεωρίας ἔνεκα*. There is nothing in what Aristotle says here to justify the assertion that his Ethics is *merely* a practical explanation of and guide to virtue. It really is a scientific treatise, or a proof that virtue is the *ἔργον* and *ἀγαθόν* of man, and intended to have a practical result upon life. It is not a mere speculative enquiry into the abstract nature of virtue, for the sake of *θεωρία*, and nothing more, the result of which might be some such definition of it, as that it was the agreement of man's soul with the Divine will, or the intercommunion of the soul with the Divine nature, or the soul being in harmony with the intentions and will of nature, without any further result, such as *Disciplina Theoretica* (*ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι*), the science of mathematics, or metaphysics; but an enquiry into its *pure practical* nature, as exhibited in and governing action, and capable of being carried out by any one who will.

- (14.) 1. *κύριαι*, they decide.
- (14.) 2. *κατὰ μὲν ὁρθὸν λόγον. κατὰ*, in conformity with; in obedience to. The sense of *κατὰ*, according to, will vary, as that to which it is applied is viewed as a lifeless pattern or a living agent; it gives the prepositions great clearness of expression to bear this principle in mind.—*ὑποκείσθω*. This may be laid down for the present as a general (*κοινόν*) definition; and he will afterwards enquire into it more accurately: but it is not sufficiently particular and practical for his present purpose, therefore he proceeds to investigate its actual phenomena, as seen in action. Another reading, of equal authority, is *ὑπεκείσθω*: but *ὑποκείσθαι* is the Aristotelian word, which he uses to lay down what he means to be a settled fundamental definition or point, or at least one which does not need at present further discussion.
- (15.) 2. *ἥστερον*, bk. vi.
- (16.) 3. *οὐδὲν ἰστηκὸς ἔχει*, have nothing fixed. He does not mean in themselves, (objectively,) but in our perception and application of them, (subjectively).—*τὰ ἐν πράξεσι*, morals. *τὰ συμφέροντα*, politics, and *τὰ ὑγιεινά*, that is, the whole moral and physical nature of man. He again insists on the uncertain nature of his subject, because he is again about to refer to the shifting particulars of human action. He is anticipating the objection that his science was no science at all, owing to its not arriving at certainty.
- (17.) 3. *ὑγιεινά*. Aristotle's early medical education makes him delight in medical illustrations.
- (18.) 4. *τοῦ καθόλου λόγου*, the question in general.—*ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος*, the question when it goes into particulars.—*παραγγελίαν*, professed system of instruction. The *παραγγελίαι* were the promises held out by professors, and especially the Sophists, to make their pupils (or victims) perfect in such and such a subject.
- (19.) 4. *αὐτοὺς*, the agents themselves.—*τὰ περὶ τὸν καιρὸν*, the circumstances of each particular act.
- (20.) 6. *τοιαῦτα*, i. e. *τὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι*. Observe *πέφυκεν*.—*φθειρισθαι*, to be brought into a bad state.—*τῶν ἀφ' αὐτῶν*, sc. this moral virtue, into the nature of which he is enquiring.

This is a simple statement of the principle of argument from analogy.

- (21.) 6. *σύμμετρα*, the exact point or quantity.
- (22.) 7. *σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας*. These two virtues are here and elsewhere particularised, because the former is the ἀρετή of the concupiscible, the latter of the irascible, (θυμοεἶδες,) part of our nature. They are frequently thus joined by Plato. See also ἀνδρεία, bk. iii. chap. 6.
- (23.) 8. οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις κ.τ.λ. Butler's theory of active impressions and active habits will illustrate much of what Aristotle says in this and the following chapter.—αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αἱ ἀνέξεις, habits of virtue are formed; φθοραί, habits of vice.
- (24.) 9. καὶ γινόμενοι, *when we are so*.

CHAPTER III.

- (25.) 1. When pleasure results from our acting in any particular way, apart, of course, from the consequences of the action, (αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων,) it is a sign of the habit being formed; and for this reason: pleasure being the result of energising according to our nature, (κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, Rhet. i. 10,) and habit being a second nature, it follows that pleasure results from it as a matter of course;—and again, virtue being the right regulation of our pleasures and pains, and vice the wrong regulation thereof, it follows that in either case pleasure (good or bad) will wait on the actions proceeding from a good or bad habit.
- (26.) 1. τοῖς ἔργοις, *acts*, as distinguished from *actions* (πράξεις): the latter imply προαίρεσις.
- (27.) 1. περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας: not merely *about* pleasure and pain, but the regulation of pleasures and pains,—of the impulses and checks of the compound principle of the higher self-love; one urging us to, the other keeping us from, certain actions. To each of the πάθη, which are the sources of the several ἀρεταί, there is an ἡδονή or λύπη attached to the

gratification, and another ἡδονή or λύπη arising from the sense of καλόν or αἰσχρόν, which balance one another; and when these are rightly balanced or regulated, right action follows. (See the particular virtues.) It must be remembered that ἡδονή has a twofold sense: it is either the feeling, tendency, instinct which is the *motive* cause of action, or the satisfaction which is the *final* cause of action; or perhaps the two may more properly be said to be the same thing looked at from a different point of view: at all events, they imply each other; but there are some passages where the context requires one notion or the other to be more prominently brought out. Aristotle insists on δρετή being περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπας, because Plato would give a different view of moral virtue, which he would make to consist in the subordination of the irascible to the rational, and the total subjection of the concupiscible; and therefore Aristotle takes pains to prove that the subject-matter, the raw material, as it were, of δρετή is the several ἡδοναί and λύπαι attached to our nature. See Plato, Rep. 411, 442; Phædo, 68, c.

(28.) 1. The proofs given are eight:—

1. They are the motive causes of human action.
2. They are the results of human action, in the regulation of which δρετή consists (3).
3. In governments, pleasure and pain, in the shape of rewards and punishments, are used to counteract vice, and to encourage virtue; and as all remedies act by contraries, it shews that what punishments are used to counteract is pleasure, what rewards are used to counteract is pain: therefore, in the opinion of men, the regulation of pleasures and pains produces right action (4).
4. They are the productive causes of virtue and vice (5).
5. They comprehend all the final causes of human action (6, 7).
6. They are innate principles of our nature (8).
7. They are, more or less, the practical standards and rules of action (9).
8. Virtue is either περὶ θυμόν, or περὶ ἡδονήν: it is more difficult to grapple with and subdue the latter, and therefore δρετή is περὶ ἡδονήν (10).

(29.) 2. ὥς δὲ Πλάτων φησίν. Legg. 653, where he speaks

of the ἀρετή of children as consisting in a right perception of ἡδονή and λύπη: φρόνησις and ἀληθείς δόξαι being the privilege of a more advanced stage of life. In the cultivation of this right αἴσθησις of pleasure and pain consists παιδεία. The passage should be referred to.

- (30.) 4. αἱ κολάσεις. Observe this notion of the true nature and object of punishments, as being *ιατρῆαι*.—δεῖ δὲ τῶν ἐναντιῶν: see bk. x. 9, 10.
- (31.) 5. πρότερον: see last chap., sect. 8.—πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχει, is of a nature corresponding to these, and has these for its subject-matter.
- (32.) 5. ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται, or in as many points as reason distinguishes in such matters.
- (33.) 5. ὀρίζονται, sc. the Cynics, and after them the Stoics, to whose view Plato somewhat approaches, when he speaks of the perfection of the passions consisting in their total subjection to reason. Speusippus used the term ἀοχλησία to express ἀπάθεια.
- (34.) 5. ἀπαθείας καὶ ἡρεμίας, states of freedom from affections, and of repose. See Butler, Sermon v. p. 82:—"In general, experience will shew that as the want of natural appetite to food supposes and proceeds from some natural disease, so the apathy the Stoics talk of, as much supposes or is accompanied with something amiss in the moral character, in that which is the health of the mind." And yet there was truth in it, if they had but said freedom from certain affections, at certain times or ways, &c.
- (35.) 7. τριῶν δυνάμεων κ.τ.λ. These are the three final causes of human action,—duty, advantage, pleasure: the last comprehends all, for the other two present themselves to us (φαίνεσθαι) as objects of pursuit under the shape of ἡδὺ of different sorts. To the καλόν is attached the ἡδὺ of good desert, whereby it operates on us as a motive. These three motives, when viewed in their highest character, are identical in every action of the really good man: a true duty, a true and real expediency, and a true and right pleasure, coincide, just as truly as the piety and benevolence and self-love of Butler.
- (36.) 7. αἰσχρὸν is not merely *shameful* or *base*, but rather *bad*.

As καλόν is the concrete of ἀρετή, so αἰσχροὺς is the concrete of κακία, and implies a breach of moral obligation, viewed as if it were a deformity.

(37.) 9. τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν, the whole matter.

(38.) 10. χαλεπώτερον. The argument seems to be,—virtue must be a regulation of ἡδονή or θυμός, and of these ἡδονή is to be preferred. This refers to Plato's notion, that ἀρετή consisted in the submission of θυμός to λόγος, and the suppression of ἡδονή by the combined efforts of these two; making it belong to the irascible rather than the concupiscible part of our nature.

(39.) 10. Ἡράκλειτος: Heraclitus's saying was χαλεπὸν γὰρ θυμῷ μάχεσθαι. Pol. v. 11.

(40.) 10. τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ, Ethics and Politics.

(41.) 11. μὴ ὡσαύτως γενομένων, i.e. as those whence virtue springs.

CHAPTER IV.

• (42.) It is necessary to modify, or at least explain, what was laid down as to acts producing habits, for the analogy of the arts would seem to suggest that he who does acts of virtue is already virtuous.

(43.) 2. ἢ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν κ.τ.λ. This is an example of the modes of refuting an argument from analogy,—either by denying the resemblance of relations on which the argument is founded, or the fact which it is attempted to apply from one side of the analogy to the other: here both are used. It is denied that, in the case of the arts, a mere act makes a man an artist; and even if it did, the arts and virtue do not stand on the same ground, (ἔτι οὐδὲ ὁμοίον ἐστίν): the productions of art are artistic, whatever may be the mental state of the artist; while real acts of virtue imply and presuppose a particular mental state and intention, (πὺς ἔχων).

(44.) 3. πὺς ἔχοντα, of a certain sort.

- (45.) 3. ἀμετακινήτως, i. e. whenever occasion offers; so, "pray without ceasing."
- (46.) 3. τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας. This does not mean that the virtues are arts, nor is τέχνας used for ἔξεις; but τὰς ἄλλας is used in the sense of, "to the others above-mentioned, the arts;" ἄλλας agreeing with τέχνας by attraction. Michelet illustrates it by the French "*nous autres hommes*."—συναριθμεῖται, taken into account.
- (47.) 6. ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον, to reasoning, theories.

CHAPTER V.

- (48.) 1. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα. Some editions, following the majority of MSS., omit these words. He here distinctly enters upon the enquiry τί ἐστὶν ἀρετή, though in chap. 2 he had said, οὐ γὰρ ἴν' εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, σκεπτόμεθα. It need only be repeated that it is into the practical, actual nature of ἀρετή that he enquires, and not into its abstract essence, such as the agreement of the soul with the will of God, &c. See note 13.
- (49.) 1. ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τρία. These are three phases or shapes which the soul possesses or assumes;—looking at the moral part of the soul, it presents itself to us as a simple δύναμις, (susceptibility of anger,) or as that δύναμις called into being, (πάθος, anger,) or the habitual operation of that πάθος (ἔξεις, πραότης). Ho here uses ψυχὴ for the ἄλογον part of it; for though reason is a δύναμις, the energy of reason, or διάνοια, is not a πάθος: and therefore, if we were here to include the intellectual under the term ψυχὴ, it would not be true that these were only τριὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.—δυνάμεις. See Met. iv. 12, p. 103; viii. 1, p. 175.
- (50.) 1. The argument of the chapter is a disjunctive, the particulars (denied in the minor) being disproved in the second figure.
- (51.) 2. πρὸς τὰ πάθη, with regard to the πάθη, their nature and objects.
- (52.) 3. ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα, argument from opinions of men, expressed in their modes of speech.

- (53.) 4. προαιρέσεις τινές, acts of προαίρεσεις.
- (54.) 5. πάσχειν, to be affected.
- (55.) 6. λείπεται. Observe this form for the conclusion of a disjunctive syllogism. Though ἔξεις may be translated *habite*, it must not be forgotten that it is not a mere phrase, but implies the notion of a state, consisting in certain principles, or operations, or actions: thus ἔξεις διανοητική is the mental exercise of certain powers, and the conscious possession of certain truths; ἔξεις ἠθική is the possession of certain moral principles, and the operation of certain moral powers. In all such words it is important to realize to ourselves what they imply, so that the familiarity of the word may not deprive it of meaning.

CHAPTER VI.

- (56.) 1. ποίει τις, in logical language, *the difference*.
- (57.) 2. ῥητὶον οὖν. Observe his definition, or rather his description, of ἀρετή generally. This furnishes us with a test of ἀρετή; it is the development of (ἀποτελεῖ) that of which it is the ἀρετή, so that it is in a good state, (αὐτὸ εὖ ἔχον,) and produces goodness of operation, (καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν): whatever does this, looking to the constitution and final causes of the thing or being in question, is its ἀρετή. Whatever, then, does this for man, looking to his nature, and the intentions of nature respecting him, is his ἀρετή; and the standard of this is (as he told us in the last book) ἔπαινος, or the opinion of men. See note 223, bk. i. Michelet quotes from Cicero, De Leg. i. 8, "*est autem virtus nihil aliud quam in se perfecta et ad summum perducta natura*. ἀρίτη is connected with ἄρης; warlike strength and courage being, in the earlier generations of the world, the most esteemed excellence.
- (58.) 3. ἀγαθός is the concreto of ἀρετή, when applied to persons, as καλός is, applied to actions.
- (59.) 4. πῶς, i. e. by repeated action.—ἡδὴ, bk. ii. 4. 3.

- (60.) 4. $\phiύσις$. This word is used in Aristotle in various ways, just as the designs and operations of nature may be recognised in various parts of the universe, and in different stages of the development of any being. See Met. iv. 4, p. 90. Thus—1. In its widest sense, $\phiύσις$ is the point up to which Aristotle could trace the governing power of the universe, and is spoken of as being that governing power, full of wisdom, benevolence, and intelligence. 2. $\phiύσις$ is used to signify that subdivision of this nature in the widest sense, which is opposed to $ἀνάγκη$ and $τύχη$, the *general* order of nature. See bk. iii. 3. 7; vi. 4. 4. 3. When speaking of the nature or constitution of any being or thing, $\phiύσις$ is used—*a*, for the properties and tendencies which that being or thing possesses, (Phys. ii. 1. 10); *b*, for the energies thereof, (Phys. ii. 1. 14); *c*, for the perfection thereof, (Phys. ii. 2. 8; Pol. i. 2).
- (61.) 4. $συνεχὲς καὶ διαίρετον$, in everything which has parts and is divisible; in everything, that is, which implies the notion of quantity. The proper sense of $συνεχὲς$ is continuous, where the parts or members of the thing spoken of follow in regular succession on each other, such as the parts of a line, or a solid body; while $διαίρετος$ is where there is no such succession or continuity of actual parts, as in numbers; so that these two words may be taken as opposed, and expressing two different sorts of magnitudes,—“in everything which is continuous, and in everything which is not continuous;” but it seems better to take them as expressing together the characteristics of all magnitudes. In the notion of continuity is implied the notion of parts, and $διαίρετος$ may simply be translated *divisible*; and so the Paraphrast (quoted by Michelet) takes it. Any $πάθος$ and $πῶξις$ may both be viewed as containing parts and divisible, both in regard of time and degree.
- (62.) 5. $τοῦτο$, the latter, i. e. $τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς$.
- (63.) 9. $ἐπιστημῇ$, here used loosely for “*system*,” which proceeds on rules, as distinguished from empiricism, which acts without rules.
- (64.) 9. $ἡ δὲ ἀρετή$, argument *à fortiori*.— $ἀκριβεστέρα κ.τ.λ.$, “proceeds more upon rules.”

- (65.) 10. ὅλως ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι. In all of the affections given above there is a principle of pleasure or pain, and this it is which is really regulated by the ἀρετή: it is important to keep this in mind, in order to understand the real meaning of ἀρετή being περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας.
- (66.) 13. μεσότης ἀρα κτλ. He here gets to his full definition of ἡθικὴ ἀρετή.—μεσότης, viewed with regard to the mental state implied by εἶς, and when ἀρετή is viewed as being περὶ πάθη, is a balance of the compound principle of self-love, pleasure and pain, which finds place in each of the several πάθη. If ἀρετή is viewed as being περὶ πράξεις, (which are also implied in εἶς,) then it is a mean point in action, equally removed from the too much and the too little; in the former sense it is στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου, in the latter it is τὸ μέσον itself.
- (67.) 14. ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόριοι εἵκαζον, *figured it*. See Met. i. 5. τοῦ ἀπείρου is a characteristic of the ἀπειρον.
- (68.) 15. ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσσει. He makes the λόγος of the φρόνιμος the standard,—φρόνιμος, the morally wise.
- (69.) 16. εὐρίσκειν καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι: the former is an effort of the understanding, the latter of the will.—ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι. See above, note 66.
- (70.) 17. τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, the definition declaring its essence,—the τὸ εἶναι τὸ τί ἦν, *the being that which it was laid down to be*, (see Gr. Gr. 398, 4,) as conceived of in the mind, the notion we form of it, as distinguished from that which it is in actual nature, (τί ἐστί). See Anal. Post. ii. 6. 1.
- (71.) 17. ἀκρότης: in itself it is a μεσότης; in relation to all other moral states it is an ἀκρότης.
- (72.) 18. εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα κτλ., *are connected, as soon as named, with the notion of badness*; imply in their very names the notion of badness; instead of συνειληπται εὐθὺς ὠνόμασμένα. This interchange of the finite verb and participle is not uncommon in Greek, in certain phrases. See Gr. Gr. 696, obs. 7.
- (73.) 18. λίσσεται τῷ φαῦλα εἶναι. Bekker reads (on the authority of two MSS.) ψίσσεται; but the words, as they

stand, have a definite meaning: "all such are predicated of (as bad) by virtue of their essential and moral badness," (τῷ εἶναι φαῦλα).

- (74.) 18. ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ κ.τ.λ., sc. λέγονται φαῦλαι.
- (75.) 18. ἐν τῷ ᾧ δέῃ κ.τ.λ., "in the category of the proper person, or time, or mode, as in the case of anger."
- (76.) 19. ὁμοίον οὖν κ.τ.λ., "it is the same as if one was to lay it down that there is a mean," &c.
- (77.) 19. ἔσται γὰρ οὕτως: every ὑπερβολή and ἑλλειψις would, on this supposition, have a ὑπερβολή, μεσότης, ἑλλειψις in itself.
- (78.) 20. διὰ τὸ μέσον εἶναι πως ἄκρον: the notions of ὑπερβολή and ἑλλειψις are excluded from ἀνδρεία, (for example,) because, though a μέσον, it is also an ἄκρον or ἀκρότης, a fixed point of perfection. A man cannot have too little ἀνδρεία, or too much, and still be ἀνδρεῖος; so those states or actions in the other extreme, which are fixed points of badness, are not bad from being in ὑπερβολή or ἑλλειψις, but simply from their own nature. A man is not ἀδικος from being too much so, but simply from being so at all.

CHAPTER VII.

- (79.) 1. κενώτεροι: another reading is κοινότεροι, which would mean that such arguments have a wider application, and thus have their advantages, but particular arguments are more accurate and true; while if κενώτεροι be read, there is no opposition between the two clauses: κοινός is used in this sense in ch. ii. 2, κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω; and Michelet quotes De Anima, i. 1. The Paraphrast undoubtedly read κοινώτεροι.
- (80.) 1. διαγραφῆς, a sketch, a table, or tabular view: the latter is the best. This table should be drawn out.—ἐπὶ τοῦτων; "in the case of these particulars" the universal arguments must hold true. Gr. Gr. 633, 3, c.
- (81.) 2. It will be found that each of these several μεσότητες is a regulation, or balance, of the various instincts of pleasure and pain—the impulses to, and the checks from, certain

actions—by the *καλόν*, which acts by virtue of the pleasure attached to it, (see bk. iii. note 15.) or by the pain attached to the *αἰσχρον*. These *μεσότητες* are, as we shall see more fully in the following books, regulations of the instincts, of *θυμός*, of bodily pleasure, of love of money, of love of power, social instincts, and of the sense of shame, which constitute the heart of man.

- (82.) 2. *φόβους καὶ θάρρη*. There seem to be four vices belonging to this *μεσότης*, as also to the *δόσεις καὶ λήψεις τῶν χρημάτων*, but in reality there are only two; but these may be looked at from different points of view. There are two instincts (*φοβός* and *θάρρη*) belonging to this *μεσότης*, (from either of which it may proceed,) which exist in different degrees of strength in different constitutions, though the former is by far the most common, and therefore, in the particular discussion of *ἀνδρεία*, it is viewed almost exclusively as a regulation of *φόβος* by *καλόν*: but as one or the other instinct is viewed as the motive cause, the extremes are called the excess and deficiency of either the one or the other.
- (83.) 2. *πολλά ἐστὶ ἀνῶνυμα*. Human language not having recognised them, is a sign that practically they never, or at least very rarely, exist. *φόβος* is an universal instinct.
- (84.) 3. *ἤττον περὶ τὰς λύπας*. Temperance consists rather in acts of abstaining from pleasure than endurance of pain; hence, in the third book, it is almost exclusively treated as *περὶ ἡδονάς*. See bk. iii. 10. 1.
- (85.) 3. *οὐ πᾶν*, not at all. Soph. Œd. Col. 142.
- (86.) 6. *διαθίσεις* = *ἔξεις*.
- (87.) 8. *περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσα*, having its difference in being about small things.
- (88.) 10. *ὑφηγημένον τρόπον*, literally, in the way which is our guide.
- (89.) 11. *ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν κ.τ.λ.*: that is, that this *μεσότης* is the *ἀρετή* of the moral part of the soul; for he has before laid down *τῶν δὲ ἔξεων τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς καλοῦμεν* as his standard of *ἀρετή*.—*ἐπαινετέον*, object of good desert; *ψεκτά*, objects of bad desert.
- (90.) 14. *ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι*, in the mere affections, which are not

exhibited in any definite πράξις. Thus αἰδώς is an instinct rather than a virtue; νέμεις and ἐπιχαιρεκακία are feelings.

(91.) 16. ἀλλ' ὅθι, sc. Rhet. ii. 9.

(92.) 16. οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται, is not spoken of in one sense only.

CHAPTER VIII.

(93.) This chapter and the next are rather practical: having shewn his ἡθικὴ ἀρετή to be a μεσότης, he gives us practical directions as to its attainment.

(94.) 1. πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντικεῖνται πως. σωφροσύνη, for instance, is opposed to ἀκολασία; ἀκολασία is opposed to ἀναισθησία.

(95.) 2. ἀπωθοῦνται, *push him further from themselves*.

(96.) 6. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον κ.τ.λ. Each virtue being the regulation of the impulse of ἡδονή, by the check of λύπη, or *vice versa*, the extreme, which is an exaggeration of the regulating principle, is less opposed to the mean than the other: thus in ἀνδρεία, the λύπη (φόβος) is regulated by the ἡδονή, (θάρρος, arising from a sense of καλόν,) and hence θρασύτης, which is an exaggeration of θάρρος, is nearer ἀνδρεία than δειλία: so in σωφροσύνη, the ἡδονή is regulated by the λύπη arising from a sense of αἰσχρόν, making us decline pleasure; and hence ἀναισθησία, which is an exaggerated form of declining pleasure, is less opposed to σωφροσύνη than ἀκολασία.

(97.) 7. ὁμοιότερον. See last note.

(98.) 8. ἐτέρα δ' ἐξ ἡμῶν. The passion which, from our constitution, is the one which rises up first within us, is the one to be regulated; and therefore, from what was said in note 96, the extreme, which is the development of this emotion, is more contrary to the mean than the other, which is only the regulating principle carried too far.

(99.) 8. οἶον αὐτοῖς κ.τ.λ. There is here a recognition of the corruption of human nature.

(100.) 8. ἐπίδοσις, properly, "that to which the greater increase accrues," i. e. that to which we are mostly inclined,—*tendency*.

CHAPTER IX.

- (101.) 1. *ἱκανῶς εἴρηται*. He speaks as if he had sufficiently proved the point that *ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ* is a *μεσότης*: it now remains for him to prove that this *μεσότης* performs the *ἔργον* of man.
- (102.) 2. *ἐπαίνειτόν* refers to the opinion of others; *καλόν* to our own sense of right.
- (103.) 3. *Καλυψώ*. A curious instance of Aristotle's memory failing him: it was Circe who gave the advice which Ulysses refers to in the lines quoted from *Od.* xii. 219.
- (104.) 4. *κατὰ τὸν δεύτερόν, φασι, πλοῦν*: a proverb, applied to those who having tried and failed, try again, or, according to Eustath. *Odys.* p. 1453, *ὅτε ἀποτυχῶν τις οὐρίον κόπαις πλὴν κατὰ Πανσανίαν*. See Stall. ad Plat. *Phæd.* p. 99, D,—*as our next best*.
- (105.) 5. *εἰς τοῦναντίον κ.τ.λ.* One would hardly expect to see self-distrust and self-denial so fully and practically recognised by a heathen philosopher, at the same time with the distinction between resistance to and total suppression of the passions. But here, as elsewhere, Aristotle's knowledge of human nature and human circumstances, and his sound practical sense, led him right where others went wrong: mark, too, the practical wisdom of making *ἡδονή* and *λύπη* the test of our disposition. *ἑαυτούς* is omitted in some editions: on its use for *ἡμᾶς αὐτούς*, see Gr. Gr. 654, 2, b.
- (106.) 6. *ἐν παντὶ διὰ φυλακτίον τὸ ἡδύ*. Aristotle, though of course unacquainted with the doctrine of the corruption of man, had too practical an eye to overlook its actual results on men's hearts and actions.
- (107.) 6. *ἀδέκαστοι*, unbribed. See Lidd. and Scott ad v. *δεκάω*.—*ὅπερ οὖν*. Il. γ. 158.—*ἐπιλέγειν*, to repeat.
- (108.) 7. *οὐ γὰρ ῥέδιον κ.τ.λ.* The whole of this passage is a striking instance of the practical wisdom of Aristotle's views and system.
- (109.) 8. *τῷ λόγῳ*, in a general argument or principle.
- (110.) 8. *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν*. He here fully recognises the variable nature of all objects of sense; but he does not, for that reason, discard all that they tell us, as valueless to the philosopher.

- (111.) 8. ἐν τῇ αἰσθησει ἡ κρίσις. He seems here to recognise a moral sense, which is able to recognise right and wrong in particulars. He connects this αἴσθησις with φρόνησις in bk. vi. ch. 10. 9. How far this moral sense is, in his opinion, given us by nature, or acquired by experience and instruction, is a disputed point; but on the whole, he seems to recognise it as a faculty of our nature, which is improved and developed by education.
- (112.) 9. δὴλον: another reading is δηλοῦ, which is used intransitively. See Lidd. and Scott ad v. ii. *So much, then, is clear.*
- (113.) 9. ὅτι ἡ μίση εἶσις κ.τ.λ. He speaks here as if he had quite concluded this part of his subject, viz. that this μεσότης, or μίση εἶσις, is the virtue (ἡδυαινή) of the moral part of the soul.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

- (1.) IN this book Aristotle discusses the voluntariness of human actions, and the consequent responsibility of man as a moral being; and then enters into the particulars of the principal virtues of the irascible and concupiscible passions, (ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη,) partly to support what he had before shewn, that ἡθικὴ ἀρετή is a μεσότης, and partly to prove that in each particular this μεσότης performs the ἔργον of man, and puts him in right relations to himself and others, which was the test of his ἀρετή, as given in the second chapter of book ii.
- (1.) 2. Before it can be shewn that ἡθικὴ μεσότης is the ἔργον of man, it must be proved that human actions, whether good or bad, are voluntary, or rather, the vague theories of certain philosophers to the contrary must be overthrown: for if these are true, and moral action, right or wrong, virtue or vice, is not voluntary, but determined by some overruling influences, (men being mere puppets of the caprice of fate,) the notion of λόγος would be excluded, and thus moral virtue

could not be the true ἀρετὴ τῆς ζωῆς τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος; the ἔργον of man must be looked for elsewhere: besides which, it has a *practical* use for politicians, in theory as well as *practice*, for the adjustment of rewards and punishments.

- (3.) 3. The major premiss of ἀκούσιον διὰ βίαν, which he takes first, is—Whatever is βίαιον has its ἀρχὴ ἑξωθεν.—ὁ πρῶτος ἢ ὁ πᾶσιν does not mean the agent and patient of the same action, but the patient of the βιά, whether active or passive.—κύριοι δυνεῖς, having power over us.
- (4.) 4. ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον κ.τ.λ. It has been said that there is a contradiction between what is said here about καλόν and what is said in sect. 11; but he is talking *here* of actions in themselves involuntary, which are very different from what he is considering in sect. 11; and the immediate motives to such actions are either a feeling of fear or a sense of duty: these act one against the other. A man sometimes does something which fear would make him decline, from a sense of duty; sometimes something to which his sense of duty makes him averse, from fear.
- (5.) 4. πρᾶξαντος, sc. αὐτοῦ, supplied from the general context. See Gr. Gr. 696, obs. 3.
- (6.) 6. μικταὶ πράξεις, *compound actions*. Where there is a mixture of willingness and unwillingness, though the mere fact of the action being done proves that willingness prevails, (μᾶλλον δ' οἶκεν ἐκούσιος. Sect. 10.) yet unwillingness exists in the abstract (ἀπλῶς, καθ' αὐτό); but willingness, looking at the circumstances: and acts thus done, are to be judged by the state of the will at the moment of action; and hence they are voluntary, or at least partly so, as no action can take place without the will, for some cause or other, consenting (πράξεις δ' ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἐκούσια. Sect. 10). There are four such πράξεις here given: two of negative suffering, where φόβος is overruled by καλόν; two of positive action, where καλόν is overcome by φόβος. The nature of these μικταὶ πράξεις, and the view taken of them, vary according to the thing done and the motive for doing it: where ἐκούσιον is evidently the strongest element of the compound, there ἔπαινος or ψόγος is awarded; where ἀκούσιον is, from the very nature of the action, very strong, even though overpowered, we grant συγγνώμη.

1. Where shame or pain is borne for the sake of some great real καλόν—ἐπαινος.
2. Where shame or pain is borne for the sake of no καλόν at all, or no equivalent καλόν—ψόγος.
3. Where καλόν is violated to escape some horror, ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων—(συγγνώμη).
4. Where καλόν is grossly violated to escape something less horrible—ψόγος.

Michelet instances Zopyrus and Regulus for the first ;—we might add Lady Godiva. αἰσχρόν is here used in the sense of “*shameful*” rather than, as usually in the Ethics, of *wrong*, as opposed to καλόν. Numerous instances of the three other sorts will be found in the histories of any Eastern rule, such as Gibbon’s Rome, or Creasy’s Ottoman Empire. In our own history, the first is illustrated by the martyrs refusing their pardon at the stake ; the second by Quakers preferring to go to prison to taking off their hat in court ; the third by Cranmer signing his recantation ; and the fourth by any traitor who has turned king’s evidence to save his neck.

- (8.) 7. δὲ νά π α λ ε ν, sc. ὅταν αἰσχρόν ἢ λυπηρόν ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ τινῶν μὴ μεγάλων ἢ καλῶν.
- (9.) 8. Ἄ λ κ μ α ι ὦ ν α. Alcmæon is made to kill his mother on the plea that his father imprecated curses on himself and his country if he did not do so.
- (10.) 9. Observe how Aristotle refuses to dogmatise in cases where each action must assume its particular hue from the circumstances.
- (11.) 9. ὥς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The force of the γάρ is difficult to discover at first, especially in connection with what follows, ὅθεν κ.τ.λ., but the whole may be paraphrased thus : “ It is difficult to abide by one’s deliberate determination, (τοῖς γνωσθείσιν,) for the struggle is, for the most part, between duty, which forbids αἰσχύρα, and fear, which urges to them ; fear makes us give up what had been, from a sense of duty, resolved on : and hence praise and blame arise on such actions, for the struggle thus being, for the most part, between fear of pain, a wish to avoid τὰ προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά, and a sense of duty, a wish to decline ἃ ἀναγκάζονται αἰσχύρα,” (αἰσχύρα is here used for something “*wrong*,” not merely “*shameful* ;” it is here

opposed to *λυπηρόν*, before it was joined with it;) “and these being balanced one against the other, then if *αἰσχρόν* is preferred, it shews that the will is more disinclined to *καλόν*, and *ψόγος* is attached to it; if *λυπηρόν* is preferred, it shews that the will is rather inclined to *καλόν*, and *ἔπαινος* ensues; where *λυπηρόν* is too great to be borne, then there is *συγγνώμη*, for there is no proof of any lack of inclination to *καλόν*, as far as is practicable for man; where there is no real *καλόν*, as in 2, note 6 above, the very act of enduring *λύπη* or *αἰσχρόν* unnecessarily is wrong, and hence *ψόγος*.”

- (12.) 10. ἀπλῶς, without reference to the *μικταὶ πράξεις*.
- (13.) 10. καὶ ἡ ἀρχή, sc. ὡς ἡ ἀρχή.
- (14.) 11. The argument is an elenchus, which it may be as well to work out, as well as that in the second figure, immediately following.
- (15.) 11. καλὸν μὲθ' ἡδονῆς. This is the pleasure which follows on right action, in the shape of self-approbation.
- (16.) 11. γελοῖον δὲ. This argument need not be reduced to a strictly logical form, as it is a simple appeal to common sense. Another reading is δέ, but δὲ marks a new argument, as well as a conclusion: see Gr. Gr. 721, 1. He refers to a modified form of the former theory, which makes ἡδὺ alone *βίαιον*.
- (17.) 13. τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοίαν. Bekker here begins chap. ii., which is perhaps the more natural division; but for the convenience of other editions, the sections will be numbered as if in continuation of chap. i.
- (18.) 14. ἔτερον δὲ ποιεῖ κ.τ.λ. The difference between doing an action δι' ἄγνοίαν, and ἀγνοῶν, is that in the former the *ἄγνοια* is the direct cause of the act, in the latter the *ἄγνοια* is not the direct cause of the act, but of the *μοχθηρία*, whence the act proceeds. This is illustrated by bk. v. chap. viii. sect. 12, ὅσα γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἄγνοίαν ἀμαρτάνουσι συγγνωμονικά.—ὅσα δὲ μὴ δι' ἄγνοίαν ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ οὐ συγγνωμονικά. The *πάθος* may make the agent ἀγνοεῖν what he is about, but it is itself the cause of the action, and not the *ἄγνοια*;—*ἄγνοια* is but the accident of the action.

- (19.) 11. The *ἄγνοια*, which does not take away responsibility, is either *ἡ καθόλου*, ignorance of some general principle of morality, which ought to be known, as, "Honesty is the best policy;" or *ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει*, ignorance shewn in the act of choice, where, through the bad moral state of the agent, he fails to discern the character of the particular action, but puts sweet for bitter, and bitter for sweet; such as where a man fancies that what is called a white lie is not dishonest. In this case the *ἄγνοια* is not the immediate, but the remote, cause of the action; indeed, it is not properly the cause of the action at all, for this springs directly from the *μοχθηρία*, or wicked tendencies, which partly consist in this absence of moral principles, and, in particular cases, in the want of moral perceptions. Thus, if a man does not think impurity wrong, this is a result of guilty demoralization, a want of moral principles; or if he does not think obscene language to come under the category of impurity, this want of moral perception does not make the action *ἀκούσιον*; in either case it is not the cause of his doing something which he does not intend, but it is the *αἴτιον τῆς μοχθηρίας*, of his intentionally doing what is wrong, inasmuch as the bad moral habit is caused by his not knowing better the nature of right and wrong; and thus *μοχθηρία* leads him wrong, though it might not have acted had he known the real nature of the matter better. Hence the importance not only of moral principles, but also, and, if possible, still more, of right and clear moral perception in particulars.

The case of the *ἀγνοῶν*, however, who is ignorant not of the moral character of the particulars, (*ἡ ἐν προαιρέσει ἄγνοια*), but of the particulars themselves, (*ἄγνοια ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα*), is very different: here the *ἄγνοια* is not the cause of his intentionally doing a wrong action, (*τῆς μοχθηρίας*), but of his doing something which he does not intend; as where a man shoots a friend from not being aware that the gun in his hand was loaded. But in both cases the degree of blame or sympathy would vary with the consideration whether the ignorance was such as might or ought to have been avoided, or the strength of the *πάθος* which overruled the moral knowledge or perceptions, (see note 18). But on all these points Aristotle refuses to dogmatise.

- (20.) 14. *διὰ τὴν κ.τ.λ.*, through the drunkenness or the anger,

or, as others interpret it, through *ἡδονή*, or some such motive, not through ignorance of right from wrong. These are instances of τοῦ ἀγνοῦντα πράττειν: but the τὸ ἀγνοεῖν of the man who is in these states does not relieve him of responsibility, though the moral knowledge which would have restrained him is, by his own fault, suspended. A man indeed, in an angry or drunken fit, might strike his father, not through ignorance of its being wrong to do so, but having mistaken his father for some one else. In such a case there is *συγγνώμη*, when the state of blindness is considered; but when the person is viewed as having wilfully, and contrary to morality, brought himself into this state, *δυσλὰ ἐπιτημία* ensues.

- (21.) 14. ἀγνοεῖ. Mark the state of ignorance in which Aristotle conceives the bad man to be: and if this plea were allowed, there would be no such thing as blame attaching to any bad action, *ὅπερ ἀτοπον*. Michelet remarks on the contrast between Aristotle and some modern philosophers, who hold that a man is excused in whatever he does, if he does but think it right. Conscience is *objective*, as well as *subjective*.
- (22.) 15. βούλεται λέγεσθαι, claims to be defined as. *The meaning of it is*—λέγεται, simply predicated; βούλεται λέγεσθαι is in theory predicated.—τὸ σύμφορον. The political ἀγαθόν is viewed as implying that of the individual.
- (23.) 15. ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἀγνοία, ignorance at the moment of choice of the character of the particular.—ἡ καθόλου, ignorance of the universal.
- (24.) 15. ἐν οἷς, the circumstances; περὶ δ, the particulars. The former would be when a man shot his friend not knowing he was near; the περὶ δ, when he did not know the gun to be loaded.
- (25.) 16. οὐ χεῖρον, it will be as well.
- (26.) 17. ἐκπείσειν αὐτούς, it had escaped them unawares; they had let it fall.—ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη: see Poet. c. 14. Merope is about to kill her son in ignorance, but recognises him in time.
- (27.) 17. δεῖξαι, to exhibit in any way.—ἀποχειριζόμενοι, Anglicè, with the gloves.
- (28.) 18. ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις, in the most essential points

of the action,—those that most decide its character.—ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις, the circumstances of the action.

- (29.) 20. This definition of ἐκούσιον, the result of the foregoing chapter, will now be applied to human action.
- (30.) 21. γάρ refers to an objection against this definition, on the ground that actions from concupiscible or irascible impulses, though ἐν αὐτῷ, are involuntary.
- (31.) 22. The argument is an elenchus.
- (32.) 24. δεῖ δὲ καὶ δρῶντας εἶναι. For the final causes of anger here recognised by Aristotle, consult Butler, Sermon viii.
- (33.) 25. Argument in second figure.
- (34.) 26. τῷ ἀκούσιᾳ εἶναι. What difference is there in faults committed from reason and those committed from desire, *in respect of their being voluntary?*—it cannot be predicated of the one without being predicated of the other.
- (35.) 27. οὐχ ἡττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα πάθη. This is the key-stone of Aristotle's moral system, discernible whenever he treats of man, his nature, position, duties, —as in the Rhetoric, for instance. He looks upon him as being of a compound nature, made up of reason and passions: in fact, he looks upon him as he is, and not as he might have been, had he been created differently.

CHAPTER II.

- (36.) 1. περὶ προαίρεσις: by an examination into the motive cause of human action he will shew it to be voluntary. προαίρεσις is the deliberate act of choice; not the general principle which directs the choice, but the choice of some particular, directed well or ill by the reason, as the agent is good or bad.
- (37.) 1. οἰκεδρατον, most nearly connected.—τῶν πράξεων: πράξις is here used in a loose way for ἔργον, as, strictly speaking, πράξις includes προαίρεσις.
- (38.) 2. φαίνεται, evidently is.—ἐπὶ πλείονι: it is a species of ἐκούσιον.

(39.) 3. οἱ δὲ λέγουσιν. He proceeds to shew, by an analysis of προαίρεσις, that it is not a simple mental impulse or act, but a compound motion: it is not an impulse of the irascible or concupiscible parts of our nature, nor is it merely an opinion on moral matters, in any of which cases it might more or less lose the character of ἐκούσιον.

(40.) 5. This chapter and the following one will be more clearly understood if we trace the course of an action of our concupiscible part from its first beginnings in the soul of a rational agent up to its completion.

ἐπιθυμία (De Anima, p. 32,—ἡδέος ὄρεξις), a general latent appetite or propension towards ἡδύ, resulting either from the λύπη of φυσικαὶ ἐνδεΐαι (κοιναί), or from particular propensions of ἡδονή (ἰδία, ἐπιθετοί), existing differently in different individuals, as the several πάθη exist in them in different degrees of strength.

αἵσθησις, presenting to the ἐπιθυμία, by means of the φαντασία, (see De Anima, p. 30,) an object suitable to the ἐνδεΐα or πάθος.

ἐπιθυμία, existing actively, (τοῦδε τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις),—a sensible propension,—appetite in motion.

ὄρεξις = ἐπιθυμία, directed towards some definite object, appetitive;—δίωξις, an *appetite*, a seeking after;—ἔρεξις, a stretching forth after.

δόξα, a judgment of the moral reason as to the pursuit or avoidance of the object in question.

βούλησις, *will*,—an act of the will consequent on the decision of the reason that the object is a proper one for pursuit,—a choice of the end,—*will of the end*: βούλησις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

ὄρεξις, again,—confirmed by the assent of the reason,—rational δίωξις: bk. vi. 2; putting in motion,

βούλευσις, a deliberation as to the means proper for the attainment of the object,—*will of the means*: τοῦ συμφέροντος ἀγαθοῦ γε ὄντος.

προαίρεσις, *will of the action*,—*purpose*; a deliberate choice of the whole action and means, combining βούλησις and βούλευσις.

ὄρεξις again, under the shape of προαίρεσις, (ὁρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν): see end of chap. v.

There are then three sorts of *δρεξις* :—

1. The energy of *ἐπιθυμία*, *appetitive*, (*De Anima*, p. 32,) τοῦ ἡδέος.
2. The energy of the *ἐπιθυμία* confirmed by reason,—*rational*, τοῦ τελοῦς.
3. Of the whole action,—*determinate*, τῆς πράξεως ὡς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἡδέος.

It must further be borne in mind that when the character is rightly formed, that is, when the agent is a good man, all the steps previous to *βούλησις* are merged in the impulses towards action; are rational impulses of the *ἡθός* towards good, inasmuch as nothing presents itself to the desire as good or pleasant, but what the reason simultaneously approves of as really good and pleasant. Here the *δρεξις* and *βούλησις* are synonymous, and the act of desire may be termed either *δρεξις* or *βούλησις*: and this probably is the reason why Aristotle not unfrequently interchanges these terms, using the one for the other. This, though founded on a true view of the phenomena of human action, will confuse the student, unless he is careful to distinguish between cases where a difference, as given above, is made between them, and where they are viewed, as in the case of a good man, as practically identical. Where analysis requires strict accuracy, *ἐπιθυμία* may be translated *desire* or *propension*,—*δρεξις*, *appetite*,—*βούλησις*, *will*;—these terms being used in the sense given by Hooker, bk. i. vii. 3: "The object of *appetite* is whatever sensible good may be wished for; the object of *will* is that good which reason teaches us to seek." So *βούλησις*, rather than *δρεξις*, would be the term for a desire after those things which reason, rather than *αἴσθησις* presents as *ἡδέα*, such as a present sacrifice for future gain; but even here *δρεξις* might be used to express that assent and energy of the irrational part towards the *ἡδύ*, without which an action cannot arise. In this case, the course of the action would stand thus:—

βούλησις, presenting the *ἀγαθόν* as *ἡδύ*.

δρεξις, stretching out after it.

The next stage, the definite *βούλησις* of an ordinary action, is of course merged in the former impulsive act of *βούλησις*. The fact is that the irrational part, as the motive cause, must operate in every action: where the irrational presents

the object, reason follows and directs; where reason presents the object, *ᾧρεξις*, the act of the irrational part, adopts it as a motive: and further, where the motive power of the end is rather considered than its quality (right or wrong), *ᾧρεξις* is the word used, rather than *βούλησις*. Hence, when speaking generally of an action, (as in bk. vi. chap. 2,) it is said to proceed from *βούλευσις* and *ᾧρεξις*: when viewed in relation to the intellect, *βούλησις* is the proper term. *ᾧρεξις*, properly speaking, takes cognizance of the end as *ἡδύ*; *βούλησις* as *ἀγαθόν*.

βούλησις, again, has degrees, and corresponds both to *wish* and *will*, as used in English Ethics: when the object is in itself unattainable, it is a mere *imperfect βούλησις*, or *wish*; the question of *δύνατον* is not taken into consideration; indeed, this properly belongs rather to *βούλευσις*: but when the object it decides upon is attainable, then it is a *perfect βούλησις*, or *will*.

ἐπιθυμία, again, is apparently identical with *ἡδονή* in its sense of a principle of human nature, which impels us to pursuit of the sensible *ἡδύ*, but it has *λύπη* attached, as implying an *ἔνδεια* (μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, chap. xi. 6); and in bk. vii. 7. 3, it is distinguished from it: as *ἐπιθυμία* is rather a passive feeling, created by *ἔνδειαι*, and drawn out by temptations; *ἡδονή*, a general tone, or temper, or mind, in which the motive cause of human nature consists,—(see bk. vii. 7. 3,)—in its bad sense, a tendency towards self-indulgence, either general or particular, which creates temptations and opportunities for itself: it is this which Aristotle is warning us against at the end of bk. ii. It is believed that an attentive consideration and development of what is here said will enable the student to assign to these terms, wherever they are used, their real meaning and value, and to solve the seeming contradictions which the use of them in different meanings produces.

- (41.) 3. *ἐπιθυμία*. It is not a simple energy of our concupiscible nature—*ἡ θυμόν*, nor of the irascible—*ἡ βούλησιν*, nor of the rational will—*ἡ τρινα δόξαν*, nor of the moral intellect: in any of these cases, it might be said it was sudden and involuntary.
- (42.) 3, 4. It is not *ἐπιθυμία*, by arguments in the second figure.

- (43.) 5. ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. It seems at first sight as if desire could be opposed to desire; but we must recollect that the opposition here in question must be "*de eodem*:" there is such an opposition *de eodem*, and at the same time, between προαίρεσις and ἐπιθυμία: but a man cannot desire the same thing and desire the exact contrary at the same time,—a man cannot be hungry and not hungry at the same time.—ἡ δέ ος καὶ ἐπιλύπον, i. e. ἐπιθυμία is moved either by the presence of some ἡδύ, or by the pressure of some pain such as hunger: so in bk. vii. 7. 3, he speaks of λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας.—προαίρεσις looks upon an action as ἀγαθόν or κακόν: in the case of the good man, καλόν is coincident with ἀγαθόν, αἰσχροὺν with κακόν; to the ἀκόλαστος, or man of reprobate mind, it is the reverse,—αἰσχροὺν is his ἀγαθόν, καλόν is his κακόν.
- (44.) 6. θυμὸς ἔτι ἥττον. He simply appeals to the common sense of mankind.
- (45.) 7. σύνεγγυς, akin to it.—βουλῆσις ἐστὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων: that is, imperfect βούλησις, or wish, as stated above. The consideration of ἀδύνατον belongs rather to βούλευσις, but real βούλησις, actual will, nevertheless does not exist where ἀδύνατον is manifest. All these arguments may be resolved into the second figure, though perhaps we conclude differences between things which have different objects from a process of perception, rather than of actual reasoning.
- (46.) 10. δόξα, a mere intellectual act.
- (47.) 11. δόξα τινί, an act of the intellect on moral subjects. This δόξα enters into a moral purpose, as shewn above, but it is not the whole of it.
- (48.) 13. ἡ τῷ ὁρθῶς. ἡ is "or," not "than;" as μάλλον preceding might suggest.
- (49.) 15. See vii. 7. 4; and below, 4. 5.
- (50.) 17. μετὰ λόγου κ.τ.λ. λόγος, properly, reason; διανοία, exercise of the reason: see De Anima, p. 69.

CHAPTER III.

He now examines one of the elements of *προαίρεσις*,—the will of the means, *βούλευσις*.

- (51.) 4. *ὅτι ἀσύνμετροι*, that is, that the side and the diagonal of a square have no common measure. This is a favourite illustration of Aristotle's. It probably was a problem then in vogue in the learned world, like squaring the circle with us.
- (52.) 4. *διὰ τινὰ ἄλλην αἰτίαν*. He here leaves room for the opinion of those who distinctly held a Divine Providence separate from nature.
- (53.) 7. *ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά*, and these are what are left, i. e. when the other causes of action are excluded.
- (54.) 7. *αἰτίαι κ.τ.λ.* This is Aristotle's usual theory of causation, in things physical. In the Rhetoric he divides *ἀνάγκη* into *φύσις* and *βία*: but *ἀνάγκη* there is only used popularly to express the plea of involuntariness, which does away with the responsibility of the agent in a trial, which he is laying down in the passage in the Rhetoric: see also An. Post. ii. 10, p. 217.
- (55.) 7. *φύσις*, in its widest sense, as the whole system of things natural, is divided elsewhere, as here, into—
1. *ἀνάγκη*, where the connection between cause and effect, or even antecedent and consequent, is invariable and perceptible,—*τῶν αἰτίων*,—such as fire and heat.
 2. *φύσις*, where this connection is perceptible and general, but not invariable, as clouds and rain. *τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ*. Eth. vi. 4.
 3. *τύχη*, (*αἰτία ἄοριστος*), where this connection is neither invariable nor perceptible,—*τῶν μήτε αἰτί μήτε ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ*. See Met. p. 228; Top. p. 130; Phys. p. 35.
- (56.) 8. *ἀκριβεῖς*, of which the laws are well ascertained.—*ἀεὶ ῥάκεῖς*, where they do not depend, in part or whole, on some other science or art for their realization: where they do thus depend, there may be deliberation as to what science, or what operations of that science, are necessary to them, as producing or co-operating cause.

- (57.) 9. ἤττον διηκριβωται, as its principles are less accurately ascertained.
- (58.) 9. περὶ τέχνας κ.τ.λ.: we deliberate more on the application of principles than the principles themselves; and more on scientific arts than on abstract sciences.
- (59.) 10. ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον: sc. ἐστὶ.—συμβούλους δε. Proof of the nature of βούλευσις.
- (60.) 11. ἀλλὰ θέμενοι κ.τ.λ. Mark carefully this analysis of βούλευσις, in every step of which the voluntariness of the action is evidenced. When he considers εὐβουλία in bk. vi., he adds to this analysis that the means thus chosen must be right means: see εὐβουλία.
- (61.) 11. πρῶτον αἴτιον, the first link in the causation.—ἀναλύειν is to resolve anything into its simple elements or parts.
- (62.) 12. ὥσπερ διάγραμμα, sc. ὥσπερ τις ἀναλύων διώγραμμα. If a puzzle were placed before us, we should take out piece after piece, till we had gone backwards through the process of putting it together; and when we proceeded to put it together, the piece which had remained till last (ἔσχατον ἐν ζήτησει) would be the one we should begin with, (πρῶτον ἐν γενέσει). But this is rather an illustration than an explanation of the text, as διάγραμμα is a geometrical figure. If a person resolve a geometrical figure into its simple elements, —a hexagon, for instance, into six triangles,—afterwards wish to construct it, the last step in the analysis would be the first in the reconstruction.
- (63.) 15. ἔοικε δὲ κ.τ.λ. refers to ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν, just above. He is shewing how it is that these points, which depend on others, are subjects for βουλῇ.—αἱ δὲ πράξεις, sc. τῆς βουλῆς: those which βουλῇ takes cognizance of.
- (64.) 16. τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα: not particulars and their simple qualities, but their fitness for or relation to the end in view. See bk. vi. 8, fin.
- (65.) 17. ἀφωρισμένον, determinate. When by βούλευσις the ἔσχατον ἐν ζήτησει has been discovered, and is in our power, then there arises a determinate purpose to perform the action, and further, a determinate ὁρεξις, called προαίρεσις.
- (66.) 14. δι' οὗ, through what means. διὰ τινός, through whose help.
- (67.) 17. τὴν ἀρχήν, the starting-point of the action,—the

πρῶτον ἐν γενέσει. When this point is found to be something immediately depending on oneself, and is approved by the judgment, (αὐτοῦ τὸ ἡγούμενον, the τὸ προαιρούμενον,) or power of moral choice, which decides on pursuit or avoidance.

- (68.) 18. ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν. This is rather introduced as an ornamental figure than as any actual proof of what he is saying. Homer (Il. E. 53,) has introduced the chiefs declaring to the people what they had thus decided upon as things to be done. The process was ended when προαίσεις had taken place in their councils.
- (69.) Deliberation, then, is a process of enquiry carried on by the reason, with its various powers and functions, set in motion by the presence of some εἰξις, (approved by reason = βούλησις,) beginning with the end in view, and proceeding, link by link, through the chain of means, till it reaches the point in our own power, and which our judgment approves. When this is reached, βουλευσις ceases, and the act of choice or purpose supervenes.

CHAPTER IV.

- (70.) He now proceeds to consider the other element of προαίσεις, the will of the end, or βούλησις.
- The first question is whether the will has for its proper object the real good, (τἀγαθόν,) or that which presents itself to us as good, (τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν).
- (70.) 2. τὸ βουλευτόν, the object of βούλησις.
- (71.) 2. συμβαίνει, it follows. He states the difficulties of the several notions on the subject.
- (72.) 4. The question is solved by saying that (ἀπλῶς) in its own nature the τἀγαθόν is the proper object of will; but as this presents itself differently to different individuals, practically and accidentally, not from its own desirableness, but from the weakness and blindness of human agents, that is to each βουλευτόν which presents itself as such: so that there is a proper object of choice, though it is realized by none but the good man. He here again introduces one of his favourite medical illustrations.

- (73.) 4. *ὁ σπουδαῖος κρίνει ὁρθῶς*. Here is an act of *δόξα* as to the character of the *ἡδύ* proposed by *ἔρεξις*: so in bk. vii. 8, he says that *ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἡθικὴ* is τοῦ ὁρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρετήν. When the moral character or moral sense is formed in its first stage, (as we shall see hereafter, bk. vi., addenda,) nothing presents itself as *ἡδύ* which is not *ἀγαθόν*, and the choice of good is instinctive, (*ὁρᾶν*): earlier, the *ἔρεξις* presents many objects which the moral reason rejects as undesirable because bad.
- (74.) 5. And herein is one great (if not the greatest) difference between the good man and the bad,—that to the good man the true good presents itself (*φαίνεται*) as good, and an object of pursuit,—the *ἀγαθόν* presents itself as *ἡδύ*; while to the bad man the *ἡδύ* presents itself as *ἀγαθόν*: the views of the *ἡδύ* and the *καλόν* are affected by the tone and state of mind (*ἔξιν*). The view we take, then, of the several ends we propose to ourselves depending upon our frame of mind, (*ἔξιν*,) this is an *ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν*; and therefore the choice of ends is voluntary.
- (75.) 5. *δαδ τὴν ἡδονήν*, the propension to pleasure, as pleasure, which exists in us, as we should say, by nature. Aristotle would ascribe it rather (though not entirely) to bad education.
- (76.) *προαίρεσις*, then, as described by Aristotle, is an act of deliberate choice, by a moral agent, of a certain end, by certain means: the whole action lies before the mind, and is resolved upon in all its details; the choice of the end, the selection and adoption of the several means, implies voluntariness and responsibility on the part of the agent. On this act of deliberate choice follows the carrying it out, of which more will be said in the latter part of bk. vi. It may be added here, that there is no more accurate description of a virtuous moral action than that given in the second collect at Evening Prayer,—holy desires, good counsels, just works. Why *προαίρεσις* is generally used for “good counsels,” see note 79: for the effect of character on our moral judgment, see bk. vii.

CHAPTER V.

- (77.) Having thus shewn that each of the parts of *προαίρεσις* is ἐν ἡμῖν, he now uses this to shew that the actions proceeding

from it are voluntary. Plato held the contrary opinion, *De Legg.* ix. 860, D, οἱ κακοὶ πάντες εἰς πάντα εἰσὶν ἄκοντες κακοί: and again, *Prot.* 343, D, οὐδεὶς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡγείται οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων ἔκοντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν, οὐδὲ αἰσχροῖ τε καὶ κακὰ ἔκοντα ἐργάζεσθαι: *Timæus*, 81, D, κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἔκων οὐδεὶς, διὰ δὲ ποτηρᾶν ἔξω τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀπαίδευτον τροφήν ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται κακός.

(78.) He considers four pleas of necessity:—

1. Absolute predestination, or controlling power, ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν: to this he answers by his proof that προαίρεσις in itself and its parts is an ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν.
2. Natural desires, corruption of nature: the ἀρχὴ is ἐν ἡμῖν, and therefore the action voluntary.
3. Acquired habits,—ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν, and therefore voluntary.
4. Wrong impressions from external things, the ἀρχὴ is ἔξωθεν: he answers this by shewing that as this impression (φαντασία) arises from our character and tone of mind, as well as from external things, we are responsible for it, as having formed that character and tone; and, further, that this φαντασία, supposing it to be sudden and irresistible, only affects part of the action,—the choice of the end,—and does not take away the voluntariness of the choice of the means. Contrast this mode of treating the subject with that of Butler, who supposes the plea of necessity true, and shews that, even on this supposition, it would not do away with human responsibility, or the notion of a supreme God.

(79.) 1. βουλευτοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν κ.τ.λ. It is to be observed, both here and in some other places, that he confines προαίρεσις to the choice of means, whereas, in reality, it is a choice both of ends and means. The reason of this is, that where the first stage of the moral character is formed, the right end is chosen instinctively, without any effort on the part of the intellect. τὰ γὰρ θέν presents itself as ἡδύ, and then the function of the intellect in the choice of the action is confined to the choice of proper means: see bk. vi. chap. 12.

(80.) 1. The first argument is in the first figure; the result of the analysis of προαίρεσις, which has occupied the three last chapters.

(81.) 2. In the *Magna Moralia*, i. 9, it is said that Socrates uses

this opposition between *κακία* and *ἀπερὶ* to shew that as *κακία* is involuntary, so must *ἀπερὶ* be.

- (82.) 3. τοῦτο δ' ἦν κ.τ.λ. should be in a parenthesis. This is a formula for the reference to a former admitted definition or position: see bk. v. i. 12, Gr. Gr. 398, 4.—ἀγαθοῖς: the dative is in attraction to ἐφ' ἡμῖν.
- (83.) 4. Aristotle here alludes to a proverb, wherein, by a plausible antithesis, the truth of the one true clause is made to throw a shadow of truth over the other, and quietly disposes of it by pointing out which is true and which is false.
- (84.) 5. He then refers to another argument of the fatalists, that a man's actions cannot be said to proceed from *him*,—that a man is not the source whence his actions flow,—that they proceed from his nature, which he cannot help,—plea of necessity in a man's nature.—τοῖς νῦν εἰρημύνοισι: what has been said about προαίρεσις, βούλευσις, βούλησις, and the conclusions drawn therefrom.—ἀναγαγεῖν, trace.
- (85.) 6. ταῦτα. = τὰ νῦν εἰρημύμενα—φαίνεται are evidently so.
- (86.) 7. τοῦτοισι. He has hitherto drawn his arguments from the nature of προαίρεσις: he now (7, 8, 9.) confirms them by the opinion and practice of man. This is much the same as Butler's practical argument.
- (87.) 10. Responsibility not taken away by the plea of acquired habits.
- (88.) 10. Analogy of bodily defects, which arise from former carelessness or dissipation: if they are blamed, they are looked upon as voluntary; and therefore, if mental habits are blamed, they are voluntary likewise.
- (89.) 13. μὴ βούλεσθαι. It was argued that a man could not wish to do himself harm, and therefore could not do so voluntarily.
- (90.) 17. Another plea of the fatalists is, that the external world conveys certain impressions to the mind, which it cannot help receiving; and therefore the actions proceeding from these are to be considered as caused by the external world acting on the mind, and not by the mind or will of the agent.
- (91.) 17. φαντασία, the impression which external things make on the mind, (φαίνεται,) or the power which receives, and, as

it were, daguerreotypes such impressions: in either sense the meaning is the same,—either that we have no power over the impressions from external things, or no power over the faculty which receives them; in either case, we cannot help receiving them. In the Rhetoric it is called *αἰσθήσεις τις ἀσθενής*: it is used again, in bk. vii. 3. 11, for the impressions from sensible objects of which beasts are capable; and again, bk. vii. 7. 8, for the impression which men follow hastily, without stopping to consult their reason. In the De Anima, p. 61, it is joined with *αἰσθησεις*—*αἱ φαντασίας καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις*; and *φάντασμα* is the impression of the *αἰσθημα* upon the mind, *δεν τῇ ὕλης*, of which *φαντασία* is the power: see De Anima, p. 76. It is important to understand the real meaning of this word in this passage, as it is sometimes translated “*imagination*,” which, in the usual senso of that word, does not give its sense.

- (92.) The answer to this argument is, that if the external world conveys wrong impressions, the tone of the mind must be prepared to receive them; and for this tone the agent is responsible: and further, if the first step, the object of desire, be necessarily impressed upon us by the external world, every subsequent step in the action is voluntary.
- (93.) 17. *εἰ δέ τις λήγοι*. The apodosis, “this is my answer,” is suppressed.—*εἰ δέ μὴ, οὐθείς*: another reading is, *εἰ δέ μήδεις*, making this another protasis, without its apodosis, and referring both to the answer given in sect. 18; both are supported by MSS. The reading in the text makes it a *reductio ad absurdum* to suppose that we are not *φαντασίας αἰτίαι*; the other would refer more directly to Plato’s words on the subject, and place the false pleas in a string, to be answered in sect. 18.
- (94.) 17. *ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις*. This is another theory of the fatalists.
- (94.) 19. *παρ’ αὐτόν, from himself. παρ’ αὐτῷ, al.*: but see Grammar, 637. iii. 3. d.
- (95.) 20. *καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει*. Another reading is, *καὶ τῷ τελείῳ*, as it is to the good man. There is something to say for and against both: the former alludes to the argument above, that the means are in the agent’s power, even supposing the end not to be; the latter, to the frequently re-

peated proposition, that the bad man has it in his own power to act or not, as well as the good. Against the former, *εἰ καὶ* is the proper form of introducing an admitted supposition; but Aristotle may have wished to mark that he only admitted it for argument's sake: against the latter, *σπουδαίως* is the term we should expect, not *τέλειως*.

- (96.) 22. ἡ πρὸς θείας, *the accumulation*. It would almost seem as if sections 21 and 22 had got transposed. Section 23 evidently fits on to 21.

- (97.) Aristotle's mode of treating the great question of human responsibility is very simple and practical. Without entering into metaphysical or psychological abstractions, he analyzes the source whence human actions proceed, and demonstrates that, if there is such a thing as voluntariness, it must exist in such actions. He points out some of the absurdities which are involved in the contrary theories, and the practical witness which human opinion and human institutions bear to man's responsibility as a fact.

CHAPTER VI.

- (98.) In this consideration of the several virtues, Aristotle has it in view to explain the nature, the subject-matter, and the mode of each, and, at the same time, to shew, as part of the proof of his book, that each several *μεσότης* is the *ἀρετή* of that particular part of human nature of which it is the development and regulation.

- (99.) As *ἡθικὴ ἀρετή* generally is *περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας*,—the regulation and balance of the impulse and checks of action, so each particular is the regulation and balance of some particular *ἡδονή* and *λύπη*,—of self-love, directed towards some particular object, in some particular sphere,—of some particular impulse or check, operating in some particular pursuit or avoidance. Where the check would lead from what ought to be done, it is regulated and balanced by the sense of honour and duty arising from *τὸ καλόν*, partly residing in the feelings, partly recognised by the reason, to which *ἡδονή* is attached. Where the impulse would lead us wrong, it is regulated and balanced by the sense of shame, arising from the same source, to which *λύπη* is attached. The sense of

good desert and bad desert counteracts and controls within due bounds the natural impulses of pursuit and avoidance. Where either the original or the counterbalancing impulse operates too much or too little, then we are in one or other of the extremes.

- (100.) 1. ἀνδρεία, the μεσότης between φόβος and θάρρος, and σωφροσύνη, the μεσότης περὶ σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας come first, because they are respectively the principal virtues of the irascible and concupiscible natures, which was the usual view taken of man's impulsive constitution by the philosophers of the time; and because in these the impulses and checks are most apparent, as being most readily and instinctively acted upon by external things, and therefore most effective in producing and influencing action. And ἀνδρεία before σωφροσύνη, because, of the two, the impulse of fear is the most instinctive and effective. We can suppose a person to have an appetite for ἡδονή, and yet be too indolent to allow it to move him to pursuit: but where the λύπη of fear comes, avoidance follows almost instinctively, even where regulated by θάρρος into ἀνδρεία. That ἀνδρεία belongs to the irascible part may be seen from φόβος being placed under the θυμοειδέες, Top. iv. 5. 4, p. 170, ὁ δὲ φόβος ἐν τῷ θυμοειδί, cf. ii. 8. 4, p. 133. It must be recollected that, in Plato's theory, the θυμοιδέες was the basis of the moral character, as far as the ἀλογον part of the soul contributed to it; its function was to assist the reason in suppressing the concupiscible impulses.

- (101.) 3. εἶναι γὰρ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι. He here recognises certain final causes of this feeling implanted in us. Remember to translate καλόν, *right*, the sense of duty, or rather, perhaps, the sense of honour, which, where positive religion is not the guide, does in some sort supply its place,—αἰσχρόν, *wrong*,—keeping in mind, at the same time, the connection between physical and moral beauty,—the beauty of holiness, which the Greeks embodied in several words and notions. When καλόν is loosely translated "*honourable*," and αἰσχρόν, *shameful* or *base*, the real notion in Aristotle's mind is lost.

- (102.) 3. εἰπεί κή, as applied by Aristotle to express goodness, and not merely justice or equity, is scarcely to be represented by any English word. Its meaning is derived partly from its primary, partly from its secondary, sense; it signifies

that the agent is acting as he ought, and therefore justly ; but, further, it signifies that there is something beautiful and attractive in what he does.—A *seemly* person,—from whence it probably was used for equity.—*αἰδέμενον*, *possessed of a sense of shame*.—*λέγεται* κ.τ.λ., sc. ὁ μὴ φοβούμενος. *μεταφοράν*: from genus to species.

- (103.) 5. οὐδ' εἰ θάρρει κ.τ.λ.: because ἀδοξίαν δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι.
- (104.) 6. φοβερώτατον δὲ ὁ θάνατος. This notion, that the meeting death with firmness is the final cause of θάρρος, and the perfection of ἀνδρεία, harmonizes with his view of man as a citizen designed for the good of the state.—*πίρας γάρ*. Stress must be laid, in this passage, on the word *δοκεῖ*, to mark that it was the common opinion of which Aristotle was speaking, not his own. See *De Anima*, i. 5. p. 25, *δοκεῖ γάρ μᾶλλον ἢ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα συνέχειν: ἐξελευθέρουσι γοῦ διαπνέεται καὶ σίπνεται*. The word *διαπνέεται* is taken from the *Phædo*, 80, c.
- (105.) 11. οὐ μὴν ἀλλά κ.τ.λ. The ἀνδρείος will be ἀδεής in storm or sickness ; but still his ἀνδρεία will have no sphere for exercise.
- (106.) 11. οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς θαλάττιοι. The man who is sick and the sailor in a storm look upon death nearly in the same way ; and the latter is used to illustrate the absence of ἀνδρεία in both cases.—*οἱ μὲν, οἱ δέ*, may be two sorts of θαλάττιοι. That is, in the case of the θαλάττιοι, there is either (*οἱ μὲν*) utter despair of life and a dislike of a death in which there is no καλόν, or (*οἱ δέ*) there is a hope of escape, arising from their skill or experience : or *οἱ μὲν* may be the ἀνδρείοι, and *οἱ δέ* the θαλάττιοι.—*οἱ μὲν* referring to the ἀνδρείοι, being, with reference to this particular case, ἀδεεῖς, (though in a different way from the θαλάττιοι,) and not ἀνδρείοι. The ἀνδρείος is not here ἀνδρείος because there is no καλόν ; and though his tone of mind prevents his fearing death, yet he would escape it if he could, whereas the ἀνδρείος would not. The sailor is ἀδεής, because his experience prevents death from threatening him as it does the landsman. Neither case is that of death being willingly met, when it is possible to avoid it, for the sake of the τὸ καλόν. In real ἀνδρεία there must be within reach a means of averting death, (ἀλή,) and a counterbalancing motive to meet it.

- (107.) 12. ἀνδρίζονται, act bravely.

CHAPTER VII.

- (108.) The conditions, then, of true ἀνδρεία are:—1. The presence of the really φοβερόν, (i. e. death). 2. φόβος, an impulse (see chap. ix.) arising from it, to avoid it, (λύπη). 3. A means of averting it, (ἀλκή). 4. θάρρος, (ἡδονή,) arising from a sense of καλόν,—an impulse towards meeting it. 5. προαίρεσις. 6. ἔξις, (see chap. viii. 15,) it must be ready to act on emergencies, without reasoning and persuading itself on each particular occasion. The absence of any one of these conditions destroys the character of ἀνδρεία.
- (109.) 1. In ἀνδρεία the λύπη comes first, and is balanced by ἡδονή; αἰσθησις presents the φοβερόν, and there is an impulse to avoid it: this is checked and regulated by θάρρος, suggested by καλόν, which acts as a motive, by virtue of the ἡδονή of good desert attached to it.
- (109.) 2. ὡς ἄνθρωπος, as far as humanity can bear. Mark the sound practical wisdom which Aristotle shews in all his views of the nature, the position, and the duties of man.
- (110.) 2. ὡς ὁ λόγος, sc. κελεύει.
- (111.) 3. τοῦτο γὰρ τίλος ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. So the θάρρος, which is to regulate the φόβος, must not be mere animal courage, nor yet a mere fear of shame, but must be suggested by a sense of καλόν. The final cause which should set men on right action is the καλόν, to which the sense of good desert is attached, so that it shall be ἡδύ: see iii. 1. 11, τὸ δὲ διὰ—καλόν μεθ' ἡδονῆς. The καλόν in the Rhetoric is defined as having a twofold source,—either our internal impressions, ὃ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὦν, ἡδύ ἢ ὅτι ἀγαθόν, or the praise of men, ὃ αἰρετόν ὦν, ἐπαινετόν ἐστι. The notion of καλόν embraces both these,—one in its sense of beautiful, the other in its sense of honourable. The καλόν, as the motive of virtue, must be an internal sense of right and good desert, (see note 101,) not only ἐπαινετόν: see chap. viii. sect. 1.
- (112.) 5. κατ' ἐξίαν. = ὡς δεῖ in section 2,—with the additional notion of “as becomes him.”
- (113.) 6. πάσχει καὶ πράττει, both *enduring* and *doing*,—passive as well as active. Leonidas would be an instance

of the latter; a martyr, to whom a pardon is offered on condition of apostacy, of the former.

- (114.) 6. *τέλος δέ κ.τ.λ.* The *μεσότης* between the two extremes fulfils the conditions of ἀρετή, ἡ δειψ, &c. He now shews more definitely that it has for its object τὸ καλόν, because that which is in accordance with the habit (τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν) is the τέλος; that is, if the ἔξις is καλόν, this is its τέλος,—if the ἔξις is αἰσχρον, αἰσχρον is its τέλος; and ἀνδρεία is καλόν, therefore the τέλος is καλόν, for everything takes its character (ἀρίζεται) from its τέλος; so that if you know the character of the τέλος, you know the character of the ἔξις, and *vice versa*.—ἵκαστον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is a sort of prosyllogism to the sentence, τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας κ.τ.λ., which seems to have struck him as necessary when he had worked out the argument.
- (115.) 7. τῶν δὲ ὑπερβαλλόντων. Each of the extremes stands in a double relation,—an excess of one principle, a deficiency of the other; and hence ὑπερβαλλόντων is used for both extremes. Even ἀφραβία (the deficiency of fear) may be viewed as an excess of θάρρος, though different from the real excess, (θρασύτης,) inasmuch as it would consist in the absence of an instinct inseparable from human nature in its proper state. And, as was said in the second book, one of these extremes is less opposed to the mean, and is better in itself than the other: it will be found that the excess of the regulating principle is the better. Thus in ἀνδρεία, φόβος is regulated or counterbalanced, by θάρρος, the excess of which is θρασύτης, and this is better than δειλία.—ἐν τοῖς πρότερον: bk. ii. 7. 2.
- (116.) 9. ἐν τούτοις = ἐν οἷς δύναται μμεῖσθαι.
- (116.) 13. ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, sc. τοῖς μεγίστοις: see chap. viii. 6.
- (117.) 10. καὶ ἐν ταῖς λύπαις. δειλία is rather passive than active: it is not that the δειδός has no instincts towards bravery, but that the prospect of pain influences him too strongly; hence it is viewed rather as a ὑπερβολή of φόβος than a deficiency of θάρρος.
- (118.) 12. περὶ ταῦτά, al. περὶ ταῦτα: but the former is the better, though there is MSS. authority for the other.—βον-λόμενοι, ready and eager.

- (119.) 13. The suicide is not ἀνδρείος, because one of the conditions for ἀνδρεία given above is wanting, viz. the καλόν as a motive.
- (120.) 13. ὅτι is to be taken after αἰρείται καὶ ὑπομένει.—ὑπομένει, sc. θάνατον, ὅτι καλόν ἐστί.

CHAPTER VIII.

- (112.) Each of the spurious imitations of ἀνδρεία considered in this chapter is deficient in one or more of the conditions of ἀνδρεία given above.
- a. ἡ πολιτική: the true internal καλόν wanting, and its place artificially supplied by external honour and disgrace.
 - b. ἐξ ἐμπειρίας: no φοβερόν.
 - c. ἐκ θυμοῦ: no φοβερόν,—it is overlooked; no καλόν, rather διὰ πάθος; no προαίρεσις.
 - d. τῶν ἐνελπίδων: no φοβερόν,—there is however a δεινόν, which distinguishes these from the next sort.
 - e. ἐξ ἀγνοίας: no φοβερόν, or rather no δεινόν.
- (122.) 1. ἡ πολιτική. It is difficult to find any equivalent word for this; "political" does not convey the required meaning; it may be called the courage displayed by citizens, as citizens, i. e. which would not influence them if they were removed from social life.—μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν: first πολιτική, for this is most like the true.—ἐκ τῶν νόμων: see Thuc. ii. 39.
- (123.) 2. Πουλυδάμας κ.τ.λ.: see Il. xxii. 100. Διομήδης: Il. viii. 148.
- (124.) 3. δι' ἀρετήν. It arises from a good state of mind, viz. respect for oneself and others, (αἰδῶ,) and the desire for καλόν in the shape of honour; but not like ἀνδρεία, from that internal καλόν which is its own reward.
- (125.) 4. εἰς τὰυτο, sc. τοῖς πολιτικοῖς.—δὲ κ.τ.λ. Il. β. 391; and quoted again Pol. iii. 14.—τύπτοντες: see Hdt. vii. 223.
- (126.) 6. ἔθεν καὶ κ.τ.λ. Protagoras, 350; Laches, 195.
- (127.) 6. κενά, al. καινά: both have MSS. authority. Michelet quotes from Tacitus, Hist. ii. 69, "mania belli;" and Cicero

ad Att. v. 10, "scis enim dici quædam πανικά, dici item τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου." καινά, on the other hand, is supported by Thuc. iii. 30, τὸ καινὸν τοῦ πολέμου: so Dion. 40, τὰ καινὸν τοῦ πολέμου ἤρπασε: and again, Diod. Sic. xi., ἀληθὲς εἶναι ὅτι πολλὰ τὰ καινὰ τοῦ πολέμου. If the former is preferred, we must translate it "*vain alarms*;" if the latter, "*surprises*." Section 15, "ἐν τοῖς ἀφνιδίοις φόβοις" seems to favour καινά.—συνεωράκασιν, *take in at a glance*.

(128.) 7. ποιῆσαι: sc. κακόν, *act on the offensive*.—ὁποῖα ἄν εἴη: the ἄν belongs to the εἴη,—which *may be*. Gr. Gr. 832.

(129.) 8. ἰδιώταις, *amateurs*.

(130.) 9. τὰ πολιτικά, for οἱ πολῖται, opposed to the mercenaries, στρατιῶται—ἐπὶ τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ. Onomarchus of Phocis having occupied the Hermæan plain, at the city of Coronæa, the levies of the citizens fought to the death against him, while the Bæotian auxiliaries took to their heels.

(131.) 10. ἰτητικώτατον: see Arist. Nub. 445: so ἱταὶ and ἱταμοί, Plato. Ὀμηρος: Il. xvi. 529; Il. v. 510; Odys. xxiv. 317.

(132.) 10. θυμός is the animal instinct, which, when regulated and elevated into a rational instinct, and directed towards the καλόν, may become ἀνδρεία: it is the natural instinct towards doing and suffering.—συνεργεῖ: cf. Plato, Rep. 440, B.

(133.) 12. ἔζεσεν αἶμα: Theocr. xx. 15.—φυσικωτάτη, *engrained in our nature*.—ἡ διὰ τὸν θυμόν, sc. λεγομένη ἀνδρεία.

(134.) 12. τὰ δι' ἀλγηδόνοσ, sc. τὰ θηρία.—διὰ ταῦτα, for the sake of λυπηρόν in ὀργή, and ἡδύ in τιμωρία.

(135.) 13. διὰ τὰ προειρημένα, sc. διὰ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος.

(136.) 15. ἦττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς, *less a matter of preparation*.—τὰ δὲ ἐξαίφνης κ.τ.λ. That is, λογισμός is merged in the ἔξις, so that the impulses of passion and the suggestions of reason are both lost in the rational instinct.

(137.) 16. ἀξίωμα, *no notion of their own powers*.—ἔκεινοι δέ, sc. ἔχουσι ἀξίωμα.

(138.) 16. οἱ Ἀργεῖοι: Xen. Hell. iv. 10. The Spartans, arming themselves with the shields of the vanquished Sicyonians,

advanced upon the Argives, who, taking them for Sicyonians, received them with contempt, but when they found out who they really were, fled.

CHAPTER IX.

- (139.) In this chapter he shews that λύπη and ἡδονή are the real springs of ἀνδρεία, and that it is the regulation of the λύπη, (φόβος,) by the ἡδονή, (θάρρος.)
- (140.) 1. μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά. It is φόβος which strikes on the mind from external objects: the θάρρος is supplied afterwards from within, as a corrective to the φόβος.
- (141.) 2. τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος, sc. τὸ καλόν. This connection between the καλόν and ἡδύ is recognised in "*dulce et decorum est*," &c.—ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ, *by circumstances*.—εἴπερ σάρκινον, *if they are flesh and blood*.—πᾶς ὁ πόνος, sc. ἐστὶ λυπηρόν—ταῦτα: τὰ ἐν κύκλῳ.
- (141.) 3. καὶ δκοντι: see Gr. Gr. 599. 3.
- (141.) 4. τῷ τοιούτῳ. Compare this with what Socrates says in the Phædo, 62.
- (142.) 5. οὐ δὲ κ.τ.λ. οὐ δὲ, al. οὐδέ, *not in all*: it does in σωφροσύνη, for instance, in which there is enjoyment in moderate indulgence, besides that arising from the καλόν. In ἀνδρεία it arises from the καλόν alone.—ἐφάπτεται, *attains to*: τὸ ἐνεργεῖν is the supplied nom. Michelet,—"aliter quam in fine positum est."
- (143.) 6. Στρατιώτας κ.τ.λ. Take these words, οὐδὲν κελύει κρατίστους εἶναι στρατιώτας, μὴ τοὺς τακούτους, (sc. τοὺς ἀρετὴν ἔχοντας πᾶσαν) ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. "There is no reason why the best soldiers should be, not these above-mentioned but, those who, though having less ἀνδρεία, have less to lose in dying."

CHAPTER X.

- (144.) σωφροσύνη, which, as it is treated of here as one of the virtues, is the regulation of the animal impulses of pleasure, has, both in Aristotle and in strictly classical Greek, especially

in its adjectival form of *σώφρων*, the far wider signification of *self-control*: so that *σώφρων* is sometimes used almost in the same sense as *φρόνιμος*, and it has this signification,—first, in a metaphorical or applied sense,—for as *δρετή* generally is *περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας*, so *σωφροσύνη* is *περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας* in their simplest form; secondly, because the regulation of the animal impulses is so difficult, that he who has really won the mastery over them must have arrived at a considerable degree of moral virtue; and thirdly, because, since all wrong actions spring from wrong notions and conceptions of *ἡδονή* and *λύπη* in general, the right regulation of the all-powerful motive seems right action, (*σώζει τὴν φρόνησιν*: bk. vi. 5. 5).

- (145.) 1. *αἰσται*, sc. *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀνδρεία*: the one is the principal virtue of the concupiscible, the other of the irascible, parts of the soul; they spring directly from the very instincts of our animal nature, which no one is without; so that where they are supposed to be wanting, he is obliged to coin the words *ἀναισθησία* and *ἀφοβία*. The objects which excite them are presented simply by *αἰσθησις*, without the intervention of reason (*λόγος*); while the impulses of the other virtues, such as ambition, are taken cognizance not by *αἰσθησις* alone, but by *αἰσθησις* and reason, (*οὐδὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας*). They are *νοητικαὶ ἐρίξεις*, which could hardly rise up in an animal who was without some share or shadow of reason or intelligence.
- (146.) 1. *περὶ ἡδονὰς*. As in *ἀνδρεία* the *λύπη* (*φόβος*) is regulated and counteracted by the *ἡδονή*, (*θάρρος*), so in *σωφροσύνη* the *ἡδονή* is counteracted and regulated by the *λύπη* arising from a sense of the *αἰσχρόν*, which is, so to say, the negative side of the *καλόν*: (chap. xii. 1, *ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονήν*,—*ἡ δὲ διὰ λύπην*). First of all a desire arises,—if it be a bad one, there arises almost coincidently a sense of the bad desert which will wait upon it; and this acts, or ought to act, as a check upon our passions; hence it is *ἥττον καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως περὶ λύπας*.
- (147.) 1. *ἀκολασία*. Mark the derivation. The state where no correction can avail,—thorough depravity,—where all sense of *αἰσχρόν* is lost.—*φαίνεται* evidently is.
- (148.) 2. Mark his practical appeal to the general language of men.

- (149.) 2. διηρησθωσαν. The division here of ἡδοναί is:—1. σωματικαί and ψυχικαί. 2. σωματικαί is divided into those τῆς ἀφ᾽ ἧς which arise from the organs of sensation, (αἰσθητήρια,) and which we share with animals, and those arising, not directly, from αἰσθητήρια, but from some higher sort of αἰσθησις, (taste,) in which our intellectual nature bears some part, as of beauty and harmony, &c., whether presented to us by the eye or the ear,—what are known in modern philosophy by the name of æsthetics, in which, though not directly the result of reasoning, our intellectual nature bears some part, and which may be formed and improved by study.
- (150.) 6. κατὰ συμβεβηκός, in a metaphorical or applied sense, i. e. arising from the associations accidentally connected with the objects on which sense proceeds, and not from the sense itself.—ἐπιθυμητῶν, al. ἐπιθυμημάτων, the objects or acts of their desire.
- (151.) 8. κατὰ, in; literally, corresponding to: see Gr. Gr. 629. 11. 3, b.—πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, *except as an accidental result*; by an accidental association with some other merely animal perception.—τῇ δ' αἰσθησιν, sc. τῆς βρώσεως.
- (151.) 10. οἱ γὰρ ἀκόλαστοι. The thoroughly depraved man's habits will be without even the elegance and taste which sometimes disguise vice: he will get drunk on anything, so that he gets drunk.
- (152.) 10. ὁ ψοφάγος. Some editions give the name Φιλόξενος ὁ Ἐρύειος before ὁ ψοφάγος, but Bekker omits them. Athenæus, p. 6, b, (1. 10.)—ἐκεῖνος ἐπιμεμφόμενος γὰρ τὴν φύσιν εἰς τὴν ἀπολαύσιν ἠβέγατο ποτὲ γέρανον τὴν φάρυγγα σχεῖν: and again, 341, d, (viii. 26.)—Φιλόξενος ποθ' ὥς λεγουσ', ὁ Κυθήριος ἠβέγατο τριῶν ἔχειν λάρυγγα πήχεων.—αὐτῷ, al. αὐτῷ: see Gr. Gr. 656. 1, and obs.
- (153.) 11. ἡ ζῶα. This gives at once a simple and yet complete definition of the subject-matter of σωφροσύνη.—τρίψεως, friction.—θερμασία, warmth, as in a bath.

CHAPTER XI.

- (154.) Having thus discussed *σωφροσύνη* in its relation to the affections, and explained what sorts of pleasure and pain come properly within the sphere of *σωφροσύνη*, he now goes on to shew how far *propensions* or *desires* are regulated by this habit of mind.—*ἐπιθυμία*, when distinguished from *ἡδονή*, differs from it, in that it springs from *ἐνδεΐα*, and therefore is painful: see below, sect. 6.
- (155.) 1. *κοιναί*, universal, generic. *ἰδία*, peculiar and individual. *ἐπιθετοί* acquired.
- (156.) 2. *ἡμέτερον*, to be of our own making; nevertheless, Nature has some hand in it.—*ἐνία κ.τ.λ.* Every one has particular objects which are to him more pleasant than general ones.
- (157.) 3. *ἐφ' ἑν*, in one direction, viz. in quantity; while in the *ἰδία ἐπιθυμία*, as he tells us below, the *ὑπερβολή* is not only in indulging too much, but indulging at wrong times, &c.; all which shew the passion within us to be stronger and less under control than it ought to be.
- (158.) 3. *αὐτήν*, sc. *γαστέρα*, or *τὴν φυσικὴν ἐπιθυμίαν*.
- (159.) 4. *περὶ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν*. *ἡδονῶν* is used here instead of *ἐπιθυμιῶν*, because, in reality, the peculiar propensions are not from the *ἐνδεΐα* of nature, but from particular views of pleasure; these give rise to *ἐπιθυμίας*: see chap. i. note 40. In the other sort, *ἐπιθυμία* exists previously to any notions of pleasure whatever.
- (160.) 4. *ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ὥς οἱ πολλοί*, more than most men do; *χαίρειν ὥς οἱ πολλοί* could never, in Aristotle's view, make a man *ἀκόλαστος*.—*ἢ ὥς*: for *ἦ*, see Gr. Gr. 779, obs. 2.
- (161.) 4. *μισήτόν* is to *αἰσχρόν* what *ἐπαινετόν* is to *καλόν*; the one referring to the disapprobation of others, the other to that of our consciences.
- (162.) 5. He first takes the two habits of mind in relation to *ἡδονή*, and then to *ἐπιθυμία*.—*ψεκτόν* is evidently a less strong term than *μισήτόν*: it expresses the opinions of men, while

the other expresses their feelings.—περὶ τὰς λύπας. σωφροσύνη is not, like ἀνδρεία, the regulating and counteracting of pain by pleasure, but of pleasure by pain. Pain does not enter into the composition of σωφροσύνη, as presenting objects whence the moral action springs: σωφροσύνη is not resistance to an attack of λύπη, nor ἀκολασία the yielding to it. As far as λύπη is concerned, the ἀκόλαστος feels pain when he fails of his desire; and to the σώφρων the absence of the object of desire is accompanied by pain. And so far pain is connected with these states of mind; but ἡδονή is the essence of them.

- (162.) 6. ὁ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. In the matter of ἐπιθυμία, again, the ἀκόλαστος is its slave, and as every ἐπιθυμία is a painful feeling, the success as well as the failure of the ἀκόλαστος causes him pain; and hence may be seen the folly and absurdity of such a man, (ἀνόητος δὲ ἔοικε).
- (163.) 7. Asceticism was unknown to Aristotle. What would he have said to those who refused the good things of God's providing merely because they were good?
- (164.) 8. The σώφρων has his notions of ἡδονή purified and chastened; his ἐπιθυμίαι moderated and directed.
- (165.) 8. ὅσα δὲ πρὸς κ.τ.λ., al. ἄ. The final causes of these bodily appetites are evidently the health and well-being of the body. Whatever the σώφρων seeks will either contribute directly to these, or, at the least, not hinder them. This rule for cases where positive laws are not laid down, is of universal application, and one much to be remembered as a practical law of action.
- (166.) 8. οὕτως ἔχων, sc. ὀρεγόμενος τῶν ἄλλων ἡδίων, ἐμποδίων τοῖς. —ὅπερ τῇ οὐσίᾳ, beyond his means.

CHAPTERX II.

- (167.) It might be argued that there was some excuse for ἀκόλαστος, inasmuch as he was hurried away by passion, while the δειλός acted more slowly. In this chapter Aristotle, who always shews a peculiar abhorrence of ἀκολασία, proves the contrary.

- (168.) 1. ἡ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. ἀκολασία is the excess of the influence of ἡδονή, unmoderated by the λήπη of shame; δειλία is the influence of λήπη, uncontrolled by the ἡδονή of καλόν. —αιρετόν: hence ἀκολασία is more voluntary.
- (169.) 2. διὰ καὶ ἐπονείδιστόπερον καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.: being voluntary, it is a reproach to any one who falls into it, for he must do so voluntarily; and it is easy to habituate oneself against it; for there are so many ἡδία in life that a man may, without much trouble, exercise himself in temperance: while ἀνδρεία, from the comparatively rare opportunities for its exercise, which are to most men few, and always attended with pain and risk, is less easily attained.
- (170.) 3. δόξειέ τε κ.τ.λ. Voluntariness is mostly tested by the τὰ καθ' ἑκαστα: and hence, as no one wishes to be δειλός, and only is so under pressure from without, it is less voluntary at the moment of action than ἀκολασία, where the motive cause of the evil is ἐπιθυμία and ὀρεῖς from within. ἀκολασία, however in the abstract, is as little an object of desire as δειλία, (τὸ δ' ὅλον ἦτον οὐδεὶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ.): in this respect both are equally (if at all) involuntary.—τοῖς καθ' ἑκαστον: the dative marks the middle term of the argument: Gr. Gr. 609. 5.
- (171.) 3. αὐτῇ, sc. ἀκολασία.
- (172.) 6. μετενήνεχθαι, *to be applied*.—ἐν τοῦτοις, sc. παιδίοις.
- (173.) 7. ἐν πειθείς, the nom. is τὸ αἰσχυρῶν ὀρεγόμενον.—καὶ πανταχόθεν, *from whatever quarter it comes*.—τὸ συγγενές, *that which is kindred to it in the soul, or that whence it springs*.—Michelet, “that which is in our nature.”
- (174.) 7. The notion of the struggle between ἐπιθυμία and λόγος, so frequently spoken of by Aristotle, the key-stone of his Ethics, as applied to education, would suggest the great problem of all systems of education,—how to subdue the passions to the reason,—the great difficulty of right action, and, even apart from the Scriptures, the best proof for the necessity of divine grace.
- (175.) 8. αὐτάς, sc. ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐνεργείας.
- (176.) 9. ἀμφοῖν,—τῆς σωφροσύνης καὶ λόγου.

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

- (1.) THE virtues of fortitude and temperance are the regulation of the animal appetites, instincts of human nature, the immediate impressions of the senses. Those in the fourth book are the regulation of other human appetites or instincts, with which the senses are less directly concerned,—love of money, love of power, love of honour,—the instincts towards social intercourse in every-day life. Thus they are no longer those of the man as an individual, but as a social being: for fortitude and temperance relate rather to the well-being and right action of a man in his relation to himself; liberality, &c., rather refer to his relations and behaviour towards others. Hence the notions of *ἡδονή* and *λύπη* come in less visibly, though not less really, inasmuch as *actual* pleasure and pain have less to do with such actions. But still there is an *ἡδονή* and *λύπη*, an impulse towards, or a check from, a certain course of action, (see chap. i. 28); and whichever of these is, from the constitution of the agent, or the nature of the circumstances, the prevailing motive, is regulated, as the case may be, by the *λύπη* or the *ἡδονή* arising from the sense of *αἰσχρόν* or *καλόν*: and as in *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀνδρεία* the better of the two extremes is that which is the excess of the regulating principle, so in many of these virtues, where there is any general tendency towards one extreme, (where we are *συμφυέστεροι μᾶλλον*.) there the error in the other extreme is the better; while in others of these virtues the impulses and checks are not the same in all men, but vary according to character and circumstances: so that if the better extreme is specified at all, it is not from its being the excess of the regulating principle, (for either extreme may be this, according to character or circumstances,) but *ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος*,—the nature and effects of the thing itself.
- (2.) 3. *ἐπιφέρουμεν συμπλίκοντες*, *we apply*, in connection with other notions.

- (3.) 5. βούλεται εἶναι, *properly is ; claims to be.*
- (4.) 5. διὰ τούτων, sc. χρημάτων ; implied in οὐσίας.—ἐκδεχόμεθα, *we use the term.*
- (5.) 9. καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος δέ, *and praise too* : see Gr. Gr. 769. 2.
- (6.) 9. τὸ γὰρ οἰκείον ἥττον προίενται μάλλον. μάλλον belongs to the whole sentence, ἥττον to προίενται. It is easier not to take than to give ; for men have a reluctance to give away (ἥττον προίενται) what is their own, rather than (μᾶλλον ἢ) not to take what does not belong to them.
- (7.) 10. οὐχ ἥττον, *rather* ; so οὐχ ἥκιστα, *most*. Lidd. and Scott ad v. 3.
- (8.) 11. τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς, i.e. σπουδαίων : see Gr. Gr. 620. 3, b.
- (9.) 15. τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ χρήματα, al. τοῦ τιμῶντος, —but there is no sense in this. The same characteristic as that in the text is given again in sect. 26, and more fully in sect. 20,—μὴ τιμῶντα δι' αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα.
- (10.) 18. τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν. This has no connection with the ὑπερβολή, (going beyond the mean,) but simply to give largely, —more than most people would, or more than what might have been expected of him.
- (11.) 19. τὸ γὰρ μὴ βλέπειν. Here, again, we have the absence of self as an ingredient of virtue.—οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει. This is one distinction between εὐθεριότης and μεγαλοπρέπεια. —The widow's mite will, of course, occur to every reader.
- (12.) 20. εὐθεριώτεροι κ.τ.λ., are, it would seem, more given to liberality.—παρалаβόντες, *inheriting it*.
- (13.) 21. ἐγκαλεῖται : neuter passive : *blame is thrown on*.
- (14.) 23. ἄσωτος : from ἄ and σῶζω.—τυράννοys, *monarchs*.
- (15.) 24. ἐπόμεναι, *thus connected with each other*. ἐναντία, *opposed to each other*.
- (16.) 25. λυπήσεται. This will shew μεταμέλεια, and make the action οὐκ ἐκούσιον.
- (17.) 26. δύνатаι ἀδικεῖσθαι, *is open to wrong*.
- (18.) 27. Σιμωνίδης. He was notorious for his love of money : see Rhet. iii. 2 ; Arist. Pax, 698, Σιμωνίδης ; πῶς ; ὅτι γίρων ὦν καὶ σαπρὸς κερδοῦς ἕκατι κῆν ἐπὶ ῥίπδς πλείοι.

- (19.) 29. πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς, *but in small matters, or with petty objects*. Liberality is displayed in large gifts as well as small; but illiberality shews itself in petty gains. Where the wickedness is on a large scale, it is hardly illiberality, but rather *πλεονεξία*: see sect. 44.—τὰ τῆς ἀσωτίας, *the actions of ἀσωτία*.
- (20.) 30. ἐπεὶ. Michelet rightly observes that ἐπεὶ does 'not always require an apodosis, but can stand independently for *moreover, then, thus*: see bk. vi. 8. 6. This may be an elliptic construction for "since this is so, then," &c.—οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται, *do not always go together*; cf. bk. viii. 4. 5: συναύξεται, on the authority of several MSS.
- (21.) 30. οἷπερ. The ἀσωτος is a man who outruns his private means: see above, sect. 23.
- (22.) 31. ἔχει γὰρ κ.τ.λ. ἀσωτία is nearer the mean, inasmuch as it is only an exaggeration of the virtuous principle. Men, by nature, are prone to think of self, and to feel reluctance (λύπη,) to give to others,—(37, συμφυέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: cf. 44): the regulating principle, the ἡδονή of the καλόν attached to giving, comes in; and this, if carried too far, i.e. beyond the καλόν, becomes ἀσωτία. The καλόν never occurs to the ἀνελύθερος as ἡδύ, and is therefore no principle of action,—(cf. 34, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν).
- (23.) 33. κάθ' ἑαυτὸν εἴρηται, as is implied in what has been said.
- (24.) 35. οὐδὲ τοῦτον ἔνεκα, *sc. τοῦ καλοῦ*.
- (25.) 36. πορίζουσιν, *dat. plur.*
- (26.) 36. εἰς ταῦτα: ἀκολασία—ἀπανή—ἡδονή.
- (27.) 38. ὁλόκληρος, *in all its forms*.
- (28.) 39. τινὰ ἐπιείκειαν, a sort of rectitude, differing from the real, because it is not from love of καλόν, but from the inferior motive, a cautious, selfish fear (εὐλάβειαν) of αἰσχρόν. —αἰσχρόν is not a legitimate motive of right action, where positive καλόν should come in: αἰσχρόν here is "*disgrace*," not "*wrong*."
- (29.) 39. ὠνόμαστα, *—sc. κυμνοπρίστης*, this name is thus *pro-verbially applied*.
- (30.) 40. κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλῷ, *al. μικρά*: those who lend

in small sums at high interest. κατὰ μικρόν,—Gr. Gr. 629, 11, 3, f.—al. καὶ τὰ μικρά. Michelet interprets it, "who give small things for large," joining it with ἐργαζόμενοι.

(31.) 41. ἐπ' αὐτοῖς: is a term common to these: see Gr. Gr. 634. 3, a, fin.

(32.) 44. ἐπὶ ταύτην, in the direction of this.

CHAPTER II.

(33.) 1. ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη. Alcibiades' speech furnishes a good illustration: Thucyd. vi.

(34.) 2. πρὸς αὐτόν. The three points in the μεγαλοπρεπής are: 1. the man's own rank and character; 2. ἐν ᾧ, the circumstances in which he is placed; 3. περὶ ᾧ, the matter in hand, the sum expended,—al. καὶ ᾧ: that is, Alcibiades was μεγαλοπρεπής in his magnificent display at the Olympic games, for the Olympic prize. He would have been βάναντος, had he made the same display at an insignificant meeting, or for an object of mean repute. An Athenian of lower rank would have been βάναντος, had he made the display anywhere;—all the conditions of the πρέπον would have been violated.

(35.) 4. ἀπειροκαλία, want of taste.

(36.) 5. ἐπιστήμονι ᾔσκει, is as it were a man of knowledge,—inasmuch as the ἐπιστήμων can, in physical truth, discern the true point; so can the μεγαλοπρεπής in his habits of life and expenses.—ἰμμελῶς, in fit proportion.

(39.) 6. ἡ ἕξις ὁρίζεται ταῖς ἐνεργείαις (sc. τῷ πρέποντι ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ ᾧ) καὶ ὧν ἐστίν, (sc. τῷ πρέποντι πρὸς αὐτόν).—τὴν δαπάνην, sc. ἀξίαν εἶναι.

(40.) 10. οἷον μέγεθος. This is a difficult passage: the best interpretation seems to be to join it with ἐλευθεριότητος: "In these the μεγά is the characteristic of the μεγαλοπρεπής;" as it were an increased degree of liberality, which has the same subject-matter; or if ταῦτα be read: is on these matters. ἐλευθεριότης, on a large scale; or it may be: "But in these points the μεγά of the μεγαλοπρεπής comes in, as if it were a greatness of something; the notion of greatness is implied in the

very term of *magnificent*. The μεγαλοπρεπής has the characteristic of greatness, though ελευθεριότης is concerned with the very same actions."

- (41.) 10. καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης κ.τ.λ.: and not only when the thing done is greater in itself, "but even when the expense and pains are equal, the μεγαλοπρεπής will produce something more magnificent." Aspasius, quoted by Michelet, illustrates this by saying that the Olympian Jupiter of Pericles was more magnificent than if, at the same cost, he had made a smaller statue, but more richly adorned: in this case, too, the μέγα of the μεγαλοπρεπής exhibits itself. μεγαλοπρεπέστερον seems to have here the sense it would have anywhere else, without any peculiar technical reference to μεγαλοπρέπεια.
- (42.) 10. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτή κ.τ.λ.: for the ἴση δαπάνη does not make an equality, as it would if both were κτήματα, which are valued by their cost; but the nature of the action and character of the agent come into account.
- (43.) 12. τὸ τίς ὤν, *the question who he is*: see Gr. Gr. 457.
- (44.) 14. τὰ τοιαῦτα, *such actions*.—ὧν αὐτοῖς μίτεστιν, *those in whom they have some interest*,—such as living relations, &c.
- (45.) 15. τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα, *sc. μεγαλοπρεπῆ ἐστί*.
- (46.) 16. ἐνταῦθα, *that which, in this or that case, is great, falls under μεγαλοπρέπεια*.
- (47.) 19. εὐνέριβλητον, *is not to be surpassed*; that is, it is as great as it can be.—καὶ refers to τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον, not to εὐνέριβλητον.
- (48.) 20. παρὰ μέλος: literally, *out of tune; unsuitably*.—πορφύραν. In comic exhibitions the παραπέτασμα (or curtain to decorate the scene) was usually of leather, not of purple cloth.—ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς: they were proverbial for their bad taste, and probably had committed some such solecism as that in the text.

CHAPTER III.

- (48.) 1. *τοῖσιν εἶναι*, we should suppose to be.
- (49.) 4. *σώφρων*, a man of well-ordered mind; modest. This word has a generic sense of controlling in some one way or other and restraining our natural tendencies; and the particular sense varies according to the context.
- (50.) 5. *δοτεῖσι*, natty, and well made.
- (51.) 6. *ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἀξίος οὐ πᾶς χαῖνος*. The essence of *χαῖνος* is that he is *ἀνάξιος μεγάλων*:—if a man is *ἀξιος μεγάλων*, and thinks himself *ἀξιος μεγίστων*, this is rather a spurious *μεγαλοψυχία* than *χαυνότης*.
- (52.) 7. *ἂν δόξειεν*, sc. *μικρόψυχος εἶναι*.
- (53.) 8. *οἱ δέ*, the others.
- (54.) 9. *περὶ τῶν*, sc. *δὲ θεοῖς ἀπονέμεται* = *τιμῇν*.—*ἢ δ' ἀξία κ.τ.λ.* This is put in to confine it to its particular subject-matter, viz. some one of τὰ ἔκτος ἀγαθά.
- (55.) 11. *ἄνευ λόγου*, without argument,—of itself.
- (56.) 13. *οὐ μὲν τὸν γε κ.τ.λ.* sc. *πρὸς τὸν γε κ.τ.λ.*
- (57.) 15. *παρασείσαντι*, *demissis manibus*; wringing his hands.—*μῆγα*, of consequence.
- (58.) 16. *κοσμός*, the setting of the virtues.
- (59.) 17. *τῷ μὴ ἔχειν*: dative of cause considered as instrument: see Gr. Gr. 607.
- (60.) 20. *ᾧ δ' ἀμφω*, sc. *ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν ἀγαθά*.
- (61.) 21. *ἐκείνων μὲν*, others.—*αὐτοὶ*, they themselves do what they fancy; their life is without rule: hence they are *ὑπερόπται*.
- (62.) 24. *ὁ ὑπάρξας*, he who first did him a kindness.
- (63.) 25. *οὗτος δὲ*: *οὗτος* is in attraction, while *δὲ* in the next clause depends directly on *μνημονεύειν*.

25. *Θίτειν*. Il. a. 503.—*οἱ Λάκωνες*. The interchange of the infinitive, (*λίγειν*), and finite verb, (*ἔλεγον*, implied after *Λάκωνες*), is curious: in the former, the notion in Aristotle's mind was that Homer had not made Thetis *λίγειν*, &c.; in

the other, that *οἱ Ἀδάκωνες* did not, as a fact, recount, &c.: or it is possible that in the former construction *διό* is equivalent to *τοῦτο αἰτιάν ἐστι*, after which *λέγειν* would follow naturally.

- (64.) 26. *ἡ μόγις*, or *very reluctantly*.—*ἐν ἰκείνοισι*, al. *ἐπ'*, but not so well.
- (65.) 27. *ἀλλ' ἢ*, *except*.
- (66.) 28. The former reading of several MSS.—*παρησιαστικὸς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι, καὶ παρησιαστικὸς δὲ διὸ καταφρονητικὸς καὶ ἀληθευτικὸς κ.τ.λ.*—is evidently corrupt. The reading in the text is given in one MS., and makes good sense. Perhaps *τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι* might have been substituted from the majority of MSS. for *καταφρονεῖν*; and the following words, which really create the difficulty, may have easily crept in, by some carelessness, from the preceding line.
- (67.) 28. *πλὴν ὅσα μὴ*, *except what*; after the analogy of *πλὴν ἐλ' μὴ*, *except*.—*ὅσα μὴ καί*=*ἐλ' μὴ τινα*.—*εἴρονα*, al. *εἰρωνεῖαν*. He does not think it worth while to say what he really means to the common sort.
- (68.) 29. *πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν*: literally, to live looking to another; to order his life by another.
- (69.) 31. *ἀνθρωπολόγος*, *he does not talk of men or human life*, but of something higher.
- (70.) 32. *σπουδάζοντος*, of one who cares for such things.
- (71.) 34. *λέξις στασιμος*, and his style stately.—*σύντορος*, *eager*.
- (72.) 33. *οὐδ' οὗτος*: see chap. ii. 22.
- (73.) 35. *δκνηροί*, *lazy*; not caring to take the trouble to act worthily of themselves; al. *νοεροί*, *sharp*, i.e. looking too sharply into themselves; al. *νοηροί*, *stupid* = *ἐαυτοὺς ἀγνωοῦντες*.
- (74.) 37. *γίνεται μᾶλλον*, there is a greater tendency to it; men are more apt to act below themselves: so that *χαυνότης* is merely an excess of that proper pride which regulates and elevates self-distrust into self-knowledge, and, where true merit really exists, leads to the self-esteem wherewith the *μεγαλόψυχος* regards himself (in a human sense, not improperly) as the possessor of virtue.

(75.) 38. The *μεγαλόψυχος* is doubtlessly, at first sight, contrary to Christian humility, and contains many repulsive features; but we must remember that a Christian is to walk worthily of the vocation wherewith he is called, and that there is nothing unchristian in what Leighton speaks of in *Serm. xiv. vol. iii. p. 256*: "It is a thing both of unspeakable excellence and usefulness for a Christian often to consider the excellence of that state to which he is called. It cannot fail to put him upon very high resolutions, and carry him on in that divine ambition of behaving daily more suitably to his high calling and hopes;" and again, *Serm. xv. p. 271*: "There is a greatness and height of spirit in the love of God and union with Him that doth vainly swell and lift it up, but with the deepest humility joins the highest and truest magnanimity." Who can read the end of Montrose, and say that his *μεγαλοψυχία* made his death less Christian? The *μεγαλοψυχία* of the heathen is founded on his own merit,—that of the Christian on the position in which he is placed by God; but with this distinction, the *μεγαλοψυχία* of Aristotle contains a great principle of Christian ethics, which it is much to be wished might be more recognised, especially by the young. It must be borne in mind, too, that the *μεγαλόψυχος* must be *δίκαιος* before he can pay respect to virtue in his own person; and that it is revelation only which teaches us distinctly that we never can be personally *δίκαιοι*. The features which are so repulsive and ridiculous in this character are its accidents, and arise from the fashions and notions of the time, which made them seem proper ways of exhibiting one's self-esteem before the world.

CHAPTER IV.

(76.) 1. *ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις*. Bk. ii. 7. 8.

(77.) 1. *ἀφεστᾶσι*, *lay no claim to*,—*have nothing to do with*.

(78.) 1. *τιμῆς ὀρίξει*. In *μεγαλοψυχία* there is no *ἄρεσις τιμῆς*: the really magnanimous is content, whether he is praised or blamed by those around him.

(79.) 4. *ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό*, *we do not refer it to the same standard*.

(80.) 5. *ἐρῇ μ ης*, *sc. μεσότητος*.—*καὶ τὸ μέσον*, *sc. ὅτι, where*

there are extremes, there is also a mean.—ἀνώνυμος, an evidence of such a character being practically unrecognised.

- (82.) 5. φαίνεται δὲ κ.τ.λ. When contrasted with φιλοτιμία, such a well-regulated desire of honour would seem short of what was proper; when with ἀφιλοτιμία, it would seem to exceed it; while contrasted with both at once, it would seem, in some way or other, to combine both: it would seem to be either, according to the light in which it was held.
- (83.) 6. ἔοικε κ.τ.λ. This, it seems, is the case in the other virtues,—the mean is opposed to each and both the extremes, while the extremes are only accidentally opposed to each other, as being each opposed to the mean; but here the only apparent opposition is between the two extremes, as the mean, though really existing, is not practically recognised: hence over-ambition seems to be directly opposed to under-ambition; but in reality each is opposed to a well-regulated ambition.

CHAPTER V.

- (84.) 1. μεσότης περὶ ὀργῆς. The regulation of those emotions of our irascible nature, (Top. iv. 5, 5. p. 172, ἡ δὲ ὀργὴ ἐν τῷ θυμοῖσθαι: cf. Top. ii. 7. 4. p. 133,) which are created by the actions of others towards us, and in which θυμός, with ἡδονή attached to it in prospect, (see Rhet. ii. 2. 2.) furnishes the impulse, rather than any pleasurable ὀρεξις: it is ὀρεξις μετὰ λύπης, not μεθ' ἡδονῆς, (sect. 10, τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ποιοῦσα ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ λύπης). For the meaning and function of θυμός, see bk. iii. note 10.
- (85.) 1. ἀνανύμου ὄντος κ.τ.λ. There is some difficulty in treating of this virtue, because it does not seem as if there were three distinct degrees or forms of anger; both ὀργή and πραότης which are the only recognised forms in which this πάθος shews itself, being rather simple affections, than affections controlled or uncontrolled: hence πραότης is by some men, and under certain circumstances, looked upon as the right habit of mind, and at other times, ὀργή: but Aristotle contents himself with shewing that in their praise and blame men do recognise a mean between rage and insensibility; that this

mean or regulation of anger, which he calls *πραότης*, is stamped as the virtue of these instincts of our nature by that approbation of men which in the end of the first book he laid down as the standard or sign of virtue, (see sect. 14, *infra*: *τό γε τοσούτον δῆλον ὅτι ἡ μὲν μέση εἰς ἐπαινετή*).

- (86.) 3. *βούλεται γάρ*: see bk. iii. note 15.
- (87.) 6. *τὸ δὲ προπηλακίζμενον κ.τ.λ.* It is scarcely necessary to call attention to the contrast between this feature of heathen ethics and Christianity.—*περιρῶν*, sc. *προπηλακίζομένους*.
- (88.) 7. *ὁλόκληρον*, *occupied the whole character*; or *was developed in all its points*.
- (89.) 8. *ἀνταποδιδόασιν*, *return the injury*; al. *ἀποδιδόασιν*.—*ἢ φανεροί εἰσι*, in the way in which their anger is felt, (see Rhet. ii. 2. 1, and 3. 16). Michelet takes it, “so that through their sharpness of mind they discover their anger;” but it seems better to join *διὰ ὀξύτητα* with *ἀνταποδιδόασιν*, and to take *ἢ φανεροί* as above, especially when we refer to the characteristic given in the Rhetoric, as to the necessity of their revenge being felt to come from them: they do not wish to do a harm secretly, but openly.
- (90.) 12. *τῇ πραότητι*: the lack of anger is merely an excess of the controlling principle; for anger is the instinct which, being properly regulated, becomes *πραότης*,—*μᾶλλον γίνεται*, sc. *ἡ ὑπερβολή*.
- (91.) 14. The mean, though *ἀνώνυμος*, is recognised by the praise of men generally as the virtue of this part of our nature.

CHAPTER VI.

- (92.) We come to the virtues of the social, or what perhaps may be more properly called the sociable, instincts of man.
- (93.) 2. *τοῖς ἐντιγχνάουσιν*, *in whose society they may be*.
- (94.) 3. *ὅτι ἡ μέση εἰς ἐπαινετή*. The point proved in this chapter likewise is, that the mean is recognised as the virtue of the sociable instincts, considered apart from *φιλία*, or the social affections.
- (95.) 3. *ἀποδέξεται*, *he will approve*.

- (96.) 5. τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, from his social instincts being properly regulated, and in the mean.—οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν, *to grieve for them.*
- (97.) 6. καθόλου κ.τ.λ.: speaking of it generally in its abstract character, it is merely habitual propriety in social intercourse; but when we consider how far it takes cognizance of what is individually or socially right, (ἀναφύρων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ σύμφερον,) we shall find that it is habitual propriety in regard of the sympathies of social life, and the pleasures and pains attached to them; that such pain and pleasure is the subject-matter of it, and that the mean consists in the regulation of our natural desire to please and sympathize with others, (καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν αἰρούμενος συνηδύνειν,) by the higher considerations of private and public good: that when it is for another's good, he will not hesitate to give pain by not sympathizing with the evil or harmful pleasures of others, but rather opposing them. And this virtue, as given by Aristotle, is no small ingredient in the practical Christian propriety which refuses to join in the scoff or the jest of ribaldry; and which, knowing that such things are worthy of death, can find no pleasure in those that do them. There are few points of practical Christianity more habitually needed, few more neglected. It is a jewel both precious and rare.
- (98.) 8. τοῖς δὲ ἀποβαίνουσιν κ.τ.λ., *following its accidental results; that is, private or public good.*
- (99.) 9. The ἀρεσκος or κῶλαξ seems to be the only contrary to the δύσερις, through the mean to which really both are opposed having no name; δύσερις is opposed to κῶλαξ, and both to the μέσος.

CHAPTER VII.

- (100.) 1. προσποιήμασι, *pretensions.*
- (101.) 2. τῶν ἐνδόξων: of what might be, but is not.
- (102.) 4. αὐθέκαστος, simple, straightforward; without pretence; just what he really is: Eud. iii. 7, ἀληθὲς καὶ ἀπλοῦς ὃν καλοῦσιν αὐθέκαστον.
- (103.) 8. ἐπιεικής, *a good, honest man.*

- (104.) 9. ἐπὶ τὸ ἑλαττον κ.τ.λ. The μᾶλλον belongs to ἀποκλίνει: *he rather tends to make things seem less than they are.*

10. οὐ γὰρ ἄν, sc. εἰ μὴ οὕτως ἦν.

- (105.) 12. οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει. The same phrase occurs in the Rhetoric about the sophist, on reference to which, and the context, its meaning will be seen to be, that the sophist has no separate formulæ, or false system of logic, (οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην); but he uses true logic as well as false if it suits his purpose, (προαίρεσις τοῦ φαίνεσθαι σοφός): so here the ἀλάζων has no formulæ or system to guide him in the choice and treatment of his subject-matter; but uses whatever comes to hand, just as it may for the time suit his purpose, of making him seem a greater man than he is: what he says is not even always false, but simply so said as to produce false impressions about the greatness of his own merits. Others translate τῇ δυνάμει by *what he can do*, by *his having the power to do so*,—referring to Top. iv. 5. 7, p. 170; but the passage seems to refer to something else,—to the cases where the person has been blamed merely because he has it in him to do wrong, whereas the *will* (προαίρεσις) is the point in question.—τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι, i. e. *by his disposition*, (προαίρεσις).

- (106.) 12. ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης, κ.τ.λ. as the liar is so, i. e. κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι;—one sort lying for the mere sake of lying, the other from his tendency to ambition or covetousness, (δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους); or ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης may be in a parenthesis, as *the liar proper*, and ὁ μὲν and ὁ δέ refer to two sorts of ἀλάζωνες, and not of ψεύσται.

- (107.) 13. οἱ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Supply ἐστὶν after ἐφ' οἷς; after κέρδους, supply ἀλαζονεύμενοι προσποιῶνται τοιαῦτα ὡν καὶ κ.τ.λ.—διαλαθεῖν which may be undetected, if they do not exist: pretensions which cannot be tested; as a false prophet, or a quack, can always give reasons why their predictions or their remedies turn out wrong—μάντιν σοφόν, al. μάντιν ἢ σοφόν, i. e. two persons, a seer, or a sophist or philosopher. In the reading in the text, σοφόν is only an ironical epithet of μάντιν, like our *wise man* for a fortune-teller.

- (108.) 13. τοιαῦτα, such things as; sc. μαντείαν, σοφίαν, λατρίαν.—τὰ ἐλεημέρια, sc. δόξα, ἀπώλανσις, λαθεῖν.

- (109.) 15. βαυκοπανοῦργοι, *affected fellows*: ἀπὸ τῶν θανκιδων δ' ἴσταν εἶδος ὑποδημάτων Ἰωνκῶν.
- (110.) 15. οἶον ἢ τῶν Λακῶνων ἰσθῆς: the ultra-simplicity of the Spartan costume is in reality not modesty, but conceit. Cf. Xen. de Rep. &c., ii. 3. 4.
- (111.) 16. ἐμπροδών, *before one's feet*,—obvious.

CHAPTER VIII.

- (112.) 1. δμιλία ἐμμελής, a certain well-timed sociability. Another virtue of social life consists in the proper regulation of the instincts towards relaxation and society.
- (113.) 3. βωμολόχοι: properly, those that waited about the altars to get the refuse of the sacrifices; a *lickspittle*, *buffoon*.
- (114.) 4. εὐτράπελοι, *witty*. We have a similar metaphor in our *well-turned jest*, *compliment*, &c.—χαρίεντες, *amusing*, *pleasing*.
- (115.) 4. ἐπιπολάζοντας, *being very common*. Cf. bk. i. 4. τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας δόξας.
- (116.) 5. ἐπιδεξιότης, *neatness*, *tact*.
- (117.) ἐν παιδίᾳς μέρει, *jestingly*, *in sport*.
- (118.) 6. ὑπόνοια, *the under or hidden sense*; wit, jest, play on words.
- (119.) 9. ἔδει ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν, *perhaps they ought to have forbidden joking a person*.
- (120.) 10. ἦττων ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ., *is a slave to his jest*.

CHAPTER IX.

- (121.) 1. πάθει. This αἰδώς is one of the elements of φυσικὴ ἀρετή.
- (122.) 2. ἀποτελεῖται, *its results are of like nature with those of fear and danger*; literally, it is perfected, or develops itself, in much the same way as fear; i. e. both are *σωματικά*.
- (123.) 3. ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς. Here we see the function of αἰδώς: men are also hindered by the fear of αἰσχρόν; but this rather is a rational, the other an instinctive, emotion.

- (114.) 5. οὐδέτερα πρακτέα, we should avoid the very appearance of evil.
- (115.) 6. τὸ δὲ οὕτως ἔχειν κ.τ.λ. The notion that shame, or sorrow for vice, is the same as being virtuous, is absurd, for the notion of virtue implies abstinence from indulgences or actions on which shame would follow.
- (116.) 7. εἴη δὲ: "*shame would be the feeling of a virtuous man on the supposed case (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) of his doing what was wrong:*" but this is really and practically impossible (οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρεάς): ἐπεικεοῦς would be a better reading, were there MS. authority for it.

BOOK V.

CHAPTER I.

- (1.) HAVING now treated of the particulars of our moral obligation separately, and shewn that in each part of our moral nature the μεσότης, or balance of the impulses and principles proper to that part, is the ἀρετή and performs the ἔργον thereof,—he now proceeds to our social nature, and shews, first, that looking on δικαιοσύνη as a habit of mind, these ἀρεταί of our moral nature are collectively the performance of social obligation, which is the highest law to which man, as man, is subject; and secondly, looking on δικαιοσύνη as a political system, that as the perfection of man's nature lies in the mean, so does the perfection of the state. The ἡ ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνη is not, as we shall presently see, primarily a balance περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, as the other virtues are, but περὶ ἴσων καὶ ἀνισων in a social system. The former completes the proof of ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ being the proper ἔργον of man's nature,—

δικαιοσύνη develops the ἔργον of man, (is ἀρετὴ τελειοτάτη: see bk. i. c. 7);

ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ is δικαιοσύνη;

ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ develops the ἔργον of man;

while the latter is an additional proof in the way of analogy that the moral excellence of man lies in the mean habit: for in ancient philosophy, so close an analogy was conceived to

exist between the state and the individual, that if the excellence of the state were not in a mean, it would have been, according to the rule of the scholastic philosophy of those days, an almost conclusive argument against a *μεσότης* being the *ἀρετή* of the individual.

- (2.) 2. *ὁρῶμεν δὲ πάντας κ.τ.λ.* The most usually received notion of *δικαιοσύνη* views it as a habit of mind which makes us just both in will and act. We must examine in what just action consists. He takes the opinions and notions of men on the subject, just as he had referred to them in forming his notion of *εὐδαιμονία*, and in discussing the several *ἀρεταί*, (*κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς προκειμένοις*).
- (3.) 4. *αὐτὸ δὲ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* The *γὰρ* refers to some such suppressed sentence as "*this general outline of the nature of the two, and the opposition between them, will help us to define justice, for, &c.*" *δύναμις γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* In the sciences or the formal arts, opposite results proceed from the same system, as logic is equally used by the logician for a good and by the sophist for a bad end; so that a bad result is no evidence of a bad science or art, but only of a misuse of a good one; while in moral matters, opposite actions must proceed from opposite habits: and thus from bad actions a bad habit is proved to exist, and from good actions a good habit; hence, from unjust actions we may argue the existence and nature of *ἀδικία*, and *ἀδικία* must have a contrary habit (*δικαιοσύνη*), whence just actions arise; and from knowing what is *ἀδικον* we may find what is *ἀδικία* (*αἱ ἔξεις ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων*), and from knowing *ἀδικία* we may find out *δικαιοσύνη* (*γνωρίζεται ἡ ἐναντία ἔξις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναντίας*): and in this case this is the easiest and most certain way; for *δικαιοσύνη* embraces so much, and is so high a perfection, that men have scarcely formed any positive notion of it, while *ἀδικία* is so much a matter of every-day life, that there is no difficulty in pointing out what men hold to be unjust; and this done, we easily get at a positive notion of *ἀδικία*, and thence of the *ἐναντία ἔξις*, viz. *δικαιοσύνη*.
- (4.) 4. *αὐτὸ, sc. δοκεῖ εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων*: the opposite habit does not belong to opposite results, i. e. an habit which has some other habit opposed to it, cannot produce the results which belong to that opposite. Thus health cannot produce the same result as sickness, but the art of medicine may be used

to produce either. Some commentators leave out οὐ; i. e. "but the contrary habit is of (i. e. has) contrary results." The sense is much the same.

- (5.) 6. *πλεοναχῶς λέγεται*, *spoken of in more senses than one*. —ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, not in all cases: the Paraphrast instances *φιλεῖν* and *μισεῖν*, where *μισεῖν* has not all the meanings opposed to *φιλεῖν*.
- (6.) 7. *ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σύγγγυς κ.τ.λ.* For *ὁμωνυμία*, see *Categ.* i. 1. Where the identity of name arises from a close similarity between the things, the difference between them is apt to be overlooked.
- (7.) *διαφορὰ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν*, the generic difference.
- (8.) 8. *καὶ ὁ ἀνισος*, al. *καὶ ἀδικος*; but the former is the better, dividing *ἀδικος* into *παράνομος*, *πλεονέκτης* and *ἀνισος*: the two last are afterwards combined.
- (9.) 8. *ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ*. He gives his reasons for omitting *πλεονέκτης* in his division of the *ἀδικον* and *δίκαιον* just given, though spoken of by men as a sort of injustice. *καὶ* is omitted in some MSS.
- (10.) 9. οἱ δ' ἀνθρώποι down to *ἀγαθὴ* is in a parenthesis.
- (11.) 9. *δεῖ δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' ἐσθλαί κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle here seems to recognise the necessity for some change of heart: men have wrong notions of *ἀγαθόν*; they do not recognise the real *ἀγαθόν* as good to them. This ought not to be so; their notions of good ought to undergo some change. This cannot be done by themselves, but they must *pray* for it.
- (12.) 10. *ἀλλ' ὅτι δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ.* He is merely explaining why there is no such term as *μειονεξία*.
- (13.) 11. *τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει κ.τ.λ.* The term *ἀνισον* embraces both *πλεονεξία* and *μειονεξία*. Michelet reads the passage, *ἔστι γὰρ ἀνισος*, (*τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ κοινόν*), *καὶ παράνομος*: *τοῦτο γὰρ*, (*ἢ παρανομία ἦτοι ἢ ἀνισότης*), *περιέχει πᾶσαν ἀδικίαν καὶ κοινόν ἐστὶ πάσης ἀδικίας*; but this is probably a gloss. Cardwell's edition has *καὶ παράνομος* before *τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει*, but this destroys the meaning of the passage, which is to shew that *ἀνισος* comprehends and is applicable to both *πλεονεξία* and *μειονεξία*. This is fully stated in what follows in some editions, but is probably a gloss, (*τὸ γὰρ ἀνισον ἔχει καὶ τὸ πλεον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον*).

(14.) 13. οἱ δὲ νόμοι κ.τ.λ.: δίκαιον in this its widest sense and sphere embraces the whole political system,—every thing which is ποιητικὸν or φυλακτικὸν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ.—This is ὅλη δικαιοσύνη, which comprehends under it the δικαιοσύνη κατ' ἀρετὴν, and ἡ ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνη.

(15.) It may be as well to give at once the scheme of δικαιοσύνη, as it will throw light on what is coming:—

α. ὅλη δικαιοσύνη, (given in ch. i. 13,) the whole system of political arrangement (νόμιμον), the ἀδικία of which is παράνοον in its widest sense.

β. ἡ κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν, (ch. i. 14 and 19,) ordering and encouraging habits and acts of the several virtues; the ἀδικία of which is not ἀνισον, but παράνομον, though this in its wider sense comprehends both divisions. This exists first as an habit energising in the performance of virtues considered as duties towards others; secondly, as a political system of laws, rewards, punishments, guiding to such an habit.

γ. ἡ ἐν μέρει τῆς ὅλης, (ch. ii.), regulation of political union; the ἀδικία of which is ἀνισον. This exists first as a political regulation of the principles of political union, and of distributive, retributive, catallactic arrangements, (παρὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν); secondly, as a habit of mind or disposition towards acting on such principles, (ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς,) a regulation of the covetous tendencies with especial view to others: hence it is that this δικαιοσύνη is said at one time to be παρὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν, (ch. ii. 7,) and at another, ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς, (ch. ii. 1).

(16.) 13. πᾶσιν, democracy: ἀρίστοις, aristocracy; ἡ τοῖς κυρίοις, or the governing body.—ἡ κατ' ἄλλον τινα τρόπον τοιοῦτον ἢ κατ' ἀρετὴν, selected for virtue or some other principle, such as wealth, birth, &c. The difference between the ἀριστοὶ and the κύριοι κατ' ἀρετὴν would be, that in the former the interest of the better sort, whether in office or not, would be consulted; in the latter, the interest only of those who in consequence of their merit hold office: the latter would be rather oligarchical. ἡ κατ' ἀρετὴν is omitted in some editions, and in one MS.

(17.) 15. αὕτη μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνη. This is the δικαιοσύνη which answers to ἡθικὴ ἀρετή, and performs one part of the function of δικαιοσύνη generally, (the general prosperity of the

state,) by enjoining and encouraging virtue, (τὰ δὲ ποιήματα τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ ὅσα νομοθεῖται περὶ παιδείαν, ch. ii. 11).

- (18.) 15. ἀρετὴ τελεία. Here then is solved the question started at the outset, (bk. i. ch. vii. 16,) and this gives the middle term for the syllogism of the book :—

Whatever is τελειοτάτη ἀρετή performs the ἔργον of man ;
ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἕτερον is this (for it = δικαιοσύνη, which is τελειοτάτη ἀρετή) ;

ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἑαυτόν performs the ἔργον of man.

In the after-part of this book he shews that there is no higher law, or ἔργον, than δικαιοσύνη, as he has before shewn that each particular μεσότης performs the ἔργον of the passions or tendencies to which it belongs, making the habit of mind good, with relation to oneself and to others.

- (19.) 15. οὐχ ἀπλῶς, *not without some limitation ; not in its most literal sense.*—οὕθ' Ἑσπερος κ.τ.λ. This saying is ascribed to Euripides, Theognes, or Aristotle himself, all equally without authority.

- *(20.) 15. τελεία μάλιστα: because it is social, which is the highest standard we can take for man, as man. ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ taken ἀπλῶς could not have been the ἀρετὴ of social man, but it becomes so when it is connected with δικαιοσύνη.

- (21.) 16. ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείξει: cf. Soph. Ant. 175.

- (22.) 20. ἑστὶ γὰρ ἡ αὐτή: in themselves, they are identical ; each being the possession of the same habits and the performance of the same duties.—τὸ μέντοι εἶναι: their essence is different ; they will be differently defined. ἀρετὴ=the possession of the habits and performance of the duties with reference to *individual* or *moral* perfection, (ἀπλῶς) ; δικαιοσύνη=the possession of the same habits and performance of the duties with reference to *social* perfection, (πρὸς ἕτερον). τὸ εἶναι is used in Aristotle in different senses, (πολλὰς γὰρ τὸ εἶναι λέγομεν, Met. xii. p. 264) : when opposed to λόγος, it signifies the actual objective existence of anything, as opposed to a verbal or merely subjective notional existence, (Met. xii. 2, p. 263) ; in another sense, (as here,) it means the full mental notion or definition of the thing, as opposed to an accidental, incomplete view of it. So De Anima, iii. 2, ἡ δὲ τοῦ

αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ μία—τὸ δὲ εἶναι οὐ ταῦτόν αὐταῖς): accidentally, the reception of the image of the αἰσθητόν and its transmission from the αἰσθητόν are the same; but in essence they differ, inasmuch as one is an energy of the subject, the other of the object: so the words spoken are the same to the hearer and speaker, but they would be differently defined in relation to each.

CHAPTER II.

- (23.) 1. There is some difficulty in determining the exact relation in which ἡ ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνη stands to δικαιοσύνη in general, and to ἡθικὴ ἀρετή; whether the ἐν μέρει refers to its being a subdivision of δικαιοσύνη, or as contained under ἡθικὴ ἀρετή: either of these views seems at variance with expressions used in these chapters. ἡθικὴ ἀρετή and δικαιοσύνη are not convertible terms, as that would exclude the ἡ ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνη in its function of a regulation of διανομή and χρεία. It will be found best, I think, to adopt the general division given above, and to view ἡ ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνη as a subdivision of ὅλη δικαιοσύνη when considered as a regulation of the above principles of social life, and as contained under ὅλη ἀρετή when viewed as a habit of mind; so that ἡ ἐν μέρει ἀδικία is παράνομον in its widest sense of a violation of the whole νόμιμον, as well as in its lesser sense of a violation of ἡθικὴ ἀρετή. The twofold nature of ἡ ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνη as a social arrangement and mental habit, necessitates this seeming cross-division; had there been a separate term for each, this of course would have been avoided.—ἐν μέρει δρετῆς: as being an habit of mind, it falls under the general class of ἀρετή; it is a particular virtue. The arguments here fall into the second figure.
- (24.) 3. τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον: in the widest sense of παράνομον, in which it is opposed to νόμιμον, to the whole system of political arrangement.
- (25.) 4. The argument here is also in the second figure.
- (26.) 5. ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν: no moral vice.
- (27.) 6. παρὰ τὴν ὅλην: as being a political regulation of διανομή and χρεία, and thus having a different subject-matter

this ἀδικία is distinct from ὅλη κακία, and this δικαιοσύνη from ὅλη ἀρετή.—ἐν μέρει: as being an habit of mind, or habitual disposition to act unfairly in these points, διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους.

- (28.) 8. διώρισταί κ.τ.λ. This may be thus paraphrased:—"ἀδικον being divided into παράνομον and ἄνισον, there is a δικαιοσύνη and ἀδικία proper to each of these, which we must discuss; and the ἀδικία and δικαιοσύνη of these two stand to each other in the relation of whole and part." The object is to shew how it is that, though ἄνισον and παράνομον are contrasted divisions of ἀδικον, yet one falls under the other as a subdivision, and of the two sorts of δίκαιον corresponding to these, one is contained under the other, (ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς,) just as πλεόν and ἄνισον, though likewise contrasted divisions of ἀδικον, stand to each other as part to whole.—ἡ πρότερον εἰρημένη ἀδικία, sc. that which is opposed to χρήσις ὅλης ἀρετῆς.

- (29.) 9. καὶ τὸ ἀδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία κ.τ.λ. The way to construe this is: "the ἀδικον and ἀδικία of the παράνομον and ἄνισον (ἐκείνων referring to the division given above, note 28,) are different; the former includes as a whole the latter, just as ἄνισον includes as a whole the πλεόν." Some editions read παράνομον for πλεόν, which confuses the passage: the MSS. vary; but the reading in the text is the best.

- (30.) 9. τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης: see above, note 23.—αὕτη ἡ ἀδικία, sc. περὶ τὸ ἄνισον.—ὅλης ἀδικίας: that is, the ἀδικία which is the violation of ὅλη ἀρετή. The words "ψέγομεν γάρ" in the first section shew that he is speaking of this particular ἀδικία as a part of the violation of ὅλη ἀρετή, (ἐν μέρει κακίας,) and not merely as a subdivision of δικαιοσύνη generally. See note 15.

- (31.) 10. πατατόμενα, al. προστατόμενα.

- (32.) 11. ἀπλῶς, generally, properly speaking; considered as an individual.—ὑστερον: briefly in the last chapter of the book, but at length in the Politics.—ἡ εἵρα: sc. whether education should be of public or private concern.

- (33.) 11. οὐ γὰρ ἴσως κ.τ.λ. There may be, indeed are, states in which the rewards and punishments of the law do not coincide with the impulses and checks of conscience, nor

even with the recognised duties of a moral being. It would be easy to give instances in which this is the case. In the *βελτίστη πολιτεία*, the model state, they would coincide. The matter is discussed in Pol. iii.

- (34.) 12. The motive powers of the state, answering to *ἡδονή* and *λύπη* in an individual, are *διανομή* and *χρεία*; and Aristotle proceeds to shew that the perfection of the state is arrived at by a mean, and thus to confirm his view, that the perfection of an individual lies in a mean.
- (35.) 13. τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων, κ.τ.λ. The *ἐκούσια* belong to catallactic, the *ἀκούσια* to diorthotic or corrective justice, so called from its correcting evils: distributive justice would exist even in the *βελτίστη πολιτεία*, as being an adjustment of the common property which must find place in every society; but the other would cease to exist where *δικαιοσύνη* was superseded by *φιλία*, in that ideal state to which theorists thought it possible to mould society, and with a view to which they would admit (as Plato in his Republic) such institutions as community of property, wives, children, &c.

CHAPTER III.

- (36.) 1. ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. Since the *ἄδικος* is *ἀνισος*, it is further to be observed that there is a mean (*μέσον*) implied in the notion of *ἀνισον*, (as containing a *πλέον* and *ἐλάττω*), viz. the *ἴσον*; and the *ἄδικον* being *ἀνισον*, it follows (*ἐξ ἐναντίων*) that there is an *ἴσον*: *δίκαιον* is this *ἴσον*, and hence also *μέσον*; it is not only an absolute equality (*ἴσον*), but also a relative equality (*μέσον*), as equally removed from *πλέον* and *ἐλάττω*: where the equality is absolute, the *δίκαιον* will be simply *ἴσον*, but being *ἴσον*, it will also be a *μέσον*; where the equality is relative, the *δίκαιον* will be a *μέσον* between *πλέον* and *ἐλάττω*, and hence also *ἴσον*: in both cases it is *δίκαιόν τισιν*; hence the following arrangement holds:—

Distributive justice.

δίκαιον is	{	<i>δίκαιον τισιν</i> = general, soldier.
		<i>μέσον τινῶν</i> : things in which, looking to the position of the parties, there is in the <i>διανομή</i> neither
		<i>πλέον</i> nor <i>ἐλάττω</i> , but a <i>μέσον</i> ,—relative equality:
		see sect. 12.

Catallactic justice

δίκαιον { *δίκαιόν τισιν.*
ἴσον δυοῖν, absolute equality between two things,
without reference to their character, (see ch. iv.
sect. 3,) but still, as being *ἴσον*, it is a *μέσον*, (see
iv. 6).

- (37.) 6. *δταν ἡ ἴσοι μὴ ἴσα κ.τ.λ.* Here are given the two faults which prove *οἰκείαι φθοραί* to a constitution admitting them;—the French system before the revolution is an instance of the former, and the American constitution of the latter.
- (38.) 7. *ἐλευθερίαν*, i. e. that every free man is entitled to an equal share.—*ἐγγίσειαν*. This was the principle of the old constitutions of Athens and Rome, in which the belonging to certain tribes or families was the *ἀξία* of the constitution.
- (39.) 8. *μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ*, *number proper*, such as 1, 5, 10, &c., by which we count; *δλως ἀριθμοῦ*, numbers generally, —wherever the notion of quantity exists.
- (40.) 9. *ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ συνεχής*: this is merely to answer a plausible *ἑνστάσις* against his statement that all analogy has four terms. In arithmetic this continuous proportion may occur, (as $3 : 6 :: 6 : 12$.) but in geometrical proportion, (*ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον ὡς ὅλον πρὸς ὅλον*.) which is the proportion of distributive justice, the same term cannot be used twice, and therefore it is not continuous: see sect. 13. Michelet thus illustrates this:—

ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον

Achilles Ajax Nummi Achilles Nummi Ajacis
8 : 4 : 6 : 3

ἐναλλάξ

Achilles Nummi Achilles : Ajax Nummi Ajacis
8 :: 6 :: 4 3

ὅλον πρὸς ὅλον, ὅπερ ἡ νομὴ συνδυάζει

Achilles et Nummi Ajax et Nummi Achilles : Ajax
 $(8+6)=14 : (4+3)=7 :: 8 : 4$

Hence τὸ ὅλον πρὸς ὅλον ὡς ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον.

- (41.) 11. *ἐναλλάξ, interchanging them*.—*συνδυάζει*. The act of distribution attaching the proper proportion to each person, *forms by combination* the ὅλον, Achilles and his share, $(\alpha + \gamma)$; πρὸς ὅλον, Ajax and his share, $(\beta + \delta)$.

- (42.) 12. τοῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, of the ἀδικον which is contrary to proportion. The syllogism is—
 ἀνάλογον is μέσον,—as being the point between πλίον and ἔλαττον;
 δίκαιον is ἀνάλογον;
 δίκαιον is μέσον.
- (43.) 13. γεωμετρικῇ: Gorg. 518, A.
- (44.) 13. ἐν ἀγαθοῦ λόγῳ γίνεται, is regarded as ἀγαθόν.

CHAPTER IV.

- (45.) 1. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν εἶναι: divided into two—corrective and catallactic,—each διορθωτικόν as correcting existing inequalities.
- (46.) 2. εἰσενεχθέντα, the terms introduced.
- (47.) 3. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει. There may be cases where the character and circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant respectively are taken into consideration in estimating the amount which will make them equal; that is, the ζημία suffered by one, and the κέρδος gained by the other, (τῇ τοῦ βλάβοντος διαφορᾷ): as, for instance, in an action for libel, a minister of state or a clergyman would, from his position, suffer a greater ζημία than another person would from the same act, and therefore the amount of damages would properly be greater; but supposing the right value to be thus fixed for the ζημία, then the damages would not be assessed according to the proportion existing between the parties. Thus, supposing a plaintiff in one case to = 4, and the defendant 4, that is, both to be in respect of station, &c. exactly equal, the ζημία might be represented by 3; while in another exactly similar act, where the two parties were unequal in their position, as plaintiff = 6, the defendant = 2, the ζημία might be represented as 10; and this would be the damages: whereas, if proportion was introduced, the balance would be struck thus, as 6 : 2 : 30 : 10, and the defendant would have to pay, not 10, the actual ζημία, but a threefold one,—and this is what Aristotle is guarding against here.
- (48.) 5. τισίν, to some cases.—οἷον, as if there was κέρδος.
- (49.) 6. ἀλλ' ὅταν κ.τ.λ. The most proper application of these terms, though even this is improperly used in some cases, is

of profit to the agent, loss to the patient; but when (ἀλλ' ὅταν) the πᾶθος has been estimated, that which the agent restores to the patient is called ζημία, as well as the loss which the patient suffered at first. He seems to be accounting for the phrase τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, inasmuch as the term ζημία is properly confined to the injury inflicted on the patient, and not to the restitution made to him.

- (50.) 12. This may be illustrated by the lines given in the text:—



Then from $\gamma\delta$ must be taken $\gamma\delta$, and added to $a\epsilon$, to make it equal to $\beta\beta$. The patient's and agent's case is represented by aa , $\gamma\gamma$: $\beta\beta$ is only used to set the inequality clearly before us.—τὸ ἐφ' ὧν. This cannot properly be applied to a single line. It seems to have crept in either as part of the formula, or by a clerical error. If it is omitted, then τὸ γδ answers to τῷ αε; and below we have τῷ γδ. The passage beginning, ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κ.τ.λ., down to καὶ τοιοῦτον, occurs thus in all MSS., but it does not belong here: and it occurs again in the next chapter; whence probably it was carelessly or ignorantly transferred by transcribers or commentators.

- (51.) 13. ἀδεῖαν, liberty to act as one will.

- (52.) 13. ἀλλ' αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν γίνονται. This is a difficult passage. Michelet suggests that ἀλλά is to be taken for "præterquam, except when," and translates it thus:—"When there is neither excess or deficiency except when they are caused by themselves, (taking δι' αὐτῶν as masculine,) i. e. by consent on both sides;" and he quotes a passage in De Anima, i. 1. 17, p. 5, for this sense of ἀλλὰ ἢ οὐκ ἔστι τις ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη ἀλλ' (except) ὁ φυσικός. There are some others in Xen. Vect. iii. 6, Anab. vi. 4. 2, (given in Gr. Gr. 773, 4,) which might bear out this meaning of "except:" if it is adopted, a stop should be put before and after ἀλλ' αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν; but it does not


seem to be the sense required; and I would rather explain the δι' αὐτῶν by the sense of διὰ in such phrases as διὰ φόβου, *to be in fear*,—one thing being in another, (see Gr. Gr. 627. 1, 3, b,)—and construe it, *when they* (the two sides) *are contained in themselves*, i. e. *self-contained*; do not encroach upon each other, and thus are equal. He is shewing that there is a middle point to which neither ζημία nor κέρδος is applicable.

CHAPTER V.

- (55.) 1. Πυθαγόριοι. They defined justice to be ἀριθμὸς ἰσάκεις ἴσος, (Magna Moral. i. 1).
- (54.) 3. εἴ κε πάθοι, placed by Gaisford (Poet. Min.) among the Fragments of Hesiod.
- (55.) 6. συνέχεις κ.τ.λ., *is the principle or bond of*.—τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθὸς κατ' ἀναλογίαν, taking into consideration the value of the things to be exchanged, (καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα); not giving one for one, or two for two. They are considered, not with regard to quantity, but quality.
- (56.) 6. τῇ ἀντιποιεῖν κ.τ.λ. The state is said by Aristotle, in different passages, to depend upon an interchange of offices,—on demand (χρεία),—on φιλία. The first is the practical view of the working of social life; the second views it as arising from the mutual needs of men; the third from the instinct towards social life.—τὸ κακῶς, sc. ποιεῖν.
- (57.) 7. Χαρίτων ἱερὸν, moral beauty expressed in physical beauty. The number of the Graces represents the threefold sense of χάρις,—the feeling of kindness, the kind action, the kind feeling in return; while their being interwoven represents the inseparable connection which does, or at least ought to, exist between the three.
- (58.) 8. ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις: such as exists between A and O, or E and I, in the logical scheme of opposition, cross combination, De Interp. x. p. 81, thus:—

Jeweller = 10.

Shoemaker = 2.



Ring = 20.

Shoe = 4.

The jeweller takes the shoe, the shoemaker the ring;—the difference between them being 16: the shoemaker gives four more pairs of shoes, or their value, to make the exchange equal.

- (59.) 8. $\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\omicron\nu$, *at first; at once*; that is, if before the exchange takes place, the value of the two things is considered relatively to each other and to their producers, and then an exchange is made, ($\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha\ \tau\acute{o}\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\iota\pi\epsilon\pi\omicron\nu\theta\acute{o}\varsigma\ \gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\eta\tau\alpha\iota$), that (fair exchange) we speak of ($\tau\acute{o}\ \lambda\epsilon\gamma\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$) will take place;—or $\tau\acute{o}\ \lambda\epsilon\gamma\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$ may refer to the proverbial expression mentioned above, $\tau\acute{o}\ \delta\acute{\iota}\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\nu\ \tau\acute{o}\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\iota\pi\epsilon\pi\omicron\nu\theta\acute{o}\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega$.— $\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \epsilon\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\upsilon\ \dot{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\omicron\nu$: partitive genitive; al. $\tau\acute{o}\ \epsilon\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\upsilon\ \dot{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\omicron\nu$.
- (60.) 8. $\epsilon\iota\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \mu\grave{\eta}$, *if the quality or value is not first considered, but only the quantity or numerical value, &c.*— $\omicron\upsilon\delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \sigma\upsilon\mu\mu\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota$, sc. $\eta\ \pi\acute{o}\lambda\iota\varsigma$ or $\tau\acute{o}\ \delta\acute{\iota}\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\nu$.
- (61.) 9. $\dot{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$. This relative equality, and not an absolute equality, obtains in all arts of life. The value of an article is not settled by the seller or producer and his production alone, but relatively to the consumer and his wants and wishes. "*An art would be destroyed unless, of whatever sort or in whatever quantity, the producer ($\tau\acute{o}\ \pi\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\nu$) produced, the consumer also ($\tau\acute{o}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\chi\omicron\nu$) takes this sense as the patient of $\pi\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\nu$) wanted this thing in that same quantity and quality.*" That is, an exact exchange, where each offered to the other exactly what the other offered to him, such as bread for bread, could not go on: nor where there was no way of equalizing products of dissimilar quantity. Others make $\tau\acute{o}\ \pi\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\nu$ and $\tau\acute{o}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\chi\omicron\nu$ refer to the same person,—the former as producing something, the latter as receiving something of the same quality and quantity in exchange for it; but the interpretation given above is the better. Others, again, make these two words refer to the giver and receiver: that *arts would be destroyed unless the consumer ($\tau\acute{o}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\chi\omicron\nu$) was willing to suffer* (i. e. *to give, $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\alpha\sigma\chi\epsilon$), as much as the producer had earned*; but this is, I think, the worst of the three.
- (62.) 10. $\delta\epsilon\ \delta\ \kappa.\tau.\lambda.$: hence there must needs be some way of comparing the value of these dissimilar articles of commerce, viz. money, which thus represents the difference ($\dot{\upsilon}\pi\epsilon\rho\beta\alpha\lambda\acute{\eta}$ and $\dot{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\epsilon\iota\psi\iota\varsigma$) between two articles differing in value and kind.
- (63.) 10. $\pi\acute{o}\sigma\alpha\ \acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\alpha$: this depends on $\mu\epsilon\tau\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}$.— $\delta\ \pi\epsilon\rho\ \kappa.\tau.\lambda.$

The value will be determined by the materials, time, and labour of each, and the demand for the thing produced: as the time, labour, materials, and demand of the architect exceed those of the shoemaker, he will want so many pairs of shoes in exchange for his house; he will want some means of equalizing the pairs of shoes and the house, or there will be *no κοινωρία*.

- (64.) 11. ἡ χρεῖα. This is supplied by the market value, and its representative, money. If, in the market, a house will fetch so many times more than a pair of shoes, the difference between them is immediately found; and a means of stating and equalizing that difference is supplied by the common measure of value, "money."
- (65.) 11. ἡ πάντα συνίχει, *is the bond of social union*, viewed as arising from the reciprocal wants of men. Thus Cicero views it.—ὁ παράλλαγμα, *the representative*.
- (66.) 12. διερσκευτοτόμος κ.τ.λ. The relative position and character and skill of the two parties are to be taken into account in estimating the value of the production of each: the higher the art, and the greater the learning and skill, &c. it requires, the higher will be its value, supposing the materials employed and the time occupied in each case to be the same; but the value of each work once being ascertained, the relation between them is not to be taken into account *at the moment when the balance is struck*; nor can it be expressed by the σχῆμα ἀναλογίας (geometrical proportion), when the exchange has been made, (δταν ἀλλάξωται: see Gr. Gr. 842. 6,) though the previous process of estimating the value of their respective productions may be so expressed. When once this has been ascertained, they are to be made *actually*, not *relatively*, equal. Thus, supposing the jeweller to be worth six times as much as the shoemaker, the jewel would be worth six pairs of shoes,—jeweller = 6, shoemaker 1; then the jewel = 12, the pair of shoes 2, the relative value of the ring and the shoe stands thus, as 6 : 1 :: 12 : 2; and the value of six pairs of shoes (= 12) must be given by the shoemaker. If they were to be made *relatively*, not *absolutely*, equal, then as : 12 : 2 :: 72 : 12; and on this principle the shoemaker would have to give the value of 72 instead of

12, and he would thus have an extreme on either side of the just mean, i. e. an excess of labour and expense, and a deficiency of profit, (*ἀμφοτέρως ἔξει τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον*).—τὸ αὐτῶν: their proper share.

- (67.) 13. *ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία κ.τ.λ.* That mutual wants are the bond of commerce is clear from the fact, that where these wants are lacking in both or either of the parties, there is no dealing. Thus, if one person needs some wine, and can give nothing but some of the produce of his fields, (*σίου ἐξαγωγῆς*), of which the other at the moment is not in want, money comes in as a surety (*ἐγγυητής*) that when he does want it, he will be able to get it.—*ἐξαγωγῆν*, al.; but the partitive genitive is best.
- (68.) 14. *πάσχει κ.τ.λ.* The value of the precious metals sometimes varies: the expected results of the gold discoveries illustrate this. This is parenthetical.—*βούλεται*, has a tendency to remain fixed.
- (69.) 15. *συνμετρίας*, common measure.
- (70.) 15. *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*, is conventional; it is not so actually, but is accepted as such.—*νόμισμα*, i. e. τῷ νόμῳ, conventionally.
- (71.) *οἰκία ἰφ' ἧς*, al.; but the weight of authority is against it.—*ἡ δξία*: the *ἡ* refers to *ἴσον*, equal, or of the same value.
- (72.) 17. *ὃν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον*: in its most prominent character, it is not *περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας*, a regulation of pleasures and pains, but *περὶ διανομῆν καὶ χρείαν*, a regulation of the principles of social life; secondarily, as a habit of mind, (*ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς*), it is a disposition to act on these principles of fair distribution and exchange, arising from the proper regulation of the *ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους*.
- (73.) 18. *ἡ δ' ἀδικία*, sc. καθ' ἣν λέγεται πρακτικὸς τοῦ ἀδίκου.—*τοῦναντίον*, sc. διανοητικὸς τοῦ ἀνίσου κ.τ.λ.—*τοῦτο*, sc. τὸ ἀδικον.
- (74.) 18. *ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως ἑστίν κ.τ.λ.*: because it is of the nature of *ὑπερβολή* and *ἐλλείψις*. With regard to oneself, it is always too much of the good, and too little of the bad; with regard to others, the *ἀδικία*, which is a violation of *ἡθικὴ ἀρετή*, (*τὸ μὲν ὄλον*), is always the taking too much good, or not enough evil,—seeking pleasure, or shunning

pain at another's expense.—*δμοίως*, sc. to the case of *ἑφ' αὐτοῦ* just given. In the distributive injustice (*τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον*) it may be either *ὑπερβολή* or *ἐλλείψις* of good or bad, as the case may be, (*ὑποτέρως ἔτυχε*). It may be giving too much good, or too little good, or too much or too little evil, to another.

CHAPTER VI.

(75.) He now distinguishes briefly between unjust acts and injustice, and proceeds to shew that the only *δίκαιον*, or law of obligation, really binding upon man as an individual, is that *πολιτικὸν δίκαιον* which is equivalent to *ἡθικὴ ἀρετή*; the other sorts of *δίκαιον* are only so in a secondary and analogical sense, and form no element of the *ἀρετή* or *ἔργον* of man.

(76.) 1. *δ ποῖα*, al. *ὁποῖα*.—*οὔτω*, sc. looking to the acts only.

(77.) 4. *δεῖ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνειν κ.τ.λ.* The following is an analysis of *δίκαιον*, as laid down by Aristotle:—

The principles.—Natural justice.

<i>δίκαιον</i>	
<i>ἀπλῶς δίκαιον.</i>	<i>πολιτικὸν δίκαιον.</i>
<i>κοινὸς, ἄγραφος νόμος: Rhet.</i>	<i>ἴδιος, γεγραμμένος νόμος: Rhet.</i>
i. 10, i. 13, ii. 8.	i. 10, i. 13, 11.
<i>α. ἐπιείκεια. β. ὑπερβολὴ ἀρετῆς.</i>	<i>φυσικόν νομικόν.</i>
	<i>γεγραμμένος ἄγραφος.</i>
<i>ἄγραφος γεγραμμένος: Rhet. i. 13. 11.</i>	
Common law. Statute law.	
Rhet. i. 13. 11.	

1. *δίκαιον* in the abstract, existing prior to any formal declaration of it by states or individuals.

2. That part of the *δίκαιον* which is adopted by the legislator and embodied in the laws and institutions of the state.

3. That part of the *δίκαιον* which the legislator did not or could not transfer to his laws or institutions, consisting—

a. of the spirit of the laws, which he could only take imperfectly,—*ἐπιείκεια*.

β. the principles or quasi duties which he did not take, (*ὑπερβολὴ ἀρετῆς*); works of imperfect obligation.

4. φυσικόν, that part of πολιτικόν which is drawn directly and positively from the abstract δίκαιον, (i.) divided into—

c. That which is ordained by actual statute, (*statute law*).

d. That which has obtained by consent, (*common law*).

5. νομικόν, that part of πολιτικόν which is not drawn directly from natural justice, but arises entirely from the wants or whims of men; care being taken that it is not contrary to natural justice. This, too, is divided into statute and common law.

(78.) 4. τὸ ζητούμενον, sc. κυρίως δίκαιον; that δίκαιον, the violation of which would make a man ἀδικος.

(79.) 4. τοῦτο δὲ κ.τ.λ. The only justice or law of obligation really binding upon man is the πολιτικόν; that which is embodied in the laws and regulations of a social state, and which is represented in the individual by ἡθικὴ ἀρετή; for real obligation cannot exist except where there are social relations. He proves this by the following argument:—δίκαιον can exist only where there is νόμος, (ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς,) νόμος where there is ἀδικία, (νόμος δ' ἐν οἷς ἀδικία,) ἀδικία where it is possible to take too much good and too little evil, (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλὴον αὐτῷ νέμειν); and this can only be where there are social relations,—common property and interchange, (ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι οὐτάρευσιν),—so that where these social relations do not exist there can be no real δίκαιον, but only καθ' ὁμοιότητα.

(80.) 4. ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων κ.τ.λ., where there are some relations of equality between the persons in the state: either absolute equality, as in a democracy where each man is on an equality with the rest, (κατ' ἀριθμόν,) or relative equality, (κατ' ἀναλογίαν,) where the several parties in the state are equal according to their several claims arising from a principle of blood, as in an oligarchy of families; or education, as in an aristocracy; or property, as in a timocracy.—μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, sc. κοινωνία,—ἀλλὰ τι down to ὁμοιότητα is parenthetical.

(81.) 4. νόμος ἐν οἷς ἀδικία. This may best be understood by tracing society from its simplest to its most complex form. In good old patriarchal days, when persons of the same family lived naturally together in mutual love, there was no mention of δίκαιον, no notion of rights; as time went

on, and the ties of blood daily became less close, and interests more distinct, the notion of personal rights took the place of affection; injuries or invasions of these rights took place, the notion of *δίκαιον* was evolved, and the question was referred to the *κριτής*, who decided between right and wrong, and by his decision gave a definite existence and shape to *δίκαιον*, which was then, as society became more extended, embodied in the *νόμος*. The order of things was this: *κοινωνία*, *φιλία*, *ἄδικον*, *δίκαιον*, *κρίσις*, *νόμος*; hence *νόμος* is an evidence of the existence of *δίκαιον*, and can only exist where there is *κοινωνία*, for where this is not, the question of *ἄδικον* and *δίκαιον* cannot arise. This is illustrated by the history of the early Church: at first they had all things in common, (*φιλία*,) then complaints arose, then *δίκαιον* stepped in, and called for the appointment of arbitrators, (deacons,) and the operation of a *νόμος*.—τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ, sc. *ἀδικία*.

- (82.) 5. *διὸ κ.τ.λ.*, *wherefore*, (= a proof of *ἀδικία* being this taking to ourselves the good, is that) *fearing ἀδικία*, we do not entrust the supreme power to a single man's will,—because we are afraid of his doing this from the natural impulses of human selfishness; but we place ourselves under the government of reason expressed by law, of which the chief magistrate is the interpreter and administrator. And the chief magistrate, to whom we thus intrust the state, is *ex officio* the guardian of justice and of that equality which excludes the notion of *πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν*, therefore it is clear that *ἀδικία*, against which we are thus guarding, consists in *πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν*; hence we see that it can exist only where this inequality is possible, i. e. in *κοινωνία*. He seems to be bringing forward men's notion of government as an evidence of his proposition, that true *δίκαιον* exists only where *κοινωνία* exists.
- (83.) 5. *ὁ ἄρχων*. Some persons make *ἄρχων* refer to *λόγος*, but this breaks the connexion with what follows, where he is evidently speaking of a person.
- (84.) 6. *ἐπεὶ*. The apodosis being some sentences off, is introduced by *ἄρα*: *μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτός*.—οὐδὲν αὐτῷ κ.τ.λ., *there seems to be no advantage to him to be ἄρχων*.
- (85.) 7. *ὅτφ δὲ μὴ κ.τ.λ.* Whosoever is not content with this, but tries to seize upon an unfair share of good, commits *ἀδικία*, and becomes a *τύραννος*. In the case of the *ἄρχων*,

δικαία, which is embodied in the very notion of τύραννος, would arise from the attempt πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν.

- (86.) 8. There are certain relations of life in which quasi justice obtains, viz. the δεσποτικόν and the πατρικόν: in the former, the slave, being merely a chattel, has no κοινωνία, no claims or rights whatever, and therefore acts which are unjust in themselves are not unjust towards him; and a child may be viewed in the same light, as one who has no rights as against his father.
- (87.) 9. ἦν, it was laid down to be, Gr. Gr. 389.4: so ἦσαν, below.
- (88.) 9. οἷς ἐπάρχει κ.τ.λ. There must be some relations existing between the governors and governed; in other words, a constitution on some principle of equality.

CHAPTER VII.

- (89.) 1. τὸ μὲν φυσικόν. Whoever framed the constitution and laws for any social state would take from natural justice such principles as were suitable to his purpose, and these, when adopted by the public voice, either expressed or implied, fall under πολιτικὸν φυσικόν, or that portion of the social arrangements and laws which are drawn directly from the law of nature,—enactments of moral obligation. The other sort are only of positive obligation.
- (90.) 2. τὰ ψηφισματώδη, matters of special enactment.
- (91.) 2. δοκεῖ δὲ ἐνίοις. The argument is in the second figure, and Aristotle meets each premiss with an ἔνστασις; denying that all natural things are invariable, and that all justice is variable. It should be worked out at length.
- (92.) 8. παρὰ τοῖς θεοῖς. In the βελτίστη πολιτεία which may be supposed to exist among the gods, those principles of justice, which among men are variable, may well be believed to be fixed and invariable.
- (93.) 3. κινήτων μέντοι πάν. In Eth. Eudem. we find κινήτων, οὐ μέντοι πάν,—putting the stop before οὐ; but this is not supported by the majority of MSS. It gives, however, a very good sense. If the reading in the text is to be preferred, Aristotle is drawing a distinction between the αὐτοδίκαιον of the gods and the δίκαιον of men. This latter, though variable, is, in some cases, at least, from nature, and not merely conventional.

- (94.) 4. φύσει. His constant definition of things φύσει is ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, being a subdivision of that higher φύσις which comprehends τὸ ἀεὶ, (ἀνάγκη,) as well as ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, (φύσει). —δὴλον: that is, it is not matter of proof, but of perception.
- (95.) 4. ἐπὶ τῶν δλλων, sc. in matters of pure physics, where νομικόν and συνθήκη do not come in, it is equally true to say that some things which are natural are variable.—ἡ δεξιὰ κ.τ.λ.: an ἐνστασις from a particular. See *Analyt. Prior.* ii. 28. p. 140.
- (96.) 5. τὸ σύμφερον, that which merely depends on human expediency: as in a place of wholesale trade, (οὗ ὠνοῦνται,) a nominal cwt. is practically 112lb., and in a retail shop (οὗ πωλοῦσιν) only 100lb., and yet the measure which thus varies is in itself the same; so there is a similar variation in δίκαιον depending on the caprice or convenience of men, and it varies as the constitutions to which it is attached vary. These constitutions are not the same everywhere, and consequently δίκαιον is not in its practical details the same everywhere, though there is such a thing in the designs of nature as a constitution, and consequently δίκαιον, which ought to obtain everywhere.
- (97.) 6. As you cannot argue from particular to universal, neither can you argue from the variableness of the single phenomena of justice, as seen in the particulars of action, (τὰ πραττόμενα,) that the principle whence they proceed is variable also.
- (98.) 7. διαφέρει κ.τ.λ. ἀδικον is injustice in the abstract,—the principle; ἀδικημα, the act; ἀδικία, the evil or vice.—ὁμοίως κ.τ.λ.: so δίκαιον, δικαίωμα, δικαιοσύνη; or for δικαίωμα we may better use δικαιοπραγία of the act, for δικαίωμα is rather the remedying injustice, and therefore is not properly applied to every sort of just act.

CHAPTER VIII.

- (99.) 1. οἷς γὰρ κ.τ.λ., sc. πράττονσιν ταῦτα, οἷς συμβίβηκε κ.τ.λ.
- (100.) 3. ἀγνοῶν is here used in the sense of δι' ἄγνοιαν, bk. iii. ch. 1.—τῆς λαβῶν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ. αὐτοῦ refers to the person whose hand some one has taken, and struck another with it.—τὸ τοιοῦτον διωρίσθω, *let the same distinction be*

drawn also as to the motive; sc. to decide whether the act is *εκούσιον*, or not.

- (101.) 4. *ἔσται δ' ὁμοίως κ.τ.λ.*, *the συμβεβηκός also* (καὶ omitt. al.) *is the same*, i. e. it prevents what is seemingly a just or unjust action from being so.
- (102.) 6. *τρίων οὔσων κ.τ.λ.*, sc. *ἀτύχημα, ἀμάρτημα, ἀδίκημα*.—*βλαβῶν*, as distinguished from *ἀδικία*, which is a fourth case, *ὅταν ἐκ προαιρέσεως*. In Rhet. i. 13, 16, *ἀδίκημα* includes the *ἀδικία*. Of course, the distinction here drawn suggests to every one the words of our Litany,—*sins, negligences, ignorances*.
- (103.) 7. *συνίβη οἷχ οὐ ἐνίκα ᾗθ' ἦ*, *a result happened which he had not thought of as the end*.
- (104.) 8. *ῥοα τε διὰ θυμόν κ.τ.λ.* The passion, which hurries the agent so rapidly away that he has no time to reflect, is the cause of the action, not *κακία*. See bk. iii. 1. 21, where he says that desire or anger do not abstractedly destroy *εκούσιον*. Here he looks at what accidentally and occasionally accompanies them.
- (105.) 9. *ἀναγκαῖα*, hunger, thirst, &c.; *φυσικά*, love, anger, &c.
- (106.) 10. *ἔτε δ' οὐδ' ἔ*. If in a court of justice an enquiry arises as to whether a man who committed some wrong act under the influence of anger is accountable for it, the question is not whether the act was committed or not, but whether the anger was justifiable; whether there was any *ἀδικία φαινόμενη* to justify the anger: it is not the act which makes a man *ἀδικος*, for that is admitted, but the mode and manner of it.
- (107.) 10. *ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας*. The man who has attacked another even under the influence of anger cannot plead *ἄγνοια*.—*ὥστε κ.τ.λ.* Hence, the fact being allowed, one party looks upon himself as injured, the *ὀργή* being unjustified; the other denies it, pleading the provocation; and this is the question to be settled: and hence it is clear that *προαίρεσις* is necessary to the notion of *ἀδικία*. Michelet takes it differently, making the clause *ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἄγνοεῖ*, a parenthetical statement of the difference between the act done from anger and one done from *προαίρεσις*. The angry man may plead *ἄγνοια*, but the *ὁ ἐπιβουλεύσας* cannot. And conceiving the question to be, whether the angry man who retaliates an injury is just or unjust, he makes the words *ὥστε κ.τ.λ.* to mean that he upon whom the angry man

retaliated thinks he has been injured by the angry man, while the angry man denies it; but this both destroys the force of the passage, and is, I think, contrary to the sense of the words: for ἐπιβουλεύσας is not the same as προβουλεύσας; and it is clear from the words ἐπὶ φαινόμενη ἀδικία ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν, that the question is not whether the angry man has προαίρεσις, but whether the φαινόμενη ἀδικία by which his anger was provoked had it so as to make it really ἀδικία, and therefore to justify the anger. Aristotle seems to mean that it is not pretended that the person who provoked the anger by an act of aggression (ἐπιβουλεύσας) can plead excusable ἄγνοια of particulars, so that he may on this plea deny the injustice which the other asserts, but he can do so on the plea of want of προαίρεσις to do an unjust action: the act of aggression (τὸ ἐπιβουλεύειν) is admitted; the question is, it was done whether ἐκ προαιρέσεως, with a deliberate intent to be unjust, so as to justify the anger of the other party.

(108.) 11. ἡ δὲ, sc. where there is προαίρεσις.

(109.) 12. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων. He uses this word in a looser sense than in bk. iii. 1. 2, (where he says, ὥς γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν: see note 104,) for any actions done without definite προαίρεσις, even those which arise from ignorance of the general principles under the impulse of πάθος; such as where a starving man, under the pressure of hunger, loses sight of his knowledge of the nature of theft, and his abstract προαίρεσις against it; his act does not arise from a bad προαίρεσις, but from the pressure of the hunger, which obscures, for the time, his προαίρεσις: it is therefore συγγνωμονικόν. Where the πάθος is less urgent it is not so.—δι' ἄγνοιαν: see bk. iii. note 19.

CHAPTER IX.

(110.) The questions discussed are as follows:—

1. Can a man be injured if he consents to the act? (πρῶτον μὲν—ἔκοντες).

2. Is the recipient of an injury always injured? (ἐπεί—δικαιοπραγούντος.)

And this latter one branches off into two other points, (sect. 9).


a. Whether he who receives, by an unjust sentence, more than he ought, is himself unjust?

β. Whether a man can injure himself?

ἀτρίως, *paradoxically*.

- (111.) 2. ἐλλογον ἀντικείμεναι ὁμοίως. The opinion that ἀδικεῖσθαι is not always the same, either voluntary or involuntary, but sometimes one, sometimes the other, according to circumstances, arises from the consideration that though δικαιοπραγεῖν is always invariable in respect of voluntariness, yet δικαιοῦσθαι does not follow it, but is sometimes voluntary, sometimes involuntary (ἐνίοι γὰρ δικαιοῦνται οὐχ ἔκοντες); and it might reasonably be expected (ἐλλογον) that ἀδικεῖσθαι would stand in the same relation (ἀντικείμεναι ὁμοίως) to ἀδικεῖν as δικαιοῦσθαι does to δικαιοπραγεῖν, and therefore, as δικαιοῦσθαι is variable, so would ἀδικεῖσθαι be also, and hence, though ἀδικεῖν is always voluntary, yet it might be sometimes voluntary, sometimes involuntary.

- (112.) ἀντικείμεναι ὁμοίως:—



ἀδικεῖσθαι and δικαιοῦσθαι ἀντίκεινται as occupying similar positions in this scheme of opposition, each being the patient of their respective agents; so in this sense in the logical scheme of opposition I would be said ἀντικείμεναι to O. The questions stated in the first four sections arise from the opposition and relation of the several terms to each other.

- (113.) 3. ὁ ἄδικον πεπονθώς: not only the sufferer, but the recipient of an act of injustice; so that under this head fall both the questions α and β above, note 110. The ἀπορία here is, whether ὁ ἄδικα πάσχων always ἀδικεῖται, or whether it may not be sometimes κατὰ συμβεβηκός, as ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν, where the agent acts unknowingly; the answer is, that it may be so when he is injured voluntarily; then ἄδικον πάσχει, but οὐκ ἀδικεῖται.
- (114.) 3. κατὰ συμβεβηκός κ.τ.λ. In the case of δίκιον the act may be κατὰ συμβεβηκός in respect both of the agent and the patient (ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων); so we may expect it to be the same with ἄδικον: whether it is so or not is the question to be discussed below.

- (115.) 3. *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν κ.τ.λ.* Again a similar question arises with regard to these, for a patient implies an agent, and as *ἀδικεῖν* being *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* makes the *ἀδικεῖσθαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός*, so likewise may we suppose that if *συμβεβηκός* obtains in *δικαιοπραγεῖν*, it does also in *δικαιοῦσθαι*.
- (116.) 8. *δύο*: involved in question 2, above, note 110.
- (117.) 9. *τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν*, sc. *εἰ ἀδικεῖ ὁ νείμας*.
- (118.) 12. *νομικόν* = *πολιτικόν*: he is considering the case of ὁ *νείμας παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν*.—*τὸ πρῶτον* = *δίκαιον ἀπλῶς*.
- (119.) 13. *διὰ ταῦτα*, sc. *χάριν* or *τιμωρίαν*.—*ἐπ' ἐκείνων*, in the case of those who divide the unjust spoil between them.
- (120.) 14. *δοῦναι κ.τ.λ.* This is an act of liberality equally easy with the acts of vice mentioned in the same sentence; but to do a liberal action, which supposes a certain state of mind, and certain circumstances, is not easy.—*οὕτ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς*. Aristotle here recognises the great fact in human nature,—the weakness of the will for good.
- (121.) 16. From supposing that every wrong act is a vicious action, every unjust act an act of injustice, it is said that a just man may act unjustly: but not so; for though, under certain circumstances, a just man might act in the same way as an unjust man, or a brave man act as a coward might, it would not be an unjust or cowardly action, unless it was done in the frame of mind and purpose which are necessary to injustice or cowardice.—*ἐπ' ὁποτεραοῦν*, *right or left*; al. *ὁποτε-ρανοῦν*.
- (122.) *ἔστι δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Justice and social obligation exist among *κοινωνοὶ τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν*.—*ἔχουσι* is dative plural agreeing with *τούτοις*: *who are capable of having too much or too little thereof*. Justice cannot exist among the gods, for having all things, they cannot be supposed to have too much; nor among the reprobate, for being incapable of having anything, they cannot be said to have too little: but as men in general occupy a middle position, they are capable of it; wherefore it exists among men in a social state, and is the *ἔργον* of man as a social being. Some editors omit *οὐκ* before *ἔστιν ὑπερβολή*, understanding Aristotle to say that the gods are above these human *ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά*: the *ἀπλῶς κακοὶ* are below them.

CHAPTER X.

- (123.) 1. *ἐπεικεία* represents the spirit of the natural *δίκαιον*, which the legislator was unable to transfer to his system of polity; and as it provides for those cases in which that system is wanting, it is the *ἐπανόρθωμα* or complement of the *δίκαιον νόμον*, which here=*πολιτικόν*: see also Rhet. i. 13, 12.—*ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπιφύρομεν*, we refer in our praise to something besides justice.
- (124.) 2. *διὰ ταῦτα*, for these reasons; *ἅπαντα*, all these.—*ὕπεναντίον*, these have nothing contradictory to themselves.—*δικαίου τινός ἐν*, belonging to a sort of *δίκαιον*, sc. natural justice.
- (125.) 4. *εὐθύς*, "from the first."
- (126.) 5. *συμβῆ ἐπὶ τούτου*, and there happens in this particular case.
- (127.) 6. *τινός δικαίου*, sc. *πολιτικοῦ*.
- (128.) 6. *διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς*, the fault arising from its generality.
- (129.) 7. *τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομίας*. In *Λεσβία οἰκοδομία* the stones were rough, and the *κανὼν μολίβδινος* fitted itself to the inequalities of the stone:—
Æsch. Fragm. 70, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν τις Λέσβιον
κῦμα' ἐν τριγώνois ἐκπεραινέτω βυθμοίς.—*κῦμα*, a waved moulding.
- (130.) 8. *ἐλαττωτικός*, yielding.

CHAPTER XI.

- (131.) 1. *φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων*, first, from what has been said, it is clear that he who commits suicide injures somebody, for he violates the law; secondly, that it is not himself whom he injures, for he does it willingly, but it is the state.
- (132.) 4. The question whether a man can injure himself is important; for it might be urged, that if a man put restraint on himself for the sake of others, he might be unjust to himself, and then *ἡθικὴ ἀρετή* would be in this view wrong. There is no law of obligation to a man's own self which obliges him to take care of his own interests in preference to those of his

neighbour. The contradictory notion is embodied in popular expressions, and more or less covertly in several moral systems of ancient and modern times. The only sense in which a man can be said to injure himself, (and then only by a metaphor;) is when the lower part of his nature governs the higher.

- (133.) 4. καθ' ὃ. Even under the view that he who commits merely an unjust act is unjust, though not bad in its widest sense, one cannot injure oneself.
- (134.) 4. τοῦτο γὰρ ἄλλο ἐκείνου, (*I mention this*) for this is different from the former case, where injustice is considered as a violation of right generally,—as ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὀλην ἀρετήν.
- (135.) 4. ἔστι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This means, there is an ἡ ἐν μέρει ἀδικία, which is merely πλεονεξία, and not even in this sense can a man injure himself; for being both the patient and agent of the injustice, he would both gain and lose by the same act.—ἔπειρ ἀδύνατον: there must be more than one party in an injustice.
- (136.) 5. καὶ πρότερον: a man, to be unjust, must be the aggressor; for retaliation is no injustice.—αὐτὸς δ' αὐτόν, sc. ἀδικῶν.—ἀμα: so that it is not πρότερον.
- (137.) 6. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κ.τ.λ.: no one acts unjustly without committing some particular, definite act of injustice, and this a man cannot do towards himself: a man cannot steal his own property.—ὅλως, generally, as well as by the settled principle οὐχ ἰκόνα ἀδικεῖσθαι.
- (138.) 7. ἡ ἐγγύς, or bordering on it—; it is not in every case τελεία κακία, for in some cases, though the action is voluntary, it is not complete ἀδικία, as where there is excusable ἄγνοια.
- (139.) 8. οὐδὲν μέλει κ.τ.λ., to the act or system. Medicine, as a system, takes no cognizance of the accidental character of the matter in hand.
- (140.) 9. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ λόγοις, on these theories or views.—διίστηκε, is separate from.—ἐν τούτοις, sc. the two parts of the soul.

BOOK VI.

CHAPTER I.

- (1.) HAVING now practically proved that *ἡθικὴ ἀρετή* is the *ἔργον* of man, both as being the right operation of our several feelings and instincts, and also as agreeing with that *δικαιοσύνη* besides which there is no duty really binding on man, he now proceeds to consider in what kind and in what degree the intellectual part of our nature is an ingredient of this *ἡθικὴ ἀρετή*. That it is so in some kind and degree was before implied, when *ὁρθὸς λόγος* was said to be our guide to right action. He now considers what this *ὁρθὸς λόγος* is, and in what faculties or habits of our reason it consists.
- (2.) 1. *ὁρος τῶν μεσοτήτων*, the limits or sphere of the mean habits.
- (3.) 3. *τούτων τίς ὁ ὁρος*: what is its definition or nature.
- (4.) 5. *ὑποκείσθω*, let it be laid down that there are.
- (5.) 5. *ὁμοιότῃτα*, the adaptation of the powers to receive the impressions and conceptions of the several objects of perception and thought. *οἰκειότῃτα*, the affinity between them. This is rather a trenching upon the higher metaphysics, and probably, like some other similar passages, was used by Aristotle as a recognised principle, which would compel the assent of those, who received it, to the point he wished to prove.
- (6.) 7. *ἡ δ' ἀρετή*: that is the excellence of anything which develops its *ἔργον*; we must therefore discover what is the *ἔργον* of the two parts of the soul. Cf. bk. ii. 6. 2.

CHAPTER II.

- (7.) 1. The end of the logistic part of the soul is right moral action; we must therefore discover what produces this.
- (8.) 1. There are in the soul three powers of moral truth, (*πρά-*

ξέως καὶ ἀληθείας,) scil. αἰσθησις, νοῦς, δρεξις: in one of these three the ἔργον and the ἀρετή of the logistic part must reside.

- (9.) 2. τοῦτων—κοινωνεῖν. Of these, perception need not be considered, as it is no immediate cause of moral action; it merely conveys to the senses an object which may lead to a moral action, if the recipient be capable thereof; but if not, as in the brute creation, it produces nothing but a mere sensual act.
- (10.) 2. ἐστὶ δ' ἐπερ κ.τ.λ. The other two powers of moral action, νοῦς and δρεξις, are intimately connected. The assent and dissent of the νοῦς are what pursuit and avoidance are in the δρεξις, and they mutually imply each other. As, therefore, the προαίρεσις is made up of δρεξις and λόγος, (or νοῦς,) if it is to be good, the νοῦς must be ἀληθής in decision, and the δρεξις ὀρθή in its pursuit, (τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ διώκειν). The δρεξις cannot be ὀρθή unless the νοῦς be ἀληθής, nor can the νοῦς be ἀληθής unless the δρεξις is ὀρθή: if the νοῦς assented to a wrong δρεξις, it would be ψευδής; if the δρεξις accepted a false decision of the reason it would not be ὀρθή. (See *hk. iii.* note 40); hence, as a good προαίρεσις is made up of δρεξις and λόγος, or νοῦς, it follows that the ἀλήθεια τοῦ νοῦ, working with, and implying, a right δρεξις, is the ἔργον of the logistic part of the soul, as producing, and securing, (or combining to produce,) right action.
- (11.) 2. ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ κ.τ.λ. Since, then, right action implies a good act of choice, and this good act of choice is simply a true decision and a right end, it follows that ἀλήθεια τοῦ νοῦ, which, as we have seen, implies both, will produce good moral action: he assumes, as he has a right to assume, that right action, and therefore right προαίρεσις, is the ἔργον of the logistic part of the soul.
- (12.) 2. διὰ ταῦτα, for these reasons, viz. the nature of ἀρετή and προαίρεσις, and the connection between the reason and the desire given above.
- (13.) 2. αὕτη μὲν οὖν: this, then, is the moral intellect and moral truth, which performs the ἔργον of the logistic part.
- (14.) 3. τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς: of the pure intellect, truth is the acknowledged ἔργον: see *Met. ii. 1*, p. 35.—τοῦ δὲ πρακτι-

κοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ, of the moral intellect, truth corresponding to and implying a right *ᾠρεξις*; hence truth, moral or intellectual, is the *ἔργον* of both parts of the soul.

- (15.) 4. To shew that *προαίρεσις* is not merely an intellectual act, as some would have it, nor yet a mere orectic appetite or desire, as others hold, but a combination of the two, we may examine the efficient and motive powers of human action.
- (16.) 4. *πράξιω*. The motive cause (*ὁθεν ἡ κίνησις*) of right action is *προαίρεσις*; the material cause or constituents of *προαίρεσις* are *ᾠρεξις* and *λόγος ὁ ἐνὸς τινος*; not mere *ᾠρεξις*, but *ᾠρεξις* approved of by *λόγος*. The first point proved is that *ᾠρεξις* by itself is not enough.
- (17.) 4. *διό*. This being the nature of *προαίρεσις*, it is clear that the intellect is an ingredient of right moral choice; not merely the intellect (*νοῦς*) as being a necessary ingredient in the act of an intellectual being, but the actual exercise of that intellect (*διάνοια*) in acts of choice and pursuit.
- (18.) 4. *οὐδ' αὖτεν ἡθικῆς ἔξεως*: this is not the same as *πάθος*, but it is that right moral state which has the intellect worked into it, and therefore implies the moral truth as one of its elements.
- (19.) 4. *ἐνπραξία γάρ κ.τ.λ.*: for right being and acting, which is the object of *προαίρεσις*, cannot exist without the action of the intellect and that right moral state in which the intellect and *πάθος* are combined, (*ἥθος*).
- (20.) 5. It being thus clear that the *διάνοια* is an active cause of right action, it now must be proved that it is not the only one, but that *ᾠρεξις* must be joined with it.

The mere intellect (*διάνοια αὐτή*) is not properly motive cause at all, (*οὐδὲν κινεῖ*); it is true that the moral intellect is concerned in action, (*πρακτική*), and when it is working towards an end (*ἐνεκα τοῦ*) is such a motive cause, for it sets in motion (*ἄρχει*) the contriving faculty; that is, when the intellect in the shape of *βούλησις* and *βούλευσις* has decided on the end, and that such and such steps are necessary and practicable towards the end proposed, then the productive or contriving faculty (*ποιητική*) commences its operations; when the *ζήτησις* is ended the *πράξις* begins, (*τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει πρῶτον ἐν τῇ γενέσει*,

lib. iii. 8. 12): it cannot be the pure intellect which thus works in morals, for every one who contrives, necessarily contrives to an end; and though the moral intellect is the motive cause of these contriving powers, something must have preceded it, for the subject of the contriving powers (*ποιητόν*), which is thus supplied by the moral intellect, is a *τέλος* only in a secondary sense, (*οὐχ ἀπλῶς*), and only relative (*πρὸς τι*) and subordinate (*τινός*) to some further end, but the subject of moral action is the real *τέλος* (*ἀλλ' τὸ πρακτόν*); this is *ἐνπραξία*, and this end is supplied by *ἔρεξις*, which is thus shewn to be as necessary an ingredient as the moral intellect itself.—*ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πρακτόν*, al. *ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν*, which must be construed, *but it is not the subject of moral action, for this, &c.*

- (21.) 5. *διάνοια αὐτῇ οὐθὲν κινεῖ*. There is a point of view in which this seems to be wrong, viz. where the object of desire is not perceptible by the senses, but by *νοῦς*, such as some future good: but this perceptive *νοῦς* which performs the functions of *αἴσθησις* where the thing is invisible, is not really the *ἀρχή* of the action; it is only a channel whereby the *ἡδύ* reaches the *πάθος*. There are two sorts of *φαντασία* which present the *ἡδύ* to the *ἔρεξις*; one (*αἰσθητικῇ*) of visible, the other (*νοητικῇ*) of invisible, objects: see ch. vii. 9, where he speaks of a sort of a *νοητικῇ αἴσθησις*, *οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων ἀλλ' οὔκ κ.τ.λ.*: so bk. vii. ch. 6. 1, *ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμία, ἐὰν μόνον εἴπῃ, ὅτι ἡδύ, ὁ λόγος ἡ αἴσθησις*: see also Met. vi. 10, p. 148.
- (22.) 5. *διό κ.τ.λ.*: whence *προαίρεσις* may be viewed as *νοῦς* accompanied by *ἔρεξις*, or as *ἔρεξις* assented to by *νοῦς*, (see bk. iii. note 40); at all events, it implies both these as necessary: and this complex principle of action is humanity, (*ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπου*): whatever habit of mind, then, secures, as far as it is in the province of the intellect to do so, that these two shall be right, secures right *προαίρεσις*, right moral action, and therefore is the *ἔργον* of the logistic part of the soul; and in the beginning of the chapter we have seen that *ἀλήθεια τοῦ νοῦ* does this.
- (23.) 6. *οὐκ ἔστι κ.τ.λ.* *Προαίρεσις* has nothing to do with that sort of *πρακτικῇ διάνοια*, the subject of which may be moral action, but which has no end beyond its own exercise, as that which considers past events.

CHAPTER III.

(24.) 1. Truth, then, in one shape or the other, being the *ἔργον* of both parts of the intellectual faculties, we now proceed to investigate what is the state or habit of mind which most perfectly and certainly arrives at truth in each.

(25.) Things or notions are said to be *true* in different relations:—

1. In respect of their corresponding to the designs of nature, *things* are said to be in a *true* state: *Physic.* i. 8. 1, ἀλ' ἡθεῖαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων; see Hooker, Sermon on Justification.

2. In respect of their correspondence to the external natures which they profess to represent, *notions* and *conceptions* of the intellect and reason are said to be *true*,—ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχή.

3. In respect of their expressing real relations between the subject and predicate, *judgments* and *propositions* are said to be *true*o.

4. In respect of its operating as nature designed, and so as to discover and represent truth to the mind, the *reason* is said to be *true*,—λόγος ἀληθής, and λόγος ψευδής, *ch.* iv. 6.

(26.) 1. ἀρξάμενοι κ.τ.λ. Having thus cleared the way, we may consider the habits or states of mind whereby the intellectual faculty arrives at truth in its decisions, and is in a state of truth (ἀληθεύει). These are five in number: neither scientific knowledge, nor intelligence, nor art, nor moral wisdom, nor wisdom generally, admit of falsehood. They vanish respectively into their contraries when falsehood encroaches upon them.

(27.) 1. ὑπολήψεις καὶ δόξα κ.τ.λ. ὑπόληψις is a general conception, (*Met.* i. 1, p. 2, ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων μία γίνηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις: *Anal. Post.* i. 16,) right or wrong, of the nature of any thing, arising from αἰσθησις, or νοῦς, or συλλογισμός, (*Anal. Post.* i. 16. p. 172, ὅταν διὰ συλλογισμοῦ λάβῃ τὴν ὑπόληψιν: *ibid.*, ὅταν ἀπλῶς ὑπολάβῃ ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν: *ibid.*, τῆς ἀπλῶς ὑπολήψεως ἀπλὴ ἢ ἀπύτη, τῆς δὲ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ πλείους,) and may be quite false, and yet would be an ὑπόληψις: so in *ch.* ix., the distinguishing epithet ἀληθής is applied to it. So δόξα is a judgment (φάσις) on a

matter of probable truth, of which though it took a false view, it would still be a δόξα, (Anal. Post. i. 33. p. 199, sq., and ix. 15, 8): ἐπὶ δόληψις differs from δόξα inasmuch as the latter is a φάσις, and implies a subject, copula, and predicate, while the former conceives of the subject and predicate as a whole, without the intervention of the copula; δόξα is of two notions separately, ἐπὶ δόληψις is of the two notions combined. The mental process may be thus represented: αἰσθησις, φαντασία, νόησις, ὑμπερία, ἐπὶ δόληψις, then δόξα on contingent, φρόνησις on moral, ἐπιστήμη on necessary, matter. The complex idea contained in δρισμός, the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, is an ἐπὶ δόληψις: so Anal. Post. i. 33, ἐπὶ δόληψις τῆς ἀμέστου προτάσεως.

- (28.) 2. ἐπιστήμη. This word has two senses:—1. an intellectual state, or habit; 2. a scientific system, or collection of principles and laws of necessary matter. It is, of course, in the former of these two senses that it is used here.—ταῖς δμοιοότησι. See Anal. Post. i. 2. 1, for spurious sorts of science.

- (29.) 2. λανθάνει εἰ ἔστι ἡ μή, (cf. Met. vi. 15, p. 158): therefore they are not fit subjects for ἐπιστήμη; and hence the subject-matter of ἐπιστήμη is ἐξ ἀνάγκης, things necessary and unchangeable. Aristotle recognises in the order of things which he expresses by φύσις in its higher sense: 1. ἀνάγκη, τῶν αἰεί, where the connection is invariable and perceptible; 2. φύσις in a second sense, (τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ,) where the connection, though perceptible, is variable, (τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν); 3. φύξις, where the connection is variable and imperceptible: δόξα belongs to the second and third, ἐπιστήμη to the first.

2. ἀπλῶς, to speak generally.

3. τὰ αἰδία κ.τ.λ.: we here get his views of the past and future eternity of the universe.

- (30.) 3. ἔστι δὲ διδασκλή κ.τ.λ. Science falls under teaching, as whatever may be known scientifically may be taught and learnt: as teaching and learning presuppose certain principles from which to start, it follows that science implies having such principles to refer to; therefore science is a habit, or habitual state of the intellect, which is able to refer what it knows to certain principles or αἰρίαι, (ἐξ ἀποδεικτικῆς;) or rather, speaking more accurately, as a state or habit of mind is only the presence of certain emotions, perceptions, con-

ceptions, or principles in the mind, science is the principle or universal conception itself, (ch. vi., ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ἐπέληψις,) it is the certain conscious possession of fixed conceptions or principles (ἀρχαί), and their application to less abstract, and apparently less evident, truths. Thus the ἐπιστημών in mathematics would possess the principles of mathematical reasoning laid down by others, (λαμβάνων ὡς παρὰ ξυνείνων, Anal. Post. i. 1, p. 145,) and be able to apply them to the various theorems and problems following therefrom, which, not self-evident in themselves, would become certain to him from their resting on principles of fixed truth: of this the instrument is syllogism, referring back these problems or theorems to their principles or αἰτίαι.—ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς: Anal. Post. i. 1.

- (31.) 3. ἡ μὲν δὲ ἐπαγωγὴ. This passage would be enough to shew Aristotle's view of induction, and its relation to syllogism as necessary to it. There are numberless passages of the same sort throughout his writings. Among others, see Anal. Post. i. 18, ii. 15. 7; Anal. Prior, ii. 25. 8, p. 139.
- (32.) 3. ὦν αὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμός. Syllogism is not the only channel or evidence of truth. There are certain fixed truths which, so far from being arrived at by a syllogistic process, furnish to that process its starting-point and foundation. So great and so entirely un-Aristotelic is the mistake of those who would wish to reduce all the processes of arriving at truth to the syllogistic form.
- (33.) 4. ἔξῃς ἀποδεικτική. ἀπόδειξις is the proving some fact or position in necessary matter, (cf. Met. v. 3, p. 100; Top. i. 1. 4, p. 15,) by referring it back to the αἰτιον, or cause of it: ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οὐ μὲν ἔκασταν ἀπλῶς, (i. e. διὰ ἀποδείξεως: see end of sect. 3,) ἐταν τὴν αἰτίαν οὐ μὲν γνωρίζειν, Anal. Post. i. 2, the whole of which chapter should be read in connection with this passage. See also Phys. i. 1; Anal. Post. i. 31; Met. i. 3.—ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς: Anal. Post. i. 2, sqq., 33.
- (34.) 4. ἐπίσταται: he stops in his enquiry. This is the way in which ἐπίστασθαι comes to signify "to know."—See Phys. vii. 3, p. 160, τὸ γὰρ ἡρεμῆσαι κ.τ.λ.
- (35.) 4. κατὰ συμβεβηκός: he will indeed know that, the possession of which is in itself knowledge; but it will not be knowledge to him, for if the principles are not more cer-

tain to him than the deductions, the deductions will have nothing to rest on; there will be no *αἴτιον* of their being true. True science says, "This is true, because the other is true;" *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* science will say, "This is true" when it has no *ἀρχή* to rest on: or "This is true *if* the other is true," when the *ἀρχή* is not more certain than what is referred to it. See Anal. Post. i. 2.

CHAPTER IV.

- (36.) Another energy of the intellect is *contrivance*; and when this faculty is so strengthened and sharpened by its use as to discern with truth and readiness the nature of the result required, and the instruments and combinations necessary to produce it, and is able practically to call it into being, then we are said to have *Art*, or the productive *habit*. This habit arises from experiment and experience, (Met. i. 1, *γίνεται δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας νοημάτων καθόλου μία γίνηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐπὶ ὁλήσεως*: cf. Anal. Post. ii. 15,) and its functions are, 1. to produce results similar to those of nature; 2. to develop what nature has left, as it were, in embryo, (Phys. ii. 8. 5, *ὅπως τε ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἃ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται*); 3. to detect the laws and powers latent in results apparently accidental, and by arrangement and combination to make them matters of rule and comparative certainty. It differs from *ἐπιστήμη* as it regards the things and laws of nature, not in their abstract essence or relations, but only so far as it may arrange and combine them with a view to production. Hence those things which are subject to an *invariable* law of nature (*ἀνάγκη*), such as the motion of the heavenly bodies, are out of its province; or those things wherein, whenever they occur, nature works for herself, and by her own inherent motive power (*φύσις*), as in the production of rain from clouds: art has to do only with such things as it is in the power of man to call into being, or not, as he likes. It investigates, indeed, and reflects (*θεωρεῖ*) on the properties and laws of the universe, but not as a mere speculation ending in itself. This knowledge of the properties and laws is not properly its subject-matter, but only accidentally, as being conducive to production. It

is this mental power which is most cultivated and most prized at the present day, and has hence almost appropriated the word "philosophy." We must not, in reading what Aristotle says of τέχνη, expect to find his view of it agree with our conceptions of it as drawn from what it is now; for it has made so much progress since that time, and its functions and sphere are so much enlarged, as to make it difficult to understand how it can be said that the universal or general laws of the universe do not fall within its province; as, though many are excluded, yet others again (such as the production of an electric current) are evidently now matters of *art*, or the contriving faculty.

- (37.) 2. ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις: see bk. i. note 213.
- (38.) 3. This is an instance of the universal conclusion, *per simplicem enumerationem*. Architecture, and every other intellectual habit of production, is an art.
Every art is an intellectual habit of production, consequently these two are identical.
- (39.) οὐτε τοιαύτη is merely a repetition of the other side of the induction, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ οἰκοδομική.
- (40.) 3. ἔξις μετὰ λόγου ποιητική. The word "habit," though it may be conveniently used to express ἔξις, yet does so very imperfectly. ἔξις ποιητική is not so much a habit of production, as the productive faculty trained and exercised to habitual operation. Ἔξις denotes that power of the mind, to which it is applied, as in a particular state of development and perfection, and might perhaps be expressed by the word *power*, as opposed to *faculty*; and in using the word "habit," we must be careful not to lose sight either of the faculty itself, or of the state of development in which it is.
- (41.) 3. λόγου δληθοῦς: true, inasmuch as it judges rightly of external things, and their fitness for the particular object of our contrivance.
- (42.) 4. ἐστὶ δὲ τέχνη κ.τ.λ. In the *Metaphysics*, p. i. 1, he says, γίνεται ἡ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων καθόλου μία γένηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις. Art is the possession and application of the general principles of production: of course things necessary, or out of our power to produce, are excluded. We must be careful (as in the case of ἐπιστήμη) to

distinguish between the word *τέχνη* when used to denote a state or power of the mind concerned in contrivance, and when used to express a system, or collection of rules for the production of any given result.

- (43.) 4. *περὶ γένεσιν*, the production of something as its *τέλος*, and the contriving the means thereto (*τεχνάζειν*), and considering what they are (*θεωρεῖν*). They seem to be placed in this order because looking at the object of *τέχνη* as completed, and going backwards as it were in process of completion, (*γένεσις*), comes first, then *τεχνάζειν*, or the active part of *τέχνη*, and then the reflective, deliberative process of *θεωρεῖν*, or examining into the nature of the object, and the powers or combinations which will produce it.
- (44.) 4. *τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κ.τ.λ.* In this chapter we have the division given above, (note 29,) of *φύσις* into *ἀνάγκη*, *φύσις*, *τύχη*: see *Met.* x. 8, p. 228.
- (45.) 5. *ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* The same notion of the independent, self-moving powers of nature we find in *Phys.* ii. 8, *μάλιστα δὲ δῆλον ὅταν αὐτὸν ἰατρύῃ ὁ ἰατρος, τοῦτο γὰρ ἔοικεν ἢ φύσις*.
- (46.) 5. *περὶ τὰ αὐτά κ.τ.λ.*: *Met.* i. 2, *ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποίησεν ἢ δ' ἀπειρία τύχην*: cf. *Plato*, *Gorgias*, 448. Many of our most valuable discoveries in art were made by chance combinations and results. These being observed and experimented upon, the connections between cause and effect discerned, the art was gradually called into being. The well-known history of the discovery of glass-making is an instance in point.
- (47.) 6. *δρεχνία*. The contrary habit, or rather the want of the contriving faculty, consists in the reason judging falsely of the nature of the end to be pursued, of the combinations or instruments necessary for the work, and thus failing in the object.

CHAPTER V.

- (48.) We have examined the faculties and habits of contemplation and production; we now proceed to those of reflection and action, and to the consideration of *φρόνησις*, or moral

wisdom; a term which, as the mental state it expresses differs according to its different functions, is used in different senses. The chief difficulty of this book is to reconcile what he says of *φρόνησις* in one place with what he says of it in others. The difficulty will be removed if we get a clear notion of the functions of *φρόνησις*, and are careful to observe the particular one in which it is at the moment spoken of. For this the reader is referred to the table at the end of the book; and it will suffice at present to call attention to the following distinctions:—

1. Between *perfect* and *imperfect φρόνησις*. In the latter the reason acts outside, as it were, of the passions, directing and checking them so as to mould them into virtues. In the former it works in the passions, so that they operate rightly by virtue of the rational instinct which arises from their union, or rather amalgamation, with the reason.

2. *a.* The practical knowledge of the right principles of moral action, (*ἀρχιτεκτονική*).

β. A right judgment on each particular of choice and action, (*ἡ περὶ καθ' ἕκαστα*).

3. *a.* A right judgment in particular objects of pursuit and avoidance, with regard to the end, (*φρόνησις τοῦ τέλους—τοῦ ἐσχάτου*). When this is perfectly developed, the simple term *νοῦς* is applied to it.

β. A right judgment on the means, (*εὐβουλία*.) See ch. xi. 2.

For another sort of *φρόνησις*, arising from *δαιμότης*, see notes on ch. xii.

(49.) 1. *εὖ ζῆν*, *well-being*, according to his proper *ζωή*, whatever that is.

(50.) 2. *ὧν μὴ ἐστὶ τέχνη*, for which there are no rules laid down.

(51.) 2. *φρόνιμος βουλευτικός*. The most usual notion of *φρόνησις*, as an intellectual operation, is the consideration of the means towards a good end, which is presented to us as an object of pursuit by *ἡθικὴ ἀρετή*, in its first stage, (see ch. xiii. 6); but *φρόνησις* has to do, not only with *βούλευσις*, or the *τὰ πρὸς τέλος*, but with the *τέλος* itself. See ch. ix. 7.

(52.) 3. *πάντα*, sc. *τοιαῦτα ὧν αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως εἶχειν*.

(53.) 4. *περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ κ.τ.λ.* The connection between these paragraphs is this:—In *ποιήσις* we arrange well

certain materials with a view to produce some end; in right *πράξις* we arrange and regulate certain actions, not with a view merely to *εὐπραξία*, for such arrangement in itself is *εὐπραξία*; so that the energy and the end are one and the same thing: wherefore *φρόνησις* has *τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ* for its subject-matter, though this is at the same time its *τέλος*: if *φρόνησις* were *ποιητική*, it could not be said to be *περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὰ*, but *περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πρὸς τὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὰ*. He seems to be accounting for his making it *περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὰ*; but we must recollect that many of these short arguments in the *Ethics*, and, indeed, more or less, in all his works, seem obscure and needless at first sight. It is not easy to see why they are introduced, but it is probably with reference to some subtle theories or distinctions of one or other of the schools of his day, which he answers thus parenthetically.

- (54.) 4. *ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος*: the end of *ποίησις* is something beyond the *ποιητόν*, and therefore its end and its subject-matter differ; not so with *φρόνησις*, for, &c.
- (55.) 4. *τῆς πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη*. Michelet reads *οὐκ αἰεὶ*, following four MSS., and on the ground that there are some *πράξεις* of which this is not true, sc. where they are instrumental to some higher *τέλος*; but still it would be true of them *qua πράξεις*, and they would be complete in themselves, though there was something beyond them.
- (56.) 5. *διὰ τοῦτο*, as a proof of this.—*ἐνθεν*. From *φρόνησις* enabling a person to judge rightly on human action, the word *σωφροσύνη* has been formed.
- (57.) 6. *τοιαύτην*, i.e. an *ὑπόληψις περὶ τὰ πρακτά*, or *περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ*, for it secures right notions of pleasure and pain; and these notions are the causes of human action: wherefore that which *σωφροσύνη* preserves is right notions on human action.—*τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά*, the final cause of the action.
- (58.) 6. *εὐθύς, ipso facto*. The right motive to action, the right view of good and evil, will in action not present itself to one who is thoroughly demoralised by pleasure or pain; and this is what the contrary habit (*σωφροσύνη*) preserves and improves; whence *φρόνησις* preserves a right view of good and evil in action.

- (59.) 6. οὐδὲ δειν τούτου ἐνεκεν. That this right end is the true final cause (τούτου ἐνεκα) and motive (διὰ τοῦτο) of moral action and moral choice (οὐ φαίνεται).—φθαρτικὴ ἀρχὴ: hence φθείρεται is used in bk. ii. for the formation of habits of vice. See note 8, bk. ii.—μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ: not merely μετὰ ἀληθοῦς λόγου, as τέχνη.
- (60.) 7. τέχνης ἀρετή. There are degrees of development in art, and consequently an excellence of it; while of φρόνησις, properly speaking, there are no degrees,—it implies perfection in itself. He who is truly φρόνιμος has all the virtues, and if he fails in any one, so that his φρόνησις is defective, he cannot be said to have φρόνησις, but only to approach to it.
- (61.) 7. ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ. Another reason why φρόνησις is the ἀρετή of the logistic part of the soul, rather than τέχνη, is that it has the characteristic of virtue which τέχνη has not, viz. that voluntary failing in it is worse than where it is involuntary; whereas, in art, if a man makes a mistake on purpose, he is not the less master of his art for that.
- (62.) 7. ἀλλὰ μήν. Moral wisdom is not merely an intellectual habit or faculty, as τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη are, for it is so worked into the πάθη and the πάθη into it, that it becomes an energy of our whole nature rather than merely of the intellectual part of it; it is a part of our self-consciousness and self-existence; so that it is not possible that it should be forgotten,—τῆς τοιαύτης (μετὰ λόγου μόνον) ἔξω λήθη ἔστιν, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.

CHAPTER VI.

- (63.) 1. νοῦς, or the intellect, is the foundation of the whole reasoning process, and yet in a less strict sense is used for the whole of that process; it is the power of διάνοια, (ὃ διανοοίμεθα, De An. iii. 4, p. 69), but it is here used for that power of the mind which intellectually perceives particular objects and their invisible qualities, compares them, and evolves from them the general notions and the general principles which are involved therein: it resembles αἴσθησις, inasmuch as it is an intellectual perception of things and qualities invisible; while αἴσθησις is, properly speaking, con-

finer to objects of sense and visible qualities; but as it is an intellectual *αἴσθησις*, that word is used sometimes for it, and the verb *αἰσθανόμεθα* for *νοούμεν*. *Νοῦς* is the intellectual eye, and its characteristic is that it sees whatever may be presented to it. The act of intellectual vision may be more or less acute and searching, just as powers of sensible vision differ in kind as well as degree. Its use in the Ethics is, at first sight, somewhat wide; but all its meanings are connected together by its general sense of the intellectual perception of the qualities of things; and its functions may be stated to be:—

1. The *νοῦς τῶν ἀρχῶν τῆς ἐπιστήμης*,—*νοῦς τῆς ἀμείσου προτάσεως*, the perceptive and inductive power which perceives or works out the immutable qualities and laws of things necessary; and this again (as well as that given below, 2.) is divided into what is called *αἴσθησις*, where the laws and principles are self-evident; or *ἐπαγωγή*, where a process of comparison and combination is necessary; or *ἐθισμός*, where the intellectual eye of the soul has been so sharpened and perfected by use as to discern *ἀρχαί* instinctively: (Eth. i. 7, τῶν δὲ ἀρχῶν αἱ μὲν αἰσθήσει θεωροῦνται αἱ δὲ ἐπαγωγῇ, αἱ δὲ ἐθισμῷ τινί).

2. The *νοῦς τῶν ἀρχῶν* in morals; the moral intellect; the perceptive and inductive power, which perceives the moral qualities and works out the moral laws from the moral world in general, on which *φρόνησις* is founded, (*τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἐτέρας προτάσεως*, ch. xi. 4); which, when it has the shadowy notions of *καλόν* and *αἰσχρόν* worked into it, and is itself worked into the *πάθη*, becomes (see below, 3.) the *moral sense*.

3. The *νοῦς τοῦ τέλους*: *τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου* = *φρόνησις τοῦ ἐσχάτου*, perception of the moral quality of any object of desire; where the *φρόνησις* has been so perfected in its first stage, that a right choice of the end is an intellectual *δύναμις* or instinct, rather than the result of an intellectual operation.

Hence we may see that *αἴσθησις* + the intellect = *νοῦς*: *νοῦς* as the moral sense = *φρόνησις τοῦ ἐσχάτου*: hence *αἴσθησις* is sometimes used for *νοῦς*, and *νοῦς* for this *φρόνησις*.

Observe that νοῦς is not said to be τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος. This is the office of deliberation, διανοίας, which implies a longer and more complex intellectual process than Aristotle assigns in the Ethics to νοῦς. Could this process (the φρόνησις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος) become instinctive, so that a man could at a glance see the right means, it would be termed νοῦς: of course νοῦς is employed in it as enabling us to see the nature of the means which βούλευσις suggests to us as desirable.

- (64.) 1. μετὰ λόγον γάρ: as ἐπιστήμη uses λόγος, and λόγος starts from certain principles, there must be some power to arrive at them.—περὶ ἐνίων, sc. τῶν τιμωτάτων.
 (65.) 2. λείπεται, conclusion of disjunctive syllogism.

CHAPTER VII.

- (66.) 1. In the study and contemplation of things immutable, we have seen that there are two separate habits or powers of mind: the one discerning, tracing, and laying down fixed laws and principles from the shifting particulars in which they operate; the other discerning the connection between these first principles and results, and what follows or depends upon them. The one is the inductive, the other the deductive, or, perhaps, more properly retroductive power, because it refers back principles and phenomena to the higher and more fixed principles on which they depend. There is, however, another habit or power, in which both the others are combined; whereby a man becomes thoroughly master of that which is within the compass of human knowledge,—at one glance seeing the laws, and their results. This man is the σοφός; he has *ideas* in each particular branch, and is completely master of the subject; while the universal σοφός is master of everything within the compass of human knowledge which is worthy his attention, and especially the higher and more eternal subjects, such as the laws of the material universe, (ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος). In mathematics, for instance, Euclid would be a σοφός, as having both *invented* and applied the laws of mathematics; while the professor who thoroughly understood the connection between the laws of Euclid and the problems and theorems which depend on them, would be ἐπιστημῶν.

- (67.) 1. τὴν δὲ σοφίαν κ.τ.λ. The word is loosely applied to excellence in the several arts; but besides this, which is recognised as well in common speech as in the verses of Homer, its most proper and highest meaning is accurate and perfect knowledge, not only of the truths which may be referred back to higher principles, but of the highest and most ultimate principles themselves. The *ἐπιστημών* accepts these ultimate principles as starting-points, and believes in them, the *σοφός*, as it were, detects them; they have to him not only a subjective, but an objective reality; they are not merely convictions in his own mind, but facts which he realizes in external nature.
- (68.) 3. κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα, containing within itself, or *the summing up*, or *the perfection*: it may be taken either way.—τῶν τιμιωτάτων. πολιτικὴ and φρόνησις, though the highest excellencies of man's social and moral nature, are nevertheless not the highest attainments man is capable of, inasmuch as man, their subject-matter, is inferior to the immutable and eternal elements and powers of nature. In ancient philosophy, permanence was a main standard of excellence, and the short-lived man, with his shifting and perishing societies and affairs, naturally seemed inferior to the apparently everlasting things of nature, of which no one knew the beginning nor the end, and which had outlived so many ages of humanity.
- (69.) 4. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. If, then, the bodily and moral good of man is variable, and the physical properties, such as whiteness and straightness, always the same, it would be also (καί) allowed that τὸ σοφόν, which contemplates the former, is as invariable as its subjects, and that τὸ φρόνιμον, which contemplates shifting particulars, is variable, and therefore both different from and inferior to σοφία.
- (70.) 4. διὸ καὶ κ.τ.λ. That φρόνησις has for its subject these particulars of shifting life, is clear from its being applied even to those animals who shew in any degree a faculty for providing for their every-day lives. (There is a curious passage in *Metaph.* i. 1, on the application of this term to animals: φρόνιμα μὲν ἀνευ τοῦ μαθεῖν ὅσα μὴ δύνата ψάφων ἀκούειν, οἷον μέλιττα καὶ εἰ τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ζώων ἔστι.)
- (71.) 4. φάνερον δέ κ.τ.λ. Plato, *Rep.* 473, holds the contrary theory: εἰ μὴ—ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ἢ οἱ

βασίλῃς—φιλοφρόσῳσι γνησίως καὶ ἱκανῶς καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταῦτόν συμ-
πίσῃ δύναμις πολιτικῇ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ—οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα ταῖς
πόλεσι κ.τ.λ.

(72.) 5. περιττά, superfluous matters.

CHAPTER VIII.

- (73.) 6. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις. It would seem as if ch. viii. ought to begin here. He has finished the examination of σοφία, and now proceeds to a further examination of that intellectual virtue which has to do with morals; but inasmuch as he is contrasting φρόνησις with σοφία, it may also be viewed as properly belonging to ch. vii.
- (74.) 7. φρόνησις is divided into the knowledge of general principles and the knowledge of particulars, and their relation to those general principles; it is not merely a καθόλου ἐπόληψις, but περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.
- (75.) 7. εἰ γὰρ εἰδέιῃ. If one has the general principle, but is ignorant of the nature of the particular, it is not so practically useful as if one knew the nature of the particular. Therefore φρόνησις is rather περὶ τὰ ἕκαστα, though both are desirable.
- (76.) 7. εἴη δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ. It is probable that there will be some governing power or system to direct and inform this particular φρόνησις. The following scheme of the relation between φρόνησις and πολιτικῇ will set this forth clearly:—First, we must observe that πολιτικῇ and φρόνησις are practically identical; the propositions and principles of which they consist are the same in themselves (ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἔξις.) though both these habits themselves, and these principles would be defined differently, (τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτόν αὐταῖς). Thus φρόνησις, consisting of a number of general principles on human good, might be defined to be the science of moral good, while πολιτικῇ, consisting of exactly the same principles, might be defined to be the science of social good. Such a principle as "honesty is the best policy," which belongs alike to πολιτικῇ and φρόνησις, would, with regard to one, be said to be a principle of social, to the other, a principle of moral, wisdom. Now the two habits of mind being in themselves iden-

the nearest approach to practice of which πολιτική is capable, (τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον).

- (80.) 3. δοκεῖ δέ. As πολιτική is rather concerned with the general principles of good, so is φρόνησις rather concerned with the application of those principles to oneself; and hence this has appropriated to itself the name φρόνησις, though it properly includes the general principles as well as the particular application of them.
- (81.) 3. ἐκείνων. From ἐκείνων to δικαστική is parenthetical.—ἐκείνων, sc. the divisions given above,—the different sorts of πολιτική:—
οἰκονομία, the system of family government.
νομοθεσία, the laying down general principles of social good.
πολιτική, the practical application of these principles,—
a. by ψήφισματα—βουλευτική.
β. by rewards and punishments, (δικαστική).
- (82.) 4. εἶδος κ.τ.λ. This is to be connected immediately with the sentence in which φρόνησις is said to be περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἓνα; and Aristotle goes on to shew that this particular φρόνησις really requires that knowledge of the general principles of social good which is supplied by πολιτική, (καίτοι ἴσως οἶκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας).
- (83.) 4. ἐκ ταύτης κ.τ.λ. From this received notion, that the φρόνιμοι mind their own affairs, the πολιτικοί the public affairs, it has resulted that particular φρόνησις is supposed to be the only φρόνησις, although general principles are needed to enable a person to see and to carry out his private good; and these being supplied by πολιτική, the ἡ καθύλου φρόνησις is lost sight of.
- (84.) 5. τοῦ εἰρημένου, sc. that φρόνησις practically is τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα: that it is not merely the possession of moral principles, but the acting on them in particulars, is evidenced by the fact that the young can become μαθηματικοί, but cannot become φρόνιμοι,—the point which they lack being experience in the particulars of every-day life.
- (85.) 6. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἂν τις σκέψαιτο κ.τ.λ. That this arises from the particular nature of the subject may be seen from the fact that the same observation holds good in those sciences or systems which depend for their principles on

experience. A boy may be a mathematician, because mathematics start from abstract principles, (*δι' ἀφαιρέσεως*), and not from experience; he cannot be a philosopher, because that implies an acquaintance with particulars as well as principles; nor yet can he study physics, for this too is the science of the phenomena of the natural world.

(86.) 6. *δι' ἀφαιρέσεως*, *abstract*.

(87.) 6. *τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστὶν οὐκ ἄδηλον*. Abstract principles of mathematics are in their very nature to be received before they are understood, for their nature and meaning is hidden; but matters of experience must be comprehended to be received, as their nature and meaning is not hidden, but manifest. It is no proof that a person has not abstract principles because he does not understand them; but if a person does not understand matters of experience, he evidently has no experience of them.

(88.) 7. *εἴτε κ.τ.λ.* This passage seems rather to be connected with what he said above, (sect. iv.) as to the necessity of knowledge of the general principles furnished by *οἰκονομία* or *πολιτική*.

(89.) 8. *ὅτι ἡ φρόνησις κ.τ.λ.* This is a difficult passage, and requires much attention to master it.—*τοῦ ἐσχάτου*, i. e. *τέλους*: of the particular object of a particular *προαίρεσις*, (*οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψις ἐστὶν*, ch. ix. fin.). The first function of the moral reason is to direct us in forming a right judgment (*δόξα*) on the true nature of any object of desire, (*τοῦ ἐσχάτου*), and in deciding whether it is to be sought or declined. When this function is by practice become habitual, it operates instinctively, and is called *νοῦς*, as being an immediate perception of a moral fact, of the moral quality of an action or thing, which is one of the functions of *νοῦς*. See note 62. 3.

(90.) 9. *ἀντίκειται κ.τ.λ.* This does not mean that it is opposed to *νοῦς* as a contrary, but that it stands over against *νοῦς*, and is analogous to it. (See *Metaph.*, p. 100.) Thus:—

Moral action.	Intellectual operation.
φρόνησις τοῦ τέλους.	νοῦς τῶν ὄρων.

(91.) 9. He is shewing why the term *νοῦς* is applied to this moral perception, *φρόνησις*. *φρόνησις* stands (*ἀντίκειται*) to moral action,

as νοῦς does to scientific operations, supplying the starting-point to morals, as νοῦς does to science: νοῦς, as used here, is *reason* without *reasoning*; so φρόνησις, when the first stage of the moral character is formed, is moral reason without reasoning, (rational sense). νοῦς is used (ch. xi. 2.) to denote this φρόνησις when it has become so instinctive as to operate as a δύναμις, (like αἴσθησις of things visible,) to see instinctively and immediately the qualities in any object which make it fit to be pursued, and to accept it as an object instantaneously and without any effort or deliberation.

- (92.) 9. νοῦς τῶν ὁρῶν ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος. νοῦς, as we have seen in ch. v., discovers the ἀρχαί or principles which are not capable of demonstration, but are perceived by αἴσθησις, or ἐπισμύς, or ἐπαγωγή.
- (93.) 9. ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχαίου: that is, of the particular τέλος, with which ἐπιστήμη has nothing to do, but which is matter of αἴσθησις; not the simple αἴσθησις of visible properties, such as whiteness in an object, (οὐκ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων,) but that sort whereby we perceive some invisible quality, (ἀλλ' οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα κ.τ.λ.,) and in which νοῦς operates instinctively,—as, when seeing a triangle by simple αἴσθησις we see its visible shape, and also by νοητικὴ αἴσθησις, (cf. Anal. Post. i. 31. 8, p. 197; also De Anim. iii. 3. 1,) by the power of an habituated νοῦς, we recognise its invisible quality of being the simplest figure, and capable of no further resolution, (ὅτι τὸ ἐν μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον); for when we have arrived at a triangle we stop, knowing instantaneously and immediately that we cannot go further, (στήσεται γὰρ κακεῖ).
- (94.) 9. ἀλλ' αὖτ' η κ.τ.λ. This latter, the instinctive power of νοῦς to see the invisible and remote qualities of material objects, is not called φρόνησις, but αἴσθησις, for it resembles the perception of visible properties more closely than it does the perception of moral qualities, (μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ φρόνησις,) both being supposed to be instantaneous and immediate; but the former, φρόνησις, (the perception of moral qualities,) belongs to a different species of intellectual perception from αἴσθησις, (ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος,) and therefore, having nothing to do with sensual perception, is not simply called αἴσθησις, but νοῦς. We shall see in ch. xi. that this φρόνησις τοῦ τέλους is simply called νοῦς.

CHAPTER IX.

- (95.) 1. *φρόνησις* being thus viewed as a simple instinct of the moral intellect, an *ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψις τοῦ τέλους*, Aristotle now proceeds to consider that intellectual process which directs us in the choice of the means.
- (96.) 1. *πότερον ἐπιστήμη*: whether it is a purely scientific intellectual process of the reason alone, directed to moral action. The syllogism whereby this is answered is in the second figure.
- (97.) 2. *εὐστοχία*, a mere instinct,—a lucky knack of guessing at the right means; implying much natural talent, but no intellectual process. This too is answered in the second figure.
- (98.) 3. *ἀγχινοία*: Anal. Post. i. 34. 1, *ἡ δὲ ἀγχινοιά ἐστιν εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκήπτῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ μίσου*.—οὐδὲ δὲ δόξα: nor, again, is it a mere intellectual decision on moral action.—ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. As error always attaches to bad counsel, and correctness always to good, it follows that good counsel is a certain correctness, (*ὀρθότης*). This argument is from the perception of a certain quality inherent in a certain subject, tested and confirmed by the perception of the contrary quality in the contrary subject.
- (99.) 3. *ἐπιστήμη*. Science does not admit of error; if error comes in, science ceases: therefore we cannot talk of anything as the correctness of that which is essentially right. There is no such notion as *ὀρθότης ὀρθότητος*.
- (100.) 3. *δόξα*. Opinion is liable to error, and therefore has an *ὀρθότης*; but this is *ἀλήθεια*, and therefore not *εὐβουλία*.

Again, *δόξα* is the result of an intellectual process. Whenever *δόξα* has taken place the matter is settled, (*ἅμα δὲ καὶ ᾤσται ἢ οὐ πᾶν οὐ δόξα ἐστίν*). It is a decision more or less certain on some point, (*ἢ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἢ οὐ*), while *εὐβουλία* is evidently the seeking for a decision, (*ὅ δὲ βουλευόμενος—ζητεῖ τι*); but then *εὐβουλία* is an intellectual process, (*ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀνευ λόγου ἢ εὐβουλία*), and it must be either an *ὀρθότης ἐπιστήμης*, or *δόξης*, or *διανοίας*: it is not of the two first, therefore it remains that it is of the last, i. e. of some intellectual operation or process, (*λείπεται ἄρα διανοίας*),—*λείπεται* being constantly used to denote the con-

clusion of a disjunctive syllogism. It is hardly credible that for a long time this was, and perhaps is still, construed, "*It is therefore inferior to the δίανοια.*"—*διανοίας*: see the *De Anima*, iii. 4.

- (101.) 4. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. There are different senses of *ὀρθότης*: as applied to *εὐβουλία* it means correct judgment towards a right end, and by right means. Thus the *ἀκρατής* or *φαῦλος* has an *ὀρθότης βουλῆς* inasmuch as he takes right means towards his end, but his end being bad, he has not *εὐβουλία*, because his *βουλὴ* is not *ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική*. Again, a man may have a good end and attain it, but by means not good or proper: he has not *εὐβουλία* any more than a man who arrives at a right conclusion by a faulty syllogism is a logician.
- (102.) 5. ἀλλ' ἔστι κ.τ.λ. Some persons perplex themselves needlessly by trying to refer this to the moral syllogism which he speaks of in the seventh book as preceding moral choice or moral action, but it seems best to take it merely as an illustration drawn from logic.
- (103.) 6. οὕκοῦν. Where the process of deliberation is slow and tedious the power of *εὐβουλία* is not yet formed, though there is some progress made towards it.
- (104.) 7. οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψις ἐστίν. *φρόνησις* is here viewed as perfect in its first stage or function of choosing the right end, to which *εὐβουλία* considers and chooses the means.

CHAPTER X.

- (105.) The intellectual processes or habits necessary to an act of good *προαίρεσις*, viz. the choice of a good end and right means, being thus laid down, it remains to consider two other faculties or habits which are aids, or, as they are termed, handmaids, to moral wisdom. The first of these is *σύνεσις*, or *apprehension*, whereby, being unable to form for ourselves right moral principles, we are able to apprehend them, to go along with them (*συνιέναι*) when stated by another person, (*ἄλλου λέγοντος*), and to decide upon their being right or wrong, (*κριτική*), so as to adopt the one and reject the other.

Of course, now, when teaching is carried on by books, rather than orally, ἀλλου λέγοντος must have a wider sphere than in the time of Aristotle, (ἀλλου λέγοντος ἢ γράφοιτος). Things of ἀνάγκη or τύχη are not taken cognizance of by σύνεσις, but whatever is matter of deliberation. It has therefore the same subject-matter as φρόνησις, from which it differs inasmuch as φρόνησις has a directive function which σύνεσις has not. Nor, again, is σύνεσις the possession or formation (ἔχειν ἢ λαμβάνειν : see Anal. Post. ii. 15, p. 231.) of φρόνησις, for the former is φρόνησις itself, the latter is a function of the moral νοῦς ; but as in matters of science a person is said συνιέναι when he goes along with his teacher, when he uses the science he has so as to apprehend a subject laid before him, so in morals, a person is said συνιέναι when he uses his moral intellectual powers on contingent matter (δόξα) to judge in moral matters, whether what is advanced by another person (ἀλλου λέγοντος) is right or wrong, true or false,—so that we can apprehend and learn truth from the teaching or direction of another ; and hence the name, for συνιέναι (to go along with what another person says) is often used for μαθάνειν.

- (107.) This σύνεσις is the ear of the mind,—“be that bath ears to hear let him hear,”—and depends on the moral state or tendencies of the individual. If a man’s moral state, as far as it may be developed, is good, he will apprehend and adopt truth, and if not, he will not be able to comprehend it ; so in every subject he who is not πεπαιδευμένος, ματαιῶς ἀκούσεται. Cf. bk. i. ch. iii. 5.
- (108.) Many persons suppose σύνεσις to be an intellectual virtue, consisting in a habit of judging of a person’s character from what he says ; whereas Aristotle throughout is talking of the powers of the mind which are concerned in producing right moral action ; not those whereby and wherein a person judges of another, but those whereby he guides himself.
- (109.) 2. ἐπιτακτική. Aristotle did not recognise the judicial function of conscience.
- (110.) 3. οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν. So in Anal. Post. i. 2. 9, p. 148, εἰδέναι, the possession, is distinguished from ξυνιέναι, the comprehension, of knowledge.
- (111.) 3. οὔτε λαμβάνειν. So in Post. Anal. ii. 15. 4, p. 231,

λαμβάνειν rather denotes the formation of principles for one-self; σύνεσις is μανθάνειν φρόνησιν rather than λαμβάνειν.

- (112.) 3. ἄλλου λέγοντος. So Dem. 67. 14, ἄλλου λέγοντος ξυνεῖητε: Eth. x. 9. 7, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ' ἂν ξυνεῖη ὁ κατὰ παθὸς ζῶν: see *ibid.*, sect. 20.
- (113.) 4. λέγομεν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. That συνιέναι is to judge of what another person puts before us, and to receive it from him, is clear from its being frequently used as synonymous with μανθάνειν.

CHAPTER XI.

- (114.) The next habit which is necessary to moral wisdom is, that we should be able to apply rightly to our own particular selves and circumstances those principles which by σύνεσις we have received from others. This power is γνῶμη, *discretion, discernment*; as συγγνώμη is the fair and right application of general principles to the persons and cases of others, so dropping the σύν, (which in this compound word gives the notion of *others*,) γνώμη by itself is a right and sensible application of general principles to ourselves; and thus γνώμη corrects possible errors into which we might be led by adopting general principles from others.

- (115.) 2. εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἔξεις κ.τ.λ. These four habits, as we might expect from their nature. (εὐλόγως,) have a relation and bearing towards the same point, that is, any moral action. Their functions are as follows:—

νοῦς, perceiving the character and quality of any τέλος which presents itself = φρόνησις τοῦ τέλους. See note 91.

φρόνησις, choosing the right means towards such an end.

σύνεσις, supplying us with principles by enabling us to judge of, and apprehend rightly from others, the principles of right and wrong.

γνῶμη, enabling us to apply these principles rightly to our needs.

On this we must observe:—

1. That νοῦς is substituted for that φρόνησις which is ἀληθὴς ἐπιλογισμὸς τοῦ τέλους, because φρόνησις, being perfected in its first stage as the right choice of the end, becomes a rational instinct, or δυνάμις, whereby, without any intellectual *pro-*

cess, the moral eye of the soul perceives right or wrong in particulars, just as αἴσθησις perceives some visible, or νοῦς some invisible, attribute of an object. In fact, this function of moral perception is exercised directly by νοῦς morally instructed; it is a simple energy of the intellectual eye, operating instinctively and immediately. We now see the meaning and bearing of the passage (ch. viii. 9.) beginning “ἀντίκειται τῷ νῷ.”

2. εὐβουλία is omitted and φρόνησις substituted for it, because the first stage of φρόνησις being thus perfected, so that the slow deliberation of moral wisdom is supplied by the immediate energies of a moral intellectual perception (νοῦς), the only intellectual process that remains—i. e. the proper function of φρόνησις as an intellectual process—is concerned with the means. It may be observed that this is the moral state of most, or rather of all, men. The choice of the end is very often matter of instinct, and immediate,—in fact, where a man is good at all, it must be so, more or less,—that of the means very seldom, if ever. It is almost impossible practically to conceive a man so good, so thoroughly exercised in virtue, that the means as well as the end should present themselves to the eye of his soul without any effort on his part.

Practically, then, the good man does not arrive at a higher degree of moral perfection than an instinctive choice of an end and a slow, deliberative choice of means: and Aristotle, with his usual faithful portraiture of human nature as it is, assigns the several functions necessary to right moral action, to the habits or powers which practically perform them.

- (116.) 2. δυνάμεις. In proportion as they become matters of habit, and perform their functions invariably and rapidly, and truly, they become powers or faculties whereby we choose the end, or the means, or learn rightly the principle of others, or apply them to ourselves.
- (117.) 2. τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ. Supply “is not confined to δίκαιον, (οὐ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον ἀλλὰ) κοινὰ κ.τ.λ.”
- (118.) 3. τῶν ἐσχάτων. The τέλος is termed ἔσχατον as being the extreme point of the whole moral action, where it stops; and it is also used to denote τὸ καθ’ ἑκαστον, or τὸ πρακτόν, as being the τέλος.

(119.) 3. καὶ ἡ σύνεσις κ.τ.λ. Though σύνεσις is the reception of general principles from others, yet it is of general principles with reference to particular actions, and hence it is τῶν ἐσχάτων as well as φρόνησις.

(120.) 4. This difficult passage may be mastered with a little attention. Νοῦς has to do with extremes in both science and morals: in science it has to do with first principles, whence scientific reasoning starts, or to which it returns. These cannot be arrived at or proved by reasoning (λόγος), but are perceived by νοῦς. But in morals, νοῦς (=φρόνησις τοῦ τέλους) is of the shifting particular τοῦ ἐσχάτου (ἔσχατον as being τέλος) καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον, because by it we perceive immediately the good or bad in what presents itself to us as an end, and pursue or avoid it accordingly; and also of the major premiss, (τῆς ἐτέρας προτάσεως,) which is applied instinctively in that energy of the moral νοῦς: for the sources of the οὐ ἔνεκα, that whereby anything becomes an οὐ ἔνεκα, a final cause of action to us, are these: 1st. the principle or standard of pursuit and avoidance, (in which pursuit is predicated of certain qualities,) and 2ndly. the perception of these qualities in some particular. It is from these two combined that anything becomes to us an object of pursuit or avoidance, (ἀρχαὶ τοῦ οὐ ἔνεκα αὐται,) thus:—

πάν καλὸν διωκτόν, general principle, laid down by the νοῦς of ourselves or others.

τοῦτό ἐστι καλόν, perceived by νοῦς in its moral function.

τοῦτό ἐστι διωκτόν, that is, τοῦτο becomes an οὐ ἔνεκα to us.

(121.) 4. ἐτέρας προτάσεως. It is generally assumed that ἐτέρα πρότασις is the minor premiss. In Anal. Prior, i. 8. 1, it is either one of the premisses. But the fact is, that it is the premiss which has not been spoken of before; so that it is only the minor when the major has been mentioned or implied: here the ἔσχατον καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον, the shifting particular, clearly indicates a minor premiss; so ἐτέρα πρότασις is the major.

(122.) 4. ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἑκάστα γάρ: 1. Anal. Post. i. 31. 5. This γάρ refers to the ἐτέρα πρότασις: νοῦς is of the ἐτέρα πρότασις as well as of the particular, because this ἐτέρα πρότασις is formed (ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἑκάστα) by that intellectual αἰσθησις which is called νοῦς,—αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς.

(123.) 5. διὸ καὶ φυσικά. As a proof of this, that these powers of moral action do not spring from or belong to σοφία, but are of τὰ καθ' ἑκαστα, we may remark that they are conceived of as more or less natural gifts, which σοφία is not ; and a proof of their being natural gifts is found in the notion that they are held to be attached in different degrees to different natural states and ages of life, (σημείον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις οἰόμεθα ἀκολουθεῖν κ.τ.λ.,) as if nature was the author of them. This passage is in a parenthesis.

(124.) 5. διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς. This διὸ refers to the passage preceding the parenthesis.

νοῦς is the ἀρχή as forming the major premiss inductively from particulars. So Anal. Post. ii. 15. 8, ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀν εἴη.

It is the τέλος as applying deductively the principle so formed instinctively and almost unconsciously, so as to judge at sight of the character, good or bad, desirable or undesirable, of an action.

(125.) 6. ἐκ τούτων, sc. τὰ καθ' ἑκαστα.—αὶ ἀποδείξεις, *moral reasoning*,—ἐκ τούτων, *as data* ; περὶ τούτων, *as conclusions*.

(126.) 6. ὥστε δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Since moral reasoning is mostly about the particulars of moral action, the qualities, good or bad, of particular actions, men of experience, or age, or moral excellence, are enabled to judge, as it were by sight, of moral actions, and therefore their axioms and opinions, even though not supported by reasons, are to be followed as guides with as much confidence as the conclusions of the moral reason of ourselves or others who are not thus qualified.

(127.) 6. ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὁμμα: cf. St. Matt. vi. 22, 23 ; Heb. v. 14.

CHAPTER XII.

(128.) The question now arises, what is the use or advantage of these intellectual perfections, scientific or moral ? Wisdom, it is urged, has no practical value, for it leads to no action ; while moral wisdom, allowing it to lead to action, is not necessary to right action ; for, first, if moral wisdom consists in the knowledge of right and wrong in action, of what advan-

tage is this knowledge? for the virtues are habits, and when we have them we act from that habit, and not from the knowledge which may be implied therein: so in bodily health, we are not more healthy or strong for knowing medicine or gymnastics scientifically, (sect. 1). Or, secondly, suppose we allow that moral wisdom does not merely consist in the knowledge of right and wrong, but also plays an important part in the formation of the habits, then it may be asked, of what use is it to those who have the habit? and even those who have it not can form it under the direction of others, as in matters of health, (sect. 2).

And again, it is absurd to suppose that moral wisdom, inferior as it is to intellectual perfection, is to govern it, as will be the case if we assign to moral wisdom the supreme direction of our lives, (sect. 3). These points Aristotle answers.

- (129) 1. τοῦτο μὲν, sc. γίνεσθαι εἶναι πράξεων.—δικαία, *social good*, (benevolence); καλά, *individual excellence*, (picty); ἀγαθά, (*individual good*), self-love.—ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν: whatever are matters of πράξις, and not of τέχνη.

- (130.) 4. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν. First, they are desirable ingredients of human happiness, as being human excellencies, and this even if they actually contributed nothing productively to that happiness; but, secondly, they do contribute something,—they are ingredients thereof, the essential causes: as health is the cause of being healthy, though it is not the productive cause of it as medicine is, so is intellectual perfection a cause of happiness, as existing and operating in it.

- (131.) 6. ἔτι κ.τ.λ. With regard to moral wisdom, it is actually one of the productive causes of moral excellence, for it is concerned in the development of the ἔργον of man; for take that stage of moral development in which a right choice of the end is made instinctively, by the so far formed moral habit, ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκόπον ποιεῖ ἀρθόν,) then moral wisdom, in its function of εἰσουλία, judges of, selects, and determines on the means, (ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον,) and this is necessary to the whole moral action.

- (132.) 6. τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου κ.τ.λ. The ἀρεταί of the other three parts—the strictly scientific, the moral intellect, the æsthetic,—having been mentioned under the names of ἐπιστήμη, φρόνησις,

ἀρετή (ἡθικὴ), he is induced to mention parenthetically the fourth principle or part of humanity. The perfection of the æsthetic part is here represented by ἀρετή, because that stage of the moral character is here supposed to be formed, in which ἀρετή operates instinctively, as a sort of αἴσθησις, in distinguishing a good end from a bad one.

- (133.) 7. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηδεὶν κ.τ.λ. He now turns to the other point put by the objectors, viz. that if φρόνησις is useful for the formation of ἡθικὴ ἀρετή, it is useless as soon as the habit is formed. He recapitulates (μικρὸν ἀνωθεν ἀρκτεῖον) what he has said as to virtue not only consisting in action, but in action deliberately chosen (διὰ προαίρεσιν). Now supposing the moral character *completely* formed, there is an instinctive, though rational, choice of the whole action, both end and means, by the operation of the moral habit, (τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὁρθῶν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετή). The whole action then being supposed to be the instinctive operation of the perfectly formed character, the question now comes of what further use is φρόνησις? It must be remembered that this is a supposed case. The moral character is rarely so perfectly formed as to choose both means and end instinctively: the usual stage is that which Aristotle recognises elsewhere, viz. where the end is chosen instinctively, and the means are still matters of deliberation and doubt. In section 6 it is said that, ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τὸν σκόπον ὁρθῶν: see also ch. xiii. sect. 7: this instinctive choice of the end being the first stage of the moral character, which in the passage before us is viewed as in a further stage of perfection, the φρόνησις of the means being merged in the moral habit as well as that of the end.

- (134.) 7. φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δίκαιων. Moral knowledge, and moral sense of individual and social right; or the genitive may depend on πρακτικώτερος.—δι' ἄγνοιαν: where ἄγνοια is the cause of the action.

- (135.) 8. τὰ δὲ δόξα κ.τ.λ. Supposing the whole action to be deliberately chosen by the instinctive moral habit, it yet remains to carry it out into act,—to contrive and execute the means which we have selected. This is not within the province of ἀρετή, even when most perfectly formed into a δύναμις, (οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως). No moral excellence can give a man this power, and therefore some fur-

ther consideration is necessary, (λεκτέον δ' ἐπιστήσασσι (*more carefully* : see Lidd. and Scott ad v.) σαφέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν).

- (136.) 9. That φρόνησις which recognises and selects the right end and means, whether together or separately, springs from νοῦς in its function of perceiving the moral qualities and uses and tendencies of things or acts; but there is another function of the intellect, or, it may be said, another function of νοῦς, which has the distinct name of δεινότης, which perceives (not the moral, but) the *useful* qualities of things; sees how these necessary means may be carried out and obtained, (ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκόπον συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν: cf. Magn. Mor. i. 34, p. 48, τῆς δὲ δεινότητος σκέψασθαι ἐκ τινῶν ἑκάστον γένοιτο τῶν πρακτῶν καὶ ταῦτα πράττειν;) and from this δύναμις of δεινότης there springs a second sort of φρόνησις, which is able to devise, carry out, obtain the means predetermined upon towards a *good end*; for unless the end is good, the habitual and deliberate exercise of this contriving faculty is not φρόνησις, but πανουργία. And it is very important to the understanding of this chapter, to keep in mind the different nature and functions of the φρόνησις which springs from νοῦς, and that which springs from δεινότης; that which chooses the means because they are good and right, and that which carries such good and right means out: hence it is seen how moral wisdom, or φρόνησις, is necessary even after the habit has been perfectly formed, see note 133,—as perfectly as it is possible to conceive it,—more perfectly than it practically can be,—certainly than it ever has been, except in the single case of Him Who had our nature without our imperfections.

δεινότης. Soph. Ant. 332, πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κοῦδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει. Our word *cunning* represents δεινότης more fully than any other, but still it does not give the notion of fear which exists in δεινός. Cunning is used in old authors both in a good and bad sense, though in later times it is mostly confined to the latter,—a tacit evidence of the way in which the faculty is generally used.—πανούργους: so we call both φρόνιμοι and πανούργοι δεινοί.

- (137.) 10. ἔστι δ' ἡ φρόνησις κ.τ.λ. φρόνησις, when thus ap-

plied to the carrying out our choice, is not the same as this faculty; for, first, it implies a greater degree of intellectual exertion, as *δεινότης* is rather an instinctive power; and secondly, *φρόνησις* implies a good end, while *δεινότης* is indifferent to the character of the end: but still *δεινότης* is an ingredient of active moral wisdom, for without it we should choose, but not act; our moral character would remain unproductive, from our inability to carry out our determinations. Practically, we do meet such people not unfrequently, to whom nature seems to have denied *δεινότης*, and hence, though they have *φρόνησις* as moral knowledge and moral perception, their light is hid under a bushel; indeed, in this world, as it is at present ordered, their very moral excellence often makes them shrink from doing what is necessary to secure their end. It must be remembered, that though the *φρόνησις* of the end often becomes actually instinctive, and the *φρόνησις* (choice) of the means can be conceived of as instinctive, the *φρόνησις* which consists in a rational and right use of *δεινότης* cannot, from its nature, ever become an instinct, and therefore remains even when the moral character is looked upon as perfectly formed; see note 133.

- (138.) 10. ἡ δὲ εἰς κ.τ.λ. The habit of contriving and carrying out the means to a good end arises to this eye of the soul, when to it is joined *ἀρετή*; for the end must be good, or else it will be *παρουργία*, and good ends do not present themselves (as good) except to those who have *ἀρετή*.
- (139.) 10. δμματι τῆς ψυχῆς may either be *φρόνησις ἀπὸ τῆς δεινότητος*, or *δεινότης*: in either case the meaning is the same, viz. that to the exercise of this practical faculty moral excellence is necessary.
- (140.) 10. αἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοί. In acts of moral choice there is a reasoning process more or less distinct; a reference of the particular to some principle, some standard of right, which may be syllogistically stated. This standard of right, this major premiss, by reference to which we draw our conclusion as to the pursuit or avoidance of the particular object in question, is not known except to the good man. The man without *ἀρετή* has a bad standard by which he measures acts in the moral syllogism, (see bk. iii. 4. 4, 5,) and there-

fore his end is wrong, and his δεινότης becomes πανουργία, and not φρόνησις; therefore without ἀρετή we cannot have the φρόνησις ἀπὸ τῆς δεινότητος.

- (141.) 10. ὥστε ἀδύνατον κ.τ.λ. This seems to be a mere repetition, for the greater part of the book has been occupied in shewing the way in which φρόνησις and ἀρετή are connected: but he is speaking, not of the φρόνησις which works in βούλησις and βουλευσις, but of the φρόνησις ἀπὸ τῆς δεινότητος, and shews that to the development of δεινότης into φρόνησις it is necessary that ἀρετή should exist. φρόνησις ἀπὸ νοῦ requires δεινότης to carry it out, otherwise it would have eyes but not hands; but in the case supposed above, and considered here, where the ἠθικὴ ἀρετή secures both the right end and right means, the φρόνησις ἀπὸ τῆς δεινότητος is the only definite energy of φρόνησις, as the operation of the moral intellect, distinguished from moral sense.

CHAPTER XIII.

- (142.) 1. ἡ ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει κ.τ.λ. δεινότης stands in such a relation to the φρόνησις which belongs to it, that the latter is a development of the former by the addition of certain ingredients; so does φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ stand to κυρία, or ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ, as the latter is likewise developed from the former by the addition of certain ingredients. This φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ consists in certain instinctive impulses towards good, (ὁρμαὶ ἀνευ λόγου: Magn. Mor. i. 34. 49, οἷον ὁρμαὶ τινες ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἀνευ λόγου πρὸς τὰ ἀνδρεία κ.τ.λ. :—the passage should be read, as it illustrates what is said here: see also Eth. x. 9. 8, δεῖ δὲ τὸ ἥθος προϋπάρχειν πῶς οἰκίον τῆς ἀρετῆς στίργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρὸν,)—certain shadowy visions of καλὸν and αἰσχρὸν, which float indefinitely before the mind of every one who possesses human nature, unless, perhaps, we are to except those savage nations or individuals whose nature has by long corruption and degeneracy fallen below even the original

fall. The shadowy instincts, residing in the imagination rather than the reason, are the guide of the child while yet his reason is dormant: as his powers in course of nature unfold themselves, these shadowy instincts impregnate his reason, and become rational, (μετὰ λόγου οὔσαι,) until, as the child grows into the man, instinct is no longer his guide, but reason; he knows why he avoids the evil and seeks the good, and thus φυσικὴ ἀρετή, which resides in the πάθη (especially in αἰδώς) by the admixture and impregnation of the reason, becomes ἡθικὴ; and this again, as has been before said, the nearer it approaches to perfection, becomes in its operation more instinctive, more a δύναμις.

- (143.) 1. ἀλλ' εἴνευ νοῦ κ.τ.λ. φυσικὴ ἀρετή then is ἀρετή minus νοῦς.—οὔτω καὶ εἴντα ὑθα. These shadowy feelings sometimes lead one wrong.—εἰὰν δὲ λαβῇ νοῦν. It is not by the addition of δεινότης that φυσικὴ ἀρετή becomes κυρία, but by the addition of that φρόνησις which springs from νοῦς.
- (144.) 2. ἡ δὲ εἴξις ὁμοία οὔσα. Both φυσικὴ and κυρία ἀρετή consist in avoiding what is wrong and doing what is right; but the latter energizes thus upon rational grounds.
- (145.) 2. ὥστε καθάπερ κ.τ.λ. As in the moral intellect there are the two powers of δεινότης and φρόνησις, which are so connected, (at least as far as φρόνησις is considered as an habitual and rational exercise of the contriving and acting power,) that δεινότης becomes φρόνησις by the addition of ἀρετή, so in moral action these states φυσικὴ and κυρία ἀρετή are similarly related, inasmuch as φυσικὴ by the addition of φρόνησις becomes κυρία.
- (146.) 2. εἴνευ φρονήσεως. Here φρόνησις is that moral wisdom which arises from νοῦς, (see above, εἰὰν δὲ λαβῇ νοῦν): ἀρετὴ ἡθικὴ can exist without the φρόνησις ἀπὸ τῆς δεινότητος, (see last chapter, sect. 8,) though it cannot act.
- (147.) 3. διόπερ κ.τ.λ. From this admixture of the intellect in the moral habit some persons think that the virtues are wholly intellectual.—φρονήσεις, acts or energies of φρόνησις.—πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, the whole of the several virtues.

- (148.) 4. σημειῶν δέ. That he was partly wrong and partly right is proved by the way in which men speak of any virtue as ἔξις κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον, which shews on the one hand that ὁρθὸς λόγος is not the whole, and on the other that it is part of it.
- (149.) 4. μαντεύεσθαι, *to feel*. It is applied to those convictions or impressions which we have without being able to give any definite reason for them, which come over the mind as the supposed inspirations of the prophet. Rhet. i. 13, μαντευόμεθα γὰρ πάντες κ.τ.λ.
- (150.) 5. μεταβῆναι, *to change our ground*.—οὐ γὰρ μόνον κ.τ.λ. ἀρετή is not only the πάθη under the government of reason, as of some power external to them, (κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον,) but it is a compound state of which ὁρθὸς λόγος is an essential ingredient, (μετὰ τοῦ ὁρθοῦ λόγου). It is not the moral governed by the intellectual, but it is the moral-intellectual. It may be said to be κατὰ λόγον with regard to the subordination of the passions to the reason, but μετὰ ὁρθοῦ λογίου when viewed as an ἔξις, or state of mind made up of certain emotions or energies.
- (151.) 5. ὁρθὸς δὲ λόγος κ.τ.λ. This marks the distinction between the two sorts of φρόνησις,—ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ and ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς δεινότητος. The latter would very inadequately express ὁρθὸς λόγος περὶ πρακτῶν.
- (152.) 5. λόγους, *acts of reason*; μετὰ λόγου, *in which reason is an ingredient*; ἐπιστήμας, *states of the pure intellect*.
- (153.) 6. οὐδὲ φρόνιμον. From there being a sort of φρόνησις which arises from δεινότης, and which is not in its idea inseparable from right action, it might be supposed that a man might be φρόνιμος without being ἀγαθός, but from what has been said it is clear even this sort of φρόνησις implies ἀρετή.
- (154.) 6. διαλεχθείη, *argue*.
- (155.) 6. ἐφυσίτατος. The λόγοι ὅρμαι, in which φυσικὴ ἀρετή mainly consists, are not all equally strong. In fact, the different nature and strength of these makes different dispositions.—ἀπλῶς, *strictly, properly*.
- (156.) 6. ἄμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει. Until φρόνησις is formed, and is in active operation as the guide of every-day life, the

virtuous acts we may perform are only the energies of φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ more or less advanced towards ἀρετὴ κυρία. When φρόνησις is formed, it operates throughout the whole πάθος, and moulds them into virtues by proper regulation. So St. James: "*If a man offend in one point, he is guilty of all.*" That is, disobedience to God in one point proves the want of that faith which conforms the whole man to obedience. The virtues may exist separately when they are only *in posse*, as the man is advancing towards moral excellence; but they cannot when they are *in esse*, inasmuch as virtue does not consist in this or that action, but in a particular frame of mind exhibiting itself in action. φρόνησις is a focus which collects the several scattered rays of light, and transmits them through itself the same, though changed.

- (157.) 7. He now sums up his answer to the difficulties started in the 12th chapter, by saying, that even were it true that φρόνησις was not concerned in moral action as a productive cause and necessary ingredient, yet, as being an excellence of part of man's nature, it would be a part of happiness: but it is a productive cause and necessary ingredient. Nor is any superiority or authority given to it over σοφία hereby, —for it is merely with relation to man that its functions are thus assigned it,—any more than medicine is superior to health because it exercises authority over it, but with a view to it,—any more than because we say πολιτική is the highest science with regard to man, we mean that it is to direct the gods.
- (158.) 8. ἡ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. φρόνησις is here considered again (as in ch. xii. 6.) as it practically exists and operates in men; the moral character giving the end, the means being found by the slower intellectual process of φρόνησις.

νοῦς.—φρόνησις.

As one of the difficulties in this book is the different senses in which the words φρόνησις and νοῦς are used, it may be as well to give them. Their being used sometimes as different, sometimes as the same, arises from the functions of the one being in certain parts and stages of the moral character the same, (see ch. viii. 8,) in others different.

νοῦς.

1. Perception of the invisible physical qualities of things, whence and whereby the ἀρχαί of scientific reasoning are perceived or formed; differing from αἰσθησις, which is the perception of the visible qualities of things.

2. Perception of moral qualities of things, whence moral premisses or principles are inductively formed, (ἀρχή, ch. xi. 6).

3. Perception of the moral quality of a particular action, by an instinctive reference to, and application of, a moral principle; instinctive perception of the end, (τοῦ τέλους, ch. xi. 6,) followed by φρόνησις in its shape of εὐβουλία, (ch. xi. 2,) which is also ascribed to ἀρετή, (ch. xii. 6,) inasmuch as it is by the existence of ἀρετή in the soul that this rational perception is able to operate as an instinct towards good, and in it the ἀρετή τοῦ τέλους consists.

α. φρόνησις ἀπὸ νοῦ.

1. The possession of moral principles.


2. The application of these principles to a particular, called also νοῦς, because the intellect sees instinctively the moral quality, as νοῦς proper sees the physical quality, (ch. viii. 8). In this sense it is an ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψις τοῦ τέλους, (ch. ix. 7). Whenever the φρόνησις is thus worked into the πάθος, a moral sense is formed.

3. The discovery of the right means by the perception of their moral qualities, as well as of fitness for the purpose in hand. This is the proper function of φρόνησις when, in its first function, it has become that moral intuition which is called analogously νοῦς; and it is its usual function in most men, because it rarely happens that the perception of the means becomes intuitive; hence it is used for εὐβουλία, (ch. xi. 2).

β. φρόνησις ἀπὸ τῆς δεινότητος.

The perception of the way in which the means determined on are to be accomplished, and the end obtained, coming in after the προαίρεσις of the end and means: this would remain a definite energy of the intellect in every action, even if the above προαίρεσις could become an instinctive energy of ἡθελεῖ ἀρετή, (ch. xii. 8).

Formation of the moral character.



The undeveloped nature of man seems to have been viewed by Aristotle as consisting,—1. Of the tendencies of *ἡδονή* and *λύπη*, residing in and working by the several *πάθη*, more or less strongly in different individuals. 2. Of the antagonistic instinct of *φυσικὴ ἀρετή*,—a shadowy sense of *καλόν* and *αἰσχρόν*, chiefly the latter, residing in the imagination, and not in the reason, with the *ἡδύ* of self-approbation attached to them as a motive. 3. The neutral power of *νοῦς*, or intellect, as first dormant, but daily developing itself.

From the first of these proceed the actions of simple selfishness; from the other the actions of *καλόν*; and as *νοῦς* is developed it is impregnated by one or the other of these, and whether it is by the one or the other settles in the main the question of the future character. If the passions have their way, and the *νοῦς* is impregnated by them, its judgments and views are simply sensual, and it results in the *αἰσθητικὴ ἐπιστήμη*, (the law of the members,) which holds *πάν ἡδὺ διωκτόν*—*πάν λυπηρόν φευκτόν*. If, on the other hand, the shadowy sense of *καλόν* and *αἰσχρόν* controls the passions, the *νοῦς* is impregnated by it. These motives daily find their way more and more into the reason, and the reason apprehending and receiving them, the result is *κυρίως ἐπιστήμη*,—a rational apprehension of the principles of *καλόν* and *αἰσχρόν*, as facts in morals and as motives of action. This shews itself first in *βούλησις*, which, under the direction of *φρόνησις*, makes a right choice of the end, judging rightly of the fitting objects of pursuit and avoidance, as well as of the nature of the objects presented for its decision, (*ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ κατὰ λόγον*); and when this has become habitual, it impresses itself in the *ἐπιθυμίας*, gives right notions of pleasure and pain, so that the true *ἡδύ* alone presents itself as *ἡδύ*, and the motive and cause of action in its shape of *βούλησις* becomes an instinct, with this difference, that it is now a rational instinct, (*ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ μετὰ λόγου*); not only the mere shadowy sense of *καλόν* and *αἰσχρόν*, but an instinct founded on the views and judgments of reason. The first stage of the moral character (*φρόνησις τοῦ τέλους*) is now formed, and this is the highest stage of perfection to which men can ordinarily rise. The second function of *φρόνησις* is that of choosing the right means, (*βούλευσις*), and this also we may conceive of as being merged in the moral character, so as to act instinctively; but it is

practically impossible, or at least nearly so, for mere men. Should it take place, then the second stage of the moral character is completed,—and ἡ ἀρετὴ τὴν προαίρεσιν (not only σκοπόν) ἀρθήν ποιεῖ,—and the man has as perfect an εἶς or ἥθος as we can conceive him to have: but men generally (may we not say of mere men universally?) are incapable of this, and this function of φρόνησις remains as a distinct intellectual operation, capable, of course, of various degrees of perfection, as the nature of things is better and more instinctively understood, and therefore the choice of the means carried on with greater readiness and truth. But there is yet another function of φρόνησις, arising from δεινότης, which is necessary to the ἐνέργεια of the good man, and which is developed and formed coincident with the other two: for this see note 136.

BOOK VII.

CHAPTER I.

- (1.) IN the theory of moral virtue, as laid down by Aristotle, the intellect has only a limited authority over the passions. His virtues are not merely acts or states of the intellect, but of the passions and intellect combined, each contributing its share to the action. Hence, as it practically happens that the proper relation between the intellect and passions is seldom attained, it might be argued that the Platonic theory, which assigns a more despotic authority to the intellect, would remedy the contradictions which arise from the rebellion of the appetites against the reason, and that in the Aristotelic system the intellect was not sufficiently developed, being liable to be dragged about by the passions at their will. And that φρόνησις which allows itself to be thus dragged about by the passions is not really knowledge, for it is impossible to act contrary to such knowledge. In answer to this, he shews how it is that φρόνησις, from the inseparable conditions of human action, fails always to obtain the proper degree of mastery, and how it is that a man may act contrary to his

knowledge; and in explaining this he at the same time completes his portraiture of our moral nature.

- (2.) 1. ἀλλήν ποιεσάμενους ἀρχήν, *taking a fresh starting-point*. He has discussed the nature of moral virtue, its relation to the ἔργον of man, and its connection with his intellectual nature; he now proceeds to fresh ground—to the examination of certain difficulties in his moral theory, and certain facts in our social position, with a view to illustrate still further the relation between moral virtue and the destinies and happiness of man.
- (3.) 1. There are three stages of moral evil,—*vice, incontinence, brutality*; and it is the second of these whence the difficulties which present themselves in our moral theory arise. ἀκρασία is but vaguely rendered by *incontinence*, but for want of a better the term may be retained,—care being taken that it represent to our minds, not the notion which is conveyed by its ordinary English meaning, but the more technical one of its Greek original,—*want of power over oneself*.
- (4.) 1. θηριότης. In ἀρετή the rational perception of καλόν agrees with the impressions of ἡδύ; in ἐγκράτεια the impressions of ἡδύ differ from, but succumb to, the perception of καλόν; in the τῇ θηριώδει ἀντιθεμένη ἔξις the whole being and nature is above the mere rational perception of καλόν, and exempt from any impulse of ἡδύ; while in κακία the rational perceptions of right and wrong are so distorted, that the αἰσχρόν presents itself as ἡδύ: in ἀκρασία the rational perceptions of καλόν differ from, and are overcome by, the impulse of ἡδύ; in θηριότης all rational perceptions of right and wrong are lost, and the desires, in consequence of the obscuration of reason, are so utterly depraved, that they belong to a nature lower than that of man.
- (5.) 2. εἰ καθάπερ φασίν κ.τ.λ. Mark the use of the indicative mood, not the conditional. It is not at all impossible but that this passage really represents Aristotle's impression on the subject.
- (6.) 2. καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίου κ.τ.λ. The brute creation are, from their lack of reason, incapable of that choice of

good or evil which constitutes ἀρετή or κακία, while the gods are removed from that sphere of action in which alone these habits can exist.

- (7.) 3. ἑτερόν τι γένος κακίας: not a different sort of κακία, but a sort different from κακία.
- (8.) 3. Σείος: Lac. for Θείος.
- (9.) 3. ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις. In such people there is no cultivation of the reason, and therefore the passions, left to themselves, grow more and more degraded.
- (10.) 3. νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις. Where the reason is deranged or impaired, and the natural tastes and desires vitiated, either by the failure or loss of some faculty or instinct; as where Nebuchadnezzar, being deprived of his understanding, lived and fed as the beasts of the field; or where mental or corporeal disease have so affected the organs or senses as to make things repugnant to human nature agreeable and natural.
- (11.) 4. ἀκρασίας—μαλακίας—τροφῆς. The former is properly the moral temper or state acted upon by ἡδύ or λυπηρόν.—μαλακία is the disposition to avoid trouble, whereby λυπηρόν is more able to convey its impression.—τροφή, the tendency to self-indulgence, a certain luxury-loving softness, whereby ἡδύ operates more rapidly and sensibly; but it is here used in connection with the two last, rather as a natural tendency towards ordinary pleasure and aversion to pain, which exists in every one. All these vary according to the particular constitutions of men, and thus are different phases of moral weakness different in different people.—ἐγκράτεια is the general moral state opposite to ἀκρασία, (self-denial generally,) and also the particular temper which does not care much for things of sense.—καρτερία is a certain manliness of character which stands up against λυπηρόν, rather glorying in hardships than flying from them, resists the softer solicitations of the ἡδύ.
- (12.) 4. ὥς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἱξέων. The more natural construction would be, ὥς τὰς αὐτὰς ἱξείας, but περὶ κ.τ.λ. depends directly on ὑποληπτόν: "We must not form a conception of these severally, as if the conception were about," &c.

(13.) 5. ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων: see bk. i. ch. 4. The whole of this passage is valuable, as giving a distinct statement of Aristotle's method of enquiry. There is not much trace here of his being the patron of a deductive as opposed to an inductive method.

(14.) 6. δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ. The dogmas and difficulties which are started on the subject, and each of which resolves itself, more or less easily, into a question:—

1. That ἐγκράτεια is good, ἀκρασία bad, which may be stated as a question: “Is all ἐγκράτεια good, all ἀκρασία bad?”

2. Is adherence to reason always ἐγκράτεια, departure therefrom always ἀκρασία?

3. The ἀκρατής acts contrary to what he knows to be right, under the influence of passion; the ἐγκρατής, with the same knowledge, resists his desires, through reason. Have the ἀκρατής and ἐγκρατής knowledge?

4. The ἐγκρατής or καρτερικός is held by some to be identical with the σώφρων, and the ἀκρατής with the ἀκόλαστος; by others only partially so; while others say they are always different.

5. Can ἀκρασία and φρόνησις exist together? and if so, in what sense?

6. To what objects may the term ἀκρασία be applied, and in what senses is it applied to such matters as anger, gain, &c.?

CHAPTER II.

(15.) 1. He here starts some difficulties which are suggested or implied in these several views of ἀκρασία.—πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς, i. e. with a right ὑπόληψις on moral subjects; that is, with φρόνησις. Some say that φρόνησις is incompatible with ἀκρασία. Others distinguish between φρόνησις and ἐπιστήμη, (ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν,) and say that such a habit of mind is incompatible with the degree of intellectual conviction expressed by ἐπιστήμη; while Socrates denied the possibility of any one erring against his mental conviction, whether it were weak or strong; that is, he denied such a sort of action as ἀκρασία at all, but said

that when any one did so err, it was not contrary to their better knowledge, but from lack of it, (δι' ἀγνοίαν).

- (16.) 2. This, like many of Socrates' views, he rejects on the simple ground of its being contrary to *experience*.—ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἴεται γέ, sc. δεῖν πράττειν: see ch. x. 3. 2, last line.
- (17.) 3. He next states the objections which attach themselves to the view which distinguishes between complete (ἐπιστήμη) and incomplete knowledge (δόξα). It must be borne in mind that he is stating not his own difficulties and arguments, (though he may agree with some of these,) but the opinions and arguments of others, which give him, as it were, the questions which he begins to consider in the next chapter. Almost all these opinions are open to objections, and this it is which makes an enquiry into ἀκρασία so complicated as well as so necessary, in order to form a clear conception of its nature.
- (18.) 4. The argument here is a destructive conditional syllogism. If it be a weak conviction, then there is συγγώμη, but the action of the ἀκρατής is μοχθηρόν and ψεκτόν, therefore it is not a weak conviction.
- (19.) 5. φρονήσεως κ.τ.λ. ἄρα is emphatic *then*, marking a new supposition, and referring it to the former one. Supposing that ἀκρασία is the acting against φρόνησις, an objection arises here too.
- (20.) 5. ἀποπον. This supposition is met on the other side by the elenchus, that the logical deduction of such an hypothesis (that the φρόνιμος was ἀκρατής) would be contrary to mental phenomena: we may see that the φρόνιμος cannot be ἀκρατής: such a supposition would imply that the φρόνιμος could knowingly act wickedly, which is contrary to the opinions of men, (οὐδ' ἂν φήσεί τις,) as well as to the practical character of the φρόνιμος, (ὅτι πρακτικὸς ὁ φρόνιμος).
- (21.) 5. τῶν γὰρ ἐσχαίων τις, *for he is one who has to do with the particulars*, not the principles of action only. If he is φρόνιμος, his single actions must be good; which, if the above hypothesis be correct, they will not be.
- (22.) 6. εἰτε ἐν μὲν κ.τ.λ. These are the arguments and difficulties connected with the fourth question in the preceding

chapter. It must be remembered that these are not stated as Aristotle's own arguments, even though he may agree with the position advanced. The whole passage is a complicated argument, consisting of a syllogism in the second figure,—*ἐγκρατής* being the minor, *σώφρων* the major term,—the minor premiss being supported by a double conditional syllogism.

- (23.) 6. οὐτε γὰρ τὸ ἄγαν κ.τ.λ. Excess does not belong to the *σώφρων*. The desires of the *σώφρων* must be both modified and purified.
- (24.) 6. ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε, sc. that *ἐγκρατής* should have desires both excessive and evil,—both *ισχυραί* and *φαῦλαι*—combined.
- (25.) 6. εἰ μὲν γάρ κ.τ.λ. If the desires are *χρησταί*, then the declining them is bad.—εἰ δ' ἀσθενεῖς καὶ μὴ φαῦλαι, οὐδὲν σεμνόν. If they are weak and not bad, it is no such wonderful thing to control them; the negation of the consequent takes away the *μή* from *φαῦλαι*, therefore the desires are *φαῦλαι*: the emphasis of this part of the argument rests more on the *μή φαῦλαι* than on the *ἀσθενεῖς*.
- (26.) 6. εἰ δ' ἀσθενεῖς καὶ μὴ ισχυραί (= *μή ισχυραί*). The negation of the consequent takes away the *μή* from *ισχυραί*, without touching upon *φαῦλαι* at all,—the emphasis of this part of the argument rests wholly upon *ἀσθενεῖς*; therefore they are *φαῦλαι* (proved before), and *ισχυραί*, proved by negation of *ἀσθενεῖς*: without keeping this in mind, the conclusion of this hypothetical would be, the desires are *μή φαῦλαι* and *μή ἀσθενεῖς*.
- (27.) 7. The real question is the kind and degree of intellectual firmness which constitutes *ἐγκράτεια*.
- (28.) 8. δ σοφιστικὸς λόγος ψευδόμενος. The Sophistical trick of reasoning called *mentiens*, (see Aldrich, iii. 8. 12): either an illustration; as in this fallacy of *mentiens* the mind feels itself logically bound to the conclusion which common sense rejects, so in *ἀκρασία* the mind feels the falsity of the moral fallacy from which it is unable practically to loose itself; or that the fallacy itself suggests a question on the nature of *ἀκρασία*, whether he who abides by such a conclusion is *ἐγκρατής*, and he who leaves it *ἀκρατής*; i. e. whether

these habits obtain in matters of pure intellect: in which case ἀκρασία would be good, ἐγκράτεια bad.

- (29.) 8. διὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See Soph. Elench. i. 6, sqq.—*εἴταν ἐπιτύχωσιν*, when they make a hit.
- (30.) 9. *ἔκ τινος λόγου*, from a certain conceivable mode of stating it.—*ὅν ὑπολαμβάνει*, sc. δεῖν πράττειν.
- (31.) 10. *δόξειεν ἄν*, may be held to be.
- (32.) 10. *μὴ ἐπέπειστο*. Most MSS. omit *μὴ*: "If the ἀκράτης had done it from a (bad) conviction that he ought to do it, he would have had a chance of altering when his conviction is changed; but now with a different conviction, viz. that he ought not to do it, he does it." But *μὴ ἐπέπειστο*, which seems on the whole preferable, is supported by one or two MSS.: "If he had not had a right conviction," (that he ought not to do it,) "he might have changed when he got that conviction, (μεταπεισθεῖς); but now, though he has that conviction, he does it." In the reading without *μὴ*, *πεπεισθαι* and *ἐπέπειστο* mean the false conviction of the ἀκόλαστος, while *πεπεισμένος* refers to the right conviction, implied in *μεταπεισθεῖς*. If *μὴ* is read, *πεπεισθαι* refers to the wrong conviction of the ἀκόλαστος, and *ἐπέπειστο* and *πεπεισμένος* to the right conviction of the ἀκράτης. In either case it is awkward to construe the same word differently in the same passage, but it is less so to do this with *πεπεισθαι* and *ἐπέπειστο* than with *ἐπέπειστο* and *πεπεισμένος*: if we take these two last to mean the same, then we must read *μὴ*.
- (33.) 11. The last words of the chapter are worth remark:—*ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὐρεσίς ἐστιν*.

CHAPTER III.

- (34.) 2. *τῶ περὶ ἃ ἡ τῶ πῶς*, differ in their subject, or their method of handling the subject.
- (35.) 3. *οὐκ οἶεται*, sc. δεῖν πράττειν.
- (36.) 3. *περὶ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.*: cf. Plat. Rep. 479, E.—*παρ' ἧν*, contrary to which.

(87.) 4. *δηλοὶ δ' Ἡράκλειτος*. See Preller, page 21, Plato, Cratyl. 402, E. Heraclitus professed to have *δόξα* only; yet his *δόξα* was practically as strong as Plato's *ἐπιστήμη*: it is merely a difference in words.

(38.) 5. There are various ways of accounting for a man's acting contrary to his knowledge, founded on the practical difference between active (*χρώμενος*) and inactive (*οὐ χρώμενος τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ*) knowledge:—

a. By the difference between the knowledge of the universal principle, and the knowledge of the character of the particular thing which presents itself for the time to the will: a mistake in the latter does not prove the absence of the former.

β. By the varieties of this knowledge of the universal and particular which are concerned in a simple action; the knowledge of a general principle as regards such things generally; the knowledge of a principle as regards men, or some class of men generally: and to each of these belongs a particular; so that frequently four varieties of knowledge are concerned in a single act, and the absence of any one of these may cause error, though the agent may be in conscious and active possession of the other three. What Butler, in Sermon X., calls *self-partiality*, continually operates to prevent men applying to themselves principles, which they believe abstractedly.

γ. By the various temperaments and states which are favourable to the exercise of knowledge, or the contrary. Not only is there abstractedly a great difference between knowledge when active and when dormant, but practically the knowledge is called into action, or suppressed, by different temperaments, or by those changes of temperament to which human nature is liable; so sleep, anger, excitement, mental or bodily, suspend the active operation of the knowledge of which, at other times, we may be in conscious possession;—a veil is thrown over the intellect at such times by the general suspension of our faculties, as in sleep, or by the over-activity of one part of our nature: how this veil is removed, and activity restored to our knowledge, is a question for pathology. Such persons cannot be said to have knowledge,

and therefore to act contrary to it at the moment of action, though they have it at other times.

- (39.) 8. *συμφῶναι*, to be worked into the nature. The whole phenomena of moral action depend on the degree in which knowledge of good and right is worked into the whole system, so as to become part of our self-consciousness, and to operate instinctively, or exists externally, as it were, to ourselves, and operates only with great effort. In *ἀκρασία* the *φρόνησις* may exist externally; in *ἐγκράτεια* it is partially, in *σωφροσύνη* it is wholly, worked into our being. See below, note 42.
- (40.) 9. *ψυσικῶς*, *psychologically*; according to its nature, and hence here *psychologically*.—*ὧν αἰσθησις ἡδη κυρία*, which thenceforward depends on the senses.—*ἡδη*: the function of *ἡ καθόλου δόξα* has ceased.
- (41.) *ὅταν δὲ μία κ.τ.λ.*, when these agree. This syllogistic process of reasoning in moral action seems to be a true account of what goes on, though, as in scientific reasoning, the process is often instantaneous and imperceptible.

He supposes two premisses or principles in the mind, arising, the one from the law of the mind, the other from the law of the members; the one may be represented by *πάν γλυκὺ αἰρετόν*, the other by *πάν αἰσχροὺν φευκτόν* (*ἡ καλούουσα γενίσθαι*). The mind assents, and the will follows whichever of these is called most strongly and sensibly into being, by having its particular attached to it. If it is *τοῦτό ἐστι γλυκὺ*, then the major premiss, *πάν γλυκὺ αἰρετόν*, is aroused (*αὕτη δ' ἐνεργεῖ*), and the conclusion of the will follows, (*τοῦτό ἐστι αἰρετόν*): whereas, if the premiss *τοῦτό ἐστι αἰσχροὺν* had suggested itself with equal strength, the major premiss, *πάν αἰσχροὺν φευκτόν*, would have presented itself in full force, and the conclusion of the will would have been *τοῦτό ἐστι φευκτόν*. Now where sensual desire or propensity is present (*τύχη δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα*), the sensual minor premiss, *τοῦτό ἐστι γλυκὺ*, presents itself with more readiness and force than the moral one, *τοῦτό ἐστι αἰσχροὺν*. It is true that, except where the mind is quite depraved, the moral major premiss *virtually* forbids it (*ἡ μὲν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο*); but the mind is carried away by the impulsive impression of desire (*ἡ ἐπιθυμία δ' ἄγει*), so that the warning voice is disregarded: thus the man is overcome not wholly

contrary to knowledge, but yields to a sensual knowledge, and the syllogistic process arising from it, which represents the end as an object of *rational* desire. Hence it is of the greatest importance to right action that the tone of the mind, according to which we take a sensual or moral view of particulars, should be in a true and healthy state, so that the particular should strike us in its moral rather than its sensual view; hence the Apostle's direction for holy living,—*"to have our loins girt about with truth,"* so that it may be always ready for use.

- (42.) Our actions in matters of sensual pleasure and pain depend really on the greater or less degree in which *φρόνησις* is worked into our moral nature.

In *ἀκολασία* the *φρόνησις* is totally absent, and a sensual wisdom (*αἰσθητικὴ ἐπιστήμη*) is substituted for it,—*πάν γλυκὺ δεικτόν*: sometimes, in cases of utter depravity, *αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶ γλυκὺ* obtains. The principle which should counterbalance and restrain the passions (*πάν αἰσχροὺν φεικτόν*) is lost (*ἀρχὴ διαφθείρεται*), and *"he imagineth mischief to himself as a law."*

In *ἡκράσια* the moral principle and the moral view is so far worked into our nature, that though external objects strike us in the sensual view rather than the moral, and the sensual principle consequently acts more instinctively and forcibly, yet there is a slight reaction on the part of the latter, though not sufficient to prevent the wrong action.

In *ἐγκράτεια* the moral principle and moral view is more completely worked in, so that the reaction is sufficient to overpower the *ἐπιθυμία*, and the moral fallacy connected with it.

In *σωφροσύνη* the *φρόνησις* is so wholly worked in, that the moral principle and moral view has become part of our very being, and takes the lead; and though there may be some slight reaction on the part of the senses, yet it does not affect or hinder right action, or even produce wrong *ἔργα*.

- (43.) 9. *ἄμα τοῦτο*, i. e. as soon as the *φάσις* has taken place.

- (44.) 10. *ἔταν οἷον κ.τ.λ.*: cf. Plato, Rep. 439.—*τούχῃ* depends on *ἔταν*, which is carried on by *δέ*.—*ἑκαστον*, the passions and the reason.—*ἐπὶ λόγον*, sc. the reasoning process, *πάν γλυκὺ ἦδύ, τοῦτὶ γλυκὺ, τοῦτὶ ἦδύ*.—*δέξις*, a result of a reasoning process; sc. *τοῦτὶ ἦδύ*.

- (45.) 10. οὐκ ἐναντίας κ.τ.λ., sc. ὁρθῷ λόγῳ. This δόξα is not essentially opposed to right reason, though it is so *accidentally*, in consequence of the ἐπιθυμία making it a practical guide to an action which ὁρθὸς λόγος disapproves: there is no struggle between this δόξα and ὁρθὸς λόγος, but between the ἐπιθυμία and the ὁρθὸς λόγος. From οὐκ ἐναντίας to λόγῳ is in a sort of parenthesis, so that the sentence beginning ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο belongs to the sentence immediately preceding οὐκ ἐναντίας κ.τ.λ.
- (46.) 11. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. This is brought forward as a proof that ἀκρασία is founded on some sort of reasoning process, on some general principle which, true in itself, is κατὰ συμβεβηκός, a right guide for practice under certain circumstances; it is not a mere impulse. Hence animals are not termed ἀκρατεῖς because they are not capable of these general principles, but act on the impulse of the senses.
- (47.) 11. φαντασία, the impression received from external things, from τὰ φαινόμενα.
- (48.) 12. πῶς δὲ λύεται κ.τ.λ. It being thus shewn how the principles of moral wisdom are lost sight of by the active influence of desire, it is no business of ours to enquire how and when they return in power to the mind: that is a question for pathology.
- (49.) 13. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τελευταία κ.τ.λ. It is the particular premiss of the moral syllogism, the judgment we form of the object before us (δόξα αἰσθητοῦ), which mainly influences our action (κυρία τῶν πράξεων); and he who is under the influence of desire does not take the moral view of the particular object, but only a sensual view. The object suggests to him τοῦτι γλυκύ, which calls forth πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, and not τοῦτι αἰσχρόν, which would call forth πᾶν αἰσχρόν φευκτόν, and prevent the action. And it may be again said, that it is of the utmost importance to right action that the tone of the mind should be right, that things should strike us in a moral, and not a sensual, point of view;—this is the object of right education.
- (50.) 13. καὶ διὰ τὸ κ.τ.λ. Since a right judgment on particulars is not necessarily implied in the knowledge of the general principle (διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου δοκεῖν εἶναι), and, being of particulars, is not matter of ἐπιστήμη (μηδ' ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως),

the want of right judgment on a particular does not imply the want of the general principle: if the particular were *ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως*, then a wrong view of the particular would imply the entire absence of the general principle.

- (51.) 14. οὐ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Socrates appears to be right (*τοῖκε δ' ἐξήρει Σωκράτης σὺμβάλειν*), for *ἀκρασία* does not take place when *ἐπιστήμη*, properly so called, (*κυρίως ἐπιστήμη*, the law of the mind,) is *present* in power in the mind. This is hindered and obscured, though it exists passively. But there is a sort of *ἐπιστήμη* present, viz. *ἡ αἰσθητική*, the law of the members, such as *πάν γλυκὲ ἦδύ*; and this does exist when *ἀκρασία* takes place. *ἀκρασία* is not a mere animal impulse, but, by the aid of a reasoning process, it operates in spite of our better knowledge, which exists, though not actively, (*ἐνίστι*, not *παρίστι*). The natural reference which a reasoning creature would make to reason to approve his actions is supplied by the operation of the sensual syllogism, and thus *φρόνησις* is suspended as a principle of action.
- (52.) 14. οὐδ' αὖτε—*πάθος* is in a parenthesis, so that *τῆς αἰσθητικῆς* is in the same construction as *κυρίως ἐπιστήμης*, depending on *παρούσης*.

CHAPTER IV.

- (53.) Having thus discussed the nature of *ἀκρασία*, he now goes on to the subject-matter. *ἀκρασία*, properly speaking, does not apply to all the particulars of moral action, but only to such bodily pleasures and pains as are necessarily part of our nature, (the *ἀναγκαῖα ἡδέα*): when honour or wealth have become, as it were, *ἀναγκαῖα*, then the term is applied metaphorically to the wrong pursuit of them, contrary to our better judgment.
- (54.) 1. *ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ καρτερικοί*. See notes at the end of the book.
- (55.) 2. *ἔχοντα ὑπερβολήν*, liable to excess.—*ἀπλῶς*, in its proper sense.—*ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος*. As we add an epithet or characteristic to the man who thus differs from other men; the common term "man" has a slight difference attached to

it to mark the individual: it is a slight difference; but nevertheless, by it he differed from other men, ἀλλ' ὁμῶς ἕτερος ἦν. Another interpretation is, that a man named *Anthropus* won the Olympic prize, and that in order to prevent it being supposed, when the individual *Anthropus* was spoken of, that the class ἄνθρωπος was meant, they attached to his name ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νενικηκώς; so that the κοινὸς λόγος (ἄνθρωπος) ἰδίου (Ἀνθρῶπος) μικρὸν διαφέρειν.

- (56.) 2. ἐκείνων, sc. τῶ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νενικηκότε. —κατὰ τὸ μέρος, as ἀκρατὴς πότου, ἀκρατὴς ὄψου κ.τ.λ., which are all varieties of ἀκρασία proper. The argument here is in the second figure.
- (57.) 3. τῶ προαιρεῖσθαι, modal dative.—οὐ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, not with an addition.
- (58.) 4. μαλακοί. This term, which expresses one phase of ἀκρασία proper, is not (like ἀκρατὴς) used metaphorically, and is only applied to bodily pleasures: if ἀκρατὴς were properly applied to all the above, then it would be applicable to them in all its shapes and phases; but it is not so. Another reading is ἀκόλαστος, taking the meaning to be, if ἀκόλαστος cannot be properly applied to ὀργῇ τιμῇ, &c., so neither can ἀκρασία; but the former is best.—περὶ ταύτας, sc. περὶ δὲ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται ἅπλως.—ἐκείνων refers to περὶ ταύτας, ὀργήν, τιμὴν, &c. The argument consists of an affirmative and a negative conclusion in the third figure.—οὐκ ἐκείνων οὐδένα is parenthetical, so that διὰ τὸ κ.τ.λ. belongs to the preceding clause: the meaning is, we do not place ἀκρατὴς ὀργῆς, τιμῆς κ.τ.λ. in the same category with ἀκόλαστος, as we do the simple ἀκρατὴς.—μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν. The ἀκόλαστος is rather bent on indulgence from the tone of his mind and taste (ἡδονῇ), than hurried into it by vehement desire. Mark the distinction here drawn between ἐπιθυμία and ἡδονή.
- (59.) 5. τῶ γίνεσθαι, generically of the number of things fair and esteemed. The first sentence of the next chapter, however, suggests that τῶ γίνεσθαι may mean "to the species man."
- (60.) 5. τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων κ.τ.λ. This is a difficult passage, especially when compared with sect. 2; but it is solved by taking τὰ μεταξύ to be the ἀναγκαῖα of sect. 2; standing, that is, between τὰ φύσει αἰρετά and τὰ φύσει φευκτά, being neither the one nor the other; not being αἰρετά, matter of choice at all,

but simply ἀναγκαῖα, in which we have no choice. The division then stands thus:—

1. φύσει αἰρετά—τιμὴ—νική κ.τ.λ. ἐν ὑπερβολῇ ψίγεται ὡς φευκτά.

2. φύσει φευκτά—θηριότης—ἀπλῶς ψίγεται.

3. τὰ μεταξύ: μηδὲ φύσει αἰρετά μηδὲ φευκτά, food and raiment, &c., ἐν ὑπερβολῇ ψίγεται ὡς φευκτά.

No one would call the last καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα.

(61.) 5. καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον; sect. 2, that is, as far as the φύσει αἰρετά and the τὰ μεταξύ are concerned.

(62.) 5. τὰ τοιαῦτα: τὰ φύσει αἰρετά.—οὐ τῷ πάσχειν, not by the simple affection.

(63.) 5. ὁ σοὶ, all are blamed who —. Supply ψίγονται. We must distinguish between ψίγεσθαι and ψεκτά: the latter has got a technical sense of things of bad desert, and thus is contrasted to those things which, as we see below, are simply φευκτά. ψίγεσθαι simply means to be found fault with. Another way of taking the sentence is to suppose that from “καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα” down to “μωραίνειν” is in a parenthesis, to support the introduction of the new terms, τὰ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς, and that the words after this parenthesis, “μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτα,” is an anacoluthon for μοχθηροὶ οὐκ εἰσὶ; and on the whole this, perhaps, is the best.—ταῦτα, sc. * τὰ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς.

(64.) 5. κρατοῦνται refers rather to the mental state of such persons; διώκουσι to the practical result thereof: he turns his attention only to one of the above divisions, the τὰ φύσει αἰρετά.

(65.) 5. Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ. Satyrus having been aided by his father in obtaining an object of unlawful desire, loved him to such a degree, that on his father's death he threw himself from a precipice.—περὶ ταῦτα, sc. τὰ φύσει καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα.

(66.) 6. ἀλλὰ καὶ ψεκτῶν. Mark the distinction between φευκτὸν, ψεκτὸν, μισητὸν: the first to be avoided as excess in things καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα; the second, objects of evil desert, as ἀκрасία; the third, objects of abhorrence, as θηριότης.

(67.) 6. δι' ὁμοιότητα κ.τ.λ. Analogously, not strictly, the word

ἀκρατής is applied to these cases, as the word *κακός* is to one who is unskilful or unlearned.—*περὶ δὲ θυμὸν* κ.τ.λ. His endeavour to shew that *ἀκρασία* is properly confined to *ἡδονή σωματική* has reference to his opposition to Plato's theory of morals,—that *θυμός*, and not *ἡδονή*, is the real motive cause of human action.

CHAPTER V.

- (68.) In this chapter he shews that the gross violations of right and decency are not to be classed under *ἀκρασία*, or from acting contrary to knowledge, but proceed from a perverted nature, where there is a complete confusion, or rather absence, of principles of right and wrong.
- (69.) 1. τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐστίν, sc. οὐκ ἐστὶν φύσει ἡδέα,—are not objects of desire by nature.
- (70.) 2. τὴν ἄνθρωπον. Lamia, a lady of Pontus: Hor. Ars Poet. 340.—*περὶ τὸν Πόντον*: Arist. Pol. viii. 3, p. 260, and bk. iv. 18, p. 106.—*τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον*. Phalaris is said to have eaten his son.
- (71.) 5. οὐκ ἡ ἀπλή ἀκρασία. Supply ἡ ἐγκράτεια.—*περὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ*, *angry passions*. See Gr. Gr. 355, obs. 1.—*τοῦ πάθους* sc. ἀκρατῆ θυμοῦ, not ἀκρατῆ ἀπλῶς.

CHAPTER VI.

- (72.) 1. ἥττον αἰσχροτά, *less wrong*, less a violation of duty. *αἰσχρόν* gives the neuter notion of *κακία*, as *καλόν* of *ἀρετή*.
- (73.) 1. φαντασία, the faculty which receives impressions (*ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης*) from external things and acts, following on *αἰσθησις*, so that below *αἰσθησις* is used for it. *ὅβρις*, properly speaking, is not matter of *αἰσθησις*, but of *φαντασία*; it is not any thing or act actually *seen*, but it arises from some such thing or act.
- (74.) 1. ὁ λόγος ἡ ἡ αἰσθησις. The two channels whereby *ἡδύ* presents itself, the one of things absent, the other of things present, are here distinctly recognised.
- (75.) 2. ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. He is here speaking of right reason, which puts forth its directions under the form of *δέξις*, as a matter of duty, which *ἐπιθυμία* does not, as we have seen in

ch. iii., allow to operate. The sensual λόγος, αἰσθητικὴ ἐπιστήμη, may have operated so far as to shew that this particular thing is ἡδύ, or that πᾶν ἡδύ διωκτόν, and so far it operates in ἀκρασία as to sanction the ὁρμή of ἐπιθυμία, but it does not say δεῖ πᾶν ἡδύ διώκειν: in θυμός, a sort of right reason, something which pretends to be so, lends its sanction to the action: δεῖ τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν.

(76.) 2. καὶ ἡ χαλεπότης κ.τ.λ. Supply τοῦ θυμοῦ ἐστὶ φυσικωτέρα τῆς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν.

(77.) 3. δολοπλόκου. The force of the quotation of course lies in the δόλος of the compound.

(78.) 3. ὥστ' εἴπερ κ.τ.λ. The way to construe this is, "If ἀκρασία proper is more a violation of justice than that of anger, it is also (καὶ) worse (αἰσχίον), and it is most properly termed ἀκρασία, and in a certain sense is vice."

(79.) 4. This sorites is somewhat difficult, from the short way in which the argument is stated, and from there being a change from the first middle term,—*the greater cause for resentment in ἐπιθυμία*, and consequently greater injustice—to that which implies this, but does not state it,—*the less cause for resentment in ὀργή*, and consequent less injustice: "and ἀκρασία δι' ἐπιθυμίαν is worse than that from anger, for it is a fitter object for resentment, (ἀδικωτέρα); for ὀργή, being accompanied with λύπη, can have no ὕβρις, and therefore is a less fit object for resentment, and therefore less unjust."

Or it may be stated in another way:—

Whatever has pain has no ὕβρις:

ὀργή has pain;

ὀργή has no ὕβρις.

Whatever is a more fitting object of resentment than ὀργή is ἀδικωτέρα τῆς ὀργῆς.

ἀκρασία δι' ἐπιθυμίαν is more an object of resentment than ὀργή, (for ὀργή has no ὕβρις). Rhet. ii. 2. 5.

ἀκρασία δι' ἐπιθυμίαν is ἀδικωτέρα.

(80.) 4. καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία κ.τ.λ., sc. ἐστὶ ἀδικωτέρα.—μεθ' ἡδονῆς: see Rhet. ii. 2. 5.

(81.) 6. κατ' ἀρχάς: the beginning of this part of his book. Cf. ch. i., ἀλλὰ πρῶτον ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν.

- (82.) 6. τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει, in kind and degree ; i. e. both in their nature, and when they exceed proper bounds.
- (83.) 6. ἀλλὰ ἡ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ τινι κ.τ.λ., *except by a figure, and that when any kind of animal, &c.* οὐ γὰρ ἔχει belongs to the sentence ending λέγομεν, being the reason why those terms are not applied to animals except in a figure.—ἀλλὰ ἐξέστηκε, *but nevertheless it has transgressed its nature by its excesses*, and therefore in a figure we do apply these terms.
- (84.) 7. ἔλαττον κ.τ.λ., sc. κακόν.—φοβερώτερον, “*more awful*,” sc. κακόν. That θηριότης is not φοβερώτερον from the amount of evil it might inflict, is clear from the words in the end of the chapter, which say that the evils it can inflict are less than what a man with νοῦς can cause. φοβερώτερον, therefore, must mean in itself, in the impressions it creates. Thus a madman at large is more awful—creates stronger impressions of fear for the time, though he is really less able to do injury than a deliberate villain. (Cf. Plato, Republic, 519.) In the next sentence the emphasis lies on διέφθαρται, as opposed to οὐκ ἔχει.—θηριότης, *the state of beasts*,—whether it be in the brute creation, or in men who are “as brute beasts.” The words οὐ γὰρ διέφθαρται τὸ βέλτιστον ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, mark, he considers such men merely brute beasts in human form.
- (85.) 7. ἀσινεστέρα, *less harmful*. See last note.—τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχῆν: that which has no principle or power of action, no power of originating action, viz. νοῦς.—παρὰ πλῆσιον οὖν. This sentence is in a parenthesis, down to κάκιον, so that μυριοπλάσια γὰρ κ.τ.λ. refer to the clause ending ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή, to shew that the φανλότης of the one which has νοῦς is more harmful than the other which is without it.

CHAPTER VII.

- (86.) The habits of mind on bodily pleasure and pain, mentioned in this chapter, exhibited in the characters corresponding thereto, are—

1. ἀκόλαστος: seeks pleasure and avoids pain, (προαιρούμενος); this is the law of his life. ἡδύ presents itself to him

as his sole ἀγαθόν, λυπηρόν as his sole κακόν,—ἀρχὴ διαφθείρεται, conscience reprobate.

2. δκρατής: indulges in evil pleasure contrary to his conscience and sense of right. The ἡδύ presents itself as ἀγαθόν, but not as τὰγαθόν.

3. μαλακός: shrinks from right pains. λυπηρόν presents itself for the time as κακόν.

4. καρτερικός: abides right pains for conscience' sake. λυπηρόν presents itself as a κακόν, but is counterbalanced by fear of αἰσχροῦ, or love of καλόν, as the case may be.

5. ἐγκράτης: declines evil pleasures for conscience' sake. ἡδύ presents itself as a good, but is overpowered itself by fear of αἰσχροῦ or love of καλόν.

6. σόφρων: evil pleasures do not present themselves as ἡδύ, nor proper pains as λυπηρόν, but the καλόν presents as ἡδύ, the αἰσχροῦ as λυπηρόν.

- (87.) 1. μεταξὺ δέ κ.τ.λ. Observe this expression of Aristotle's view of human nature.
- (88.) 2. ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς κ.τ.λ.: excessive pleasures, out of the way, extraordinary indulgences,—such as are told of the old Roman epicures.—ἡ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς, sc. ἡδέα; carrying common pleasures to excess,—such as the drunkard or sensualist. The ἡ before διὰ προαίρεσιν is evidently out of place, as the ἀκόλαστος always acts with προαίρεσις: it is found, however, in almost all the MSS. Nevertheless, the Paraphrast and some other commentators omit it. It certainly creates hopeless confusion. Michelet suggests εἰ for ἡ, but it seems quite as simple an alteration to omit it: it may have crept in from the ἡ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς.
- (89.) 3. τῶν μὴ προαιρουμένων, sc. Aristotle here draws a distinction between the man whom an internal bias towards self-indulgences (ἡδονή) leads to act against his conscience, and one who acts thus under the pressure of a strong desire, an urgent external temptation, (ἐπιθυμία,) of which the former is the worse. This is the principle of the rhetorical way of putting a wrong act, (τὰ ἐλάχιστα μέγιστα,) the less the external temptation, the greater the natural tendency to wrong.
- (90.) 3. διὸ κ.τ.λ. is introduced parenthetically, as what may be called "a proof by instance."

(91.) 3. τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων, sc. ἀγόμενος δι' ἡδονήν, and ψευδὴν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας: of these, the latter is a species of μαλακία, the former approaches nearer (μᾶλλον) to the ἀκόλαστος, inasmuch as the motive cause of the evil act is his own evil tendencies.

(92.) 5. τρύφη: a species of μαλακία, a certain indolent, self-indulging temperament, which, above all things, dislikes trouble.—τὴν λύπην: equivalent accusative to πονήσῃ.—καὶ μιμούμενος κ.τ.λ. The man who does this affects the gait and indolent bearing of a sick person, but does not fancy that he is to be pitied for his affectation, though he is so as much as a sick man.

(93.) 6. Καρκίνου. I have so often heard a false quantity in this word that I think it as well to refer the student to Arist. Vesp. 1508.—ἐν τῇ Ἀλόπῃ, a play of Carcinus.—Κερκύων. In this play Cercyon killed himself on finding out his daughter's disgrace.—Ξενοφάντης. A Xenophantus is mentioned by Seneca as having been a minstrel at the court of Alexander; and thus Aristotle became intimate with him.—Σκῦθας: see Hat. i. 105.

(94.) 7. παιδιώδης. He seems to seek ἡδὺ ἐν ὑπερβολῇ from προαίρεσις, but he is really trying to escape from λυπηρόν.—ἀνεσις, a cessation from toil.

(95.) 8. σφοδρότητα, *their vehemence*. See ch. xiv. 6, for an account of this.

In προπέτεια the κυρίως ἐπιστήμη has not time to make itself heard.

In the case of μελαγχολικοί, it speaks to ears closed by the dogged vehemence of the desire for some self-indulgence,—such as when a man tries to drown care by pleasure.

In ἀσθένεια the κυρίως ἐπιστήμη is partially heard, but ἐπιθυμία leads the mind to the wrong course of reasoning, and thus carries it off.

CHAPTER VIII.

- (96.) 1. ὥσπερ ἡπορήσαμεν: see ch. ii. 10.—*λανθάνει*, it escapes the person's notice. The ἀκόλαστος is so without being aware of his wretchedness. The ἀκρατής is reminded of it by the stings of conscience.
- (97.) 2. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων, sc. the different sorts of ἀκρατεῖς: there is a parenthesis down to ἀπείροι, and we might not unreasonably suspect it to be an interpolation.—ἐκστατικοί, sc. ὀξείς: see last chapter.—ἡττῶνται, sc. οἱ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες μὴ ἰμμένοιτες δέ.—ὁμοίως γὰρ refers to οὐ λανθάνει.
- (98.) 3. Here, instead of stating the similarity or dissimilarity between them separately, he states it together, and proves each separately, so that the clause τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ . . . ἔσται belongs to the former clause, ἔτι μὲν οὖν . . . φανερόν, and the clause οὐ μὴν . . . ἀδικοῦσι δέ τοι ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως, "but perhaps in some respects they are the same."—τὸ Δημοδόκου. All that is known of Demodocus is that he was a native of a small island near Miletus, who made the Milesians butts for his wit.—ἀδικοὶ οὐκ εἰσὶ,—because the προαίρεσις is wanting.
- (99.) 4. ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι κ.τ.λ.: see bk. iii. ch. 4. The final cause is the starting-point in moral reasoning or actions, as in scientific reasoning we start from the hypothesis.—ἐκεῖ in mathematics: see bk. vi. 11. 4; and ch. 2. 3.—ὁ λόγος, reasoning, as opposed to νοῦς.
- (100.) 4. ἀλλ' ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἠθικὴ τοῦ ὁρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. We here gather that a δόξα of some sort is necessary to a moral action. After the ἐπιθυμία has been roused, and the δρεξις moved, there is then a decision of the moral intellect (δόξα) as to the fitness or unfitness of the end. We are guided aright in this decision by the general tone of our mind,—either by the shadowy instincts of right and wrong (φυσικὴ ἀρετή) in the yet unformed character, or by the rational principles or instincts (ἠθικὴ) in the more developed mind. When this δόξα has pronounced the proposed οὐ ἔνεκα to be right, βούλησις follows, and the οὐ ἔνεκα becomes an actual end to us, (see bk. iii. note 40). The σῶφρων is of such a character that right always presents itself to him as right, and good, and pleasant; the ἀκόλαστος views

pleasure as good, and consequently very often the *ἡδύ* as the good. He imagines it to himself as a law.—*τοῦ δρθο-δοξεῖν* depends on *διδασκαλική*.

- (101.) 5. *ἔσται δέ τις*. He is setting forth the two characters already described, not introducing new ones.—*ἀνεῖθεν δεῖν*, “that he ought unrestrainedly to follow evil pleasures.” The *δρθή*, the sense of right and wrong, *οὐ διαφθείρεται*, while in the *ἀκόλαστος* it is destroyed.

CHAPTER IX.

- (102.) The question started in ch. ii. 7 divides itself into three:—

1. Is *ἐγκράτεια* merely intellectual firmness?
2. Is it intellectual adherence to a right opinion?
3. Is intellectual *rectitude* the essence of it, intellectual *firmness* the accident?

- (103.) 1. *ἡ δὲ τῷ ψευδεῖ* refers to the case supposed in ch. ii., such as that of Philoctetes:—is such a man to be considered *ἀκρατής*?

- (104.) 1. *ἡ κατὰ συμβεβηκός*. A man to be *ἐγκρατής* must have intellectual firmness; but this is not enough—it is *καθ’ αὐτό* possessing and acting on right moral judgment and principles, to which the peculiar circumstances (*κατὰ συμβεβηκός*) of the case make intellectual firmness necessary. The essence of *ἐγκράτεια* is moral, the way in which it accidentally operates is intellectual; the intellectual is a means to the moral, therefore the latter is the essence, the former the accident, (*εἰ γὰρ τις—τό πρότερον*).

- (105.) 2. *ὥσπερ ἄσματος κ.τ.λ.*, i. e. it is an exaggeration of the right principle.—*ἐπεὶ ἐπιστος*: the *ἐγκρατής* may change *διὰ λόγον*, though not *διὰ πάθος*: the difference between firmness and obstinacy.—*δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ λόγον*, sc. *μετοβάλλει*.—*λομβόνουσι*, *receive from external things*.

- (106.) 3. *ὥσπερ ψήφισματα*. The *ψήφισμα* does not carry with it any power of effecting what it decrees; as far as itself goes, it is inoperative.—*ὥστε μάλλον κ.τ.λ.*: because they are influenced, not by reason, but by pleasure and pain.

- (107.) 4. ἀλλὰ καλήν, sc. διὰ καλὴν ἡδονήν. Remark the distinction here drawn between the sorts of ἡδονή, καλή, and αἰσχροά.
- (108.) 5. He here shews that ἐγκράτεια is a mean, as well as those properly termed virtues.—ὁ τοιοῦτος: that is, as far as this point in his character is concerned. This is supported by three MSS. ὁ τοιοῦτος al. is a mere repetition of the first words of the clause: ἐστὶ must be supplied, ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐκ ἐμμένων ἐστὶ τῷ λόγῳ.—διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τι: through his sense of pleasure being too strong; while the other does not allow himself the indulgences which reason allows, owing to his sense of pleasure being too-weak, (διὰ τὸ ἥττον τι).
- (109.) 6. ἠκολούθηκεν, is derived from it in the way of analogy.

CHAPTER X.

- (110.) 1. He now shews that wherever ἀκρασία takes place, perfect φρόνησις is wanting. It is not that φρόνησις is not a sufficient development of the intellect, but because it is not sufficiently worked into the πάθη.
- (111.) 2. τὸν δὲ δεῖνόν. As δεινότης does not involve any moral considerations, but is merely a power of carrying out the necessary means to a desired end, the δεινός may be ἀκρατής, and *vice versa*, for the ἀκρατής may shew great δεινότης in arriving at his end.
- (112.) 2. κατὰ τὸν λόγον. δεινότης and the φρόνησις ἀπὸ τῆς δεινότητος are, as far as the intellect is concerned, an exertion of nearly the same faculty, but the latter has a right end in view, while the former may have either one or the other; or κατὰ τὸν λόγον may be construed, “as to their definition,” for both might be defined to be δύναμις τοῦ πράττειν τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος, though in the case of φρόνησις it must be ὀρθὸν τέλος.
- (113.) 3. ἐπίβουλος, “with malice intent.”—ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν, sc. ἀσθενής: does not abide by his intent. The μελαγχολικός is a person of morbid temperament, upon whom a temptation comes suddenly, and is embraced as a relief from the pain of existence.
- (114.) 4. τῶν βουλευσαμένων, sc. the ἀσθενεῖς.

CHAPTER XI.

- (115.) Having discussed and explained the nature of *ἀκρασία* and *ἐγκράτεια*, he now proceeds to *ἡδονή* and *λύπη* as the motive causes of human action; while in the tenth book he rather considers them in their relation to, and connection with, the end, *εὐδαιμονία*.
- (116.) The fact that Aristotle discusses the question again in bk. x., and goes over, in many points, the same ground as here, has led some to suppose that these last chapters have found their way from the Eudemean Ethics (in which they occur verbatim) into this place; but the distinction given in the last note will point out a difference in his way of looking at pleasure and pain in this book and the tenth, while their close connection with *ἀκρασία* will suggest a sufficient reason why he should have introduced them here.
- (117.) 3. *ἔναι μὲν εἶναι*, sc. *ἀγαθὰ*.
- (118.) 4. He gives the arguments by which these three opinions are supported.—*γίνεσις*, *transition state*.—*συγγενής*, *co-existent with*. While the *γίνεσις* (*οικοδόμησις*, for instance) is going on, the *τέλος* thereof (*οἰκία*) is not in existence; when the *τέλος* (*οἰκία*) is in existence, the *γίνεσις* (*οικοδόμησις*) has ceased: therefore, if *ἡδονή* is a *γίνεσις*, it cannot ever be co-existent with the *ἀγαθόν*, for this is a *τέλος*.

CHAPTER XII.

- (119.) Aristotle in this chapter is giving the arguments on the other side of the question. We must not suppose that these are held all by the same persons, but they probably were used by differing schools or individuals, so that we must not expect the same facts to be assumed or the same results deduced in the several positions:—
1. That there is a difference between the *ἀπλως ἡδύ* and the *πρὸς ἡδύ*, so that what may be true of the latter is not true necessarily of the former, (sect. 1).
 2. That there is a difference between the *ἐνέργεια* of pleasure and the *ἔξῃς* of pleasure, (sect. 2).

3. That even those pleasures which seem to be *γενέσεις* are not so really, but rather *ἐνέργειαι*, (sect. 3).

Sects. 4, 5, 6, and 7 are evident.

(120.) 1. *πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ.* The argument here is, that the objections urged above may be true as against *ἡδονή τινα*, but not *ἡδονή ἀπλῶς*.

(121.) 1. *ἀκολουθήσουσιν.* As there is an *ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς*, and *ἀγαθὸν τινα*, so there are *φύσεις* and *ἐξεις*, which are *ἀγαθαὶ ἀπλῶς*, and others only *ἀγαθαὶ τινα*; and further, there are some *κινήσεις* and *γενέσεις ἀγαθαὶ ἀπλῶς*, and others only *ἀγαθαὶ τινα*,—as, for instance, the *γένεσις*, or process of the act of sight, is *ἀγαθὴ ἀπλῶς*, the *γένεσις*, or process of recovery from sickness, is *ἀγαθὴ τινα*.

(122.) 1. *ἔνιαι δὲ οὐδὲ τῷδε*, sc. *αἰὲ* or *καθ' αὐτάς*.

The divisions of *ἡδονή* in this respect are,—

ἀγαθαὶ ἀπλῶς.

ἀγαθαὶ τιναὶ αἰ.

ἀγαθαὶ τινὶ ποτε.

φαινόμεναι ἡδοναί.

(123.) 2. *ἔτι κ.τ.λ.* Further, we must distinguish between the *ἀπλῶς ἡδύ* and the *κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδύ*; for as not only an *ἐξίς*, or completed state, is *ἀγαθόν*, but also the *ἐνέργειαι* which precede and lead to that state, so also those *ἐνέργειαι* which may be viewed as *γενέσεις*, carrying us onward and producing in us some state which is agreeable to nature, *αἱ (ἐνέργειαι, sc.) καθιστᾶσαι (ἡμᾶς) εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἐξιν*: see Rhet. i. 10,) are pleasures, though only accidentally so, as being the *ἐνέργειαι* which are working towards a yet imperfect and deficient state, (*ὑπολοίπου ἐξεως*, so below, sect. 3,) *εἰς τελείωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως*, in order to get rid of the pain, *ἔνδεια*. They are not *καθ' αὐτάς* or *ἀπλῶς ἡδέϊαι*, because they are only *ἡδέϊαι* when the *ἐξίς* is *ὑπόλοιπος*; while to those who have no such lack or deficiency they are not pleasant. But all *ἡδονή* is not such a *γένεσις*, since (*ἐπεὶ*) some exist without any preceding *ἔνδεια* or *ἐπιθυμία*, i. e. without any such *ὑπόλοιπος ἐξίς*. Michelet reads *ὑπολύπου ἐξεως*, i. e. *connected with pain*, that is, with an *ἔνδεια*; but the other reading has the same meaning. Aspasius interprets these words as above,—*τῆς λοιπαζομένης φύσεως καὶ ἐν ἐνδείᾳ οὐσης*: the Paraphrast,—*ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια τὴν ἠλλείπουσαν ἐξιν ἀναπληροῦ*. Others interpret *ὑπολοίπου*, the re-

mains of our former nature; i.e. those appetites and wants which arise from the recollection of our former nature: but the former interpretation is the best, though the sense given to ὑπολοίπος is unusual; but the words οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς οὐσης below point to this sense. Cardwell reads, with one MS., “ὅτι αἱ ἐνέργειαι” for “ἔστι δ’ ἡ ἐνέργεια,” making this sentence the reason or explanation of the former one: but the reading in the text comes to much the same thing. The clause beginning ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀνευ λύτης seems to belong to the one ending with ἡδεῖαι, εἰσὶν, so that ἔστι δ’ ἡ ἐνέργεια—ἔξως is in a sort of parenthesis, and we must supply before good, &c. But all are not of this sort.

- (124.) 2. ἔτι ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.—ἔξίς. The connection of these words with what follows seems to be, that as the ἀγαθόν shews itself in an ἐνέργεια or an ἔξίς, so the ἡδύ exists either as an ἐνέργεια or an ἔξίς, though in the former it is only κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἡδύ, as tending towards a desired ἔξίς.
- (125.) 2. τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς οὐσης. This expression gives us the sense of the one opposed to it, viz. ὑπολοίπου ἔξως.
- (126.) 2. σήμεϊον κ.τ.λ., sc. that the pleasures belonging to the ἐνέργεια of ἀναπλήρωσις and those belonging to the state which is the result of that ἀναπλήρωσις are different, so that what may be true of the one is not necessarily true of the other.
- (127.) 2. ἀναπληρουμένης: in the process of ἀναπλήρωσις.—καθεστῆκυίας: in a state of κατέστασις, or satisfaction; a settled, quiescent state.—συνέστηκεν, *clash*, *differ*.
- (128.) 3. ἡδονή does not necessarily stand to ἀγαθόν as a γένεσις to the τέλος, which is the completion of it; for some sort of pleasure is simply an ἐνέργεια and a τέλος in itself, without anything beyond it.
- (129.) 3. οὐδὲ γινομένων κ.τ.λ. Nor do such pleasures arise when we are in the transition state of γένεσις, (γινομένων,) but when we are in the possession and enjoyment of them, (χρωμένων).
- (130.) 3. καὶ τέλος κ.τ.λ. The τέλος of such pleasures (sight, for instance) is not distinct from the pleasure itself, but only of those which conduce to the supplement of some natural want, (ὑπολοίπου ἔξως, sect. 1).—διό κ.τ.λ.: see ch. xi. 4.

- (131.) 3. ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεως, *the operation or energy of a state consonant to nature*. This is the definition of ἀπλῶς ἡδονή: the others, as we have seen above, are only κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἡδέϊαι—αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν, *a perceptible state of transition towards something*.
- (132.) 3. δοκεῖ δέ κ.τ.λ. It may be said that the very notion of pleasure being a γένεσις arises from its being in the most proper sense, (κυρίως) ἀγαθόν; for as that which is properly ἀγαθόν is an ἐνέργεια, and ἡδονή being properly such an ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, people confound it with a γένεσις, fancying that the two are identical. The way people got at the notion of its being a γένεσις was—ἡδονή must be an ἐνέργεια, because it is ἀγαθόν, and an ἐνέργεια must be a γένεσις. He brings forward the source of the error (that ἡδονή is a γένεσις) which he has just been confuting, in proof of his position that ἡδονή is in the proper sense an ἀγαθόν, (though not τὰγαθόν).
- (133.) 4. τὸ αὐτὸ καί, *the same as if* (you were to call) healthy things bad, because, &c.—πρὸς χρηματισμόν, *money-making, business*.—ταύτην. Viewed relatively, both ἡδία and ὑγεία are sometimes bad; but this does not prove them absolutely bad.
- (134.) 6. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλης κ.τ.λ. An art is that which sets out and regulates the productive powers of a δύναμις: that which sets out and regulates the operation of an ἐνέργεια is a law, not an art.—καίτοι: “and yet the objection does not seem to be founded in fact, for,” &c.
- (135.) 7. τὸ δὲ τὸν σὺφρονα φεύγειν, *sc. τὴν ἡδονήν*.—τὸν δαλυπον βίον, *sc. ἀλυσία* in preference to ἡδονή.

CHAPTER XIII.

- (136.) 1. ἡ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική, *is an evil to particular persons*, (opposed to ἀπλῶς,) *as being in some way an hindrance to them*: αἱ πῇ τῷ, opposing πῇ to ἀπλῶς.
- (137.) 1. ὡς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος κ.τ.λ. The method devised to meet the foregoing argument (ἐξ ἐναντίων) was simply this: as the two extremes are not only opposed to the mean as good, but each to the other as an evil, so the opposition between λύπη and ἡδονή may be of this latter kind, and both be evils. Aristotle answers—if both were evils, both would be alike avoided. Cf. bk. i. 12.

- (138.) 2. τοῦτο, sc. ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος.—οὐδεμία γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The argument is, “ἐνέργεια τέλειος is ἡδονή, (as being ἀνεμπόδιστος,) εὐδαιμονία implies ἐνέργεια τέλειος, εὐδαιμονία implies ἡδονή.”
- (139.) 3. οἱ δέ κ.τ.λ.: see bk. i. ch. x. The essence of the εὐδαιμονία would remain, though the adjuncts perished; the εὐδαιμονία would remain, though the man would not be εὐδαίμων: see bk. i. note 175.—ἢ ἐκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες, *whether they really mean it or not*.
- (140.) 5. φήμη δ' οὐ κ.τ.λ., Hes. Opp. 762.—λαοί, sc. φημίζουσιν, Hesiod.
- (141.) 6. οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, sc. πᾶσι.
- (142.) 6. ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν. In reality, there is a divine instinct within men, which prompts them to desire and seek after true pleasure, though in their views and practices they recognise and seek only the lower sort, because these are commonly received as the only pleasures. Reasonable self-love is at bottom a motive cause to every one.—παράβλλειν is neuter.—πάντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. These words give an important feature in Aristotle's view of human nature.
- (143.) 7. ἡ ἐνέργεια, sc. τῆς ἡδονῆς.—ἐνδέχεται ζῆν, sc. τὸν εὐδαίμονα.

CHAPTER XIV.

- (144.) 2. οὕν, *if then this is the case*.
- (145.) 2. ἡ οὕτως. This is another opinion, which Aristotle, on the whole, adopts. He frequently introduces such opinions of his own by ἡ οὕτως.—τὸ μὴ κακόν, sc. the getting rid of the λύπη τῆς ἐπιθυμίας.—μέχρι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ: that is, as long as they are within proper limits.—τῷ δέωκειν: modal dative.
- (146.) 2. οὐδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς, sc. ὑπερβολῇ ἐστι, i. e. where the energy or state is such as not to admit of its being indulged in too much, (such as sight, or thought,) there is no possibility of the pleasure arising from it being desired too much.—τὰς δναγκαίας, sc. ἡδονάς.—ἐναντίως δ' ἐπὶ λύπῃς. In the case of ἡδονή a man is bad, not for pursuing pleasure at all, but its excess; in the case of λύπη a man is bad, not from avoiding the excess of pain, but pain altogether.—ὅλως, sc. ὁ φᾶνλος.
- (147.) 2. οὐ γὰρ ἐστι. This is an answer to the second ques-

tion proposed above, (διὰ τὶ οὖν κ.τ.λ.) "If some pleasures are bad, why are the pains opposed to them bad likewise?" Having first answered the difficulty, "how far bodily pleasures are good," (ἢ οὕτως ἀγαθαί κ.τ.λ.), he then introduces his answer to the other, as if it were a deduction from it. We must supply the sentence to which γάρ refers: "So that it is not absurd for one who holds excess of pleasure to be an evil, to say that λύπη is an evil also, for λύπη is not in itself the opposite of the bad sort of pleasure, but only accidentally, in the case of him to whom this bad sort of pleasure is good," (ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ διώκοντι τὴν ὑπερβολήν). In itself this bad pleasure is an evil, and therefore cannot be opposed to λύπη, which is an evil also.

- (148.) 3. τὸ διὰ τὶ φαίνεται ἀληθές is the nominative case to φανῇ.—ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ. The apodosis begins in sect. 4, πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.: when a reasonable cause can be given for the origin of an error, it confirms the truth. Cf. Hooker, Ecc. Pol. I. viii. 3.

- (149.) 4. ὡς οὐσης λατρείας, sc. τῆς ἡδονῆς.—σφοδραί. These remedies against violent pain are in themselves violent, hence the two are placed in strong contrast.—διὰ καὶ διώκονται διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον (by the side of the contrary,) φαίνεσθαι, sc. ἡδέϊαι. These false pleasures appear to be pleasures from their contrast to the pain to which they are opposed.—διὰ δύο ταῦτα may be either, the two reasons above do not prove these pleasures to be good, for the following reasons; or δύο ταῦτα may refer to the following reasons themselves.—ὅτι αἱ μὲν κ.τ.λ. He is giving one reason for the view which some men, looking only at bodily pleasures, and these in excess, take of ἡδονή as an evil.

- (150.) 4. αἱ δὲ λατρείαι κ.τ.λ. This is another reason for the same. The full sentence is, αἱ δὲ λατρείαι (οὐ σπουδαῖα εἶναι δοκοῦσι) ὅτι ἐνδεοῦς (εἰσὶ) καὶ (ὅτι) ἔχειν (τὶ) βέλτιόν ἐστι, ἢ (τοῦτο) γίνεσθαι: "But the pleasures which are of the nature of remedies are held to be bad, because they imply a deficiency, and because it is better to be in possession of any thing, than that this thing should be in course of production," or ἔχειν may be rendered "an ἔξισ, and γενέσθαι" and γενέσθαι towards that ἔξισ. It is better to be well than to have recourse to remedies for getting well: an *λατρεία* implies an evil, rather

In both the will is supposed to be in a passive state, and two principles—one sensual, the other moral—existing passively in the mind. If the former were wanting, it would be *σωφροσύνη*; if the latter, it would be *ἀκολασία*.

ἀκρασία, α. pursuit of improper pleasure; sensual perception of particulars,—“*τοὐτὶ γλυκὺ*”; *ἐπιθυμία*, of the senses roused,—the sensual principle called out; *πάν γλυκὺ ἡδύ*: sensual syllogism: *φάσις* representing it as an object of rational desire; *τοὐτὶ ἡδύ—δρεξις*, of the will consequent thereon, apparently sanctioned by reason: slight but intellectual reaction of moral principle,—*ἡ μὲν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο; ἐπιθυμία ἄγει*, with the sanction of the *αἰσθητικὴ ἐπιστήμη*,—action as *ἡδύ*.

ἐγκράτεια, α. sensual perception of particular *τοὐτὶ γλυκὺ*: *ἐπιθυμία*: effective reaction of moral perception, *τοὐτὶ αἰσχρόν*: moral principle called into being, *πάν αἰσχροὺν φευκτόν*,—*φάσις*; *τοὐτὶ φευκτόν*, action declined, though *ἡδύ*.

ἀκρασία, β. (*μαλακία*), avoidance of pain, *τοὐτὶ λυπηρόν*; sensual principle, *πάν λυπηρόν φευκτόν*; *φάσις*, *τοὐτὶ φευκτόν*: slight ineffective reaction of moral principle, *πάν καλὸν διωκτόν*,—action declined as painful.

ἐγκράτεια, β. (*καρτερία*), sensual perception, *τοὐτὶ λυπηρόν*; reaction of moral perception, *τοὐτὶ καλόν*; moral principle, *πάν καλὸν διωκτόν*.—*φάσις*: *τοὐτὶ διωκτόν*, action performed, though painful.

μὴ βουλευσάμενοι.

ἀκρασία διὰ δξύτητα: *τοὐτὶ γλυκὺ*; hasty decision,—*τοὐτὶ ἡδύ*, *τοὐτὶ διωκτόν*,—without giving time for the moral principle to make itself heard.

ἀκρασία διὰ σφοδρότητα (*μελαγχολικοί*): *τοὐτὶ γλυκὺ*, *τοὐτὶ διωκτόν*, violent impulse to escape pain,—obstinate *ἐπιθυμία*,—moral principle not allowed to speak.

ἀκρασία δι' ἀσθένειαν: *βουλευσάμενοι*, taking counsel with right reason, but not having the moral principle in sufficient strength to be effectual;—given above.

ἀκρασία δι' ἐθισμόν: where self-indulgence has given increase to the *ἐπιθυμία*, quickened sensual perception, and strengthened the sensual principle.

For *ἀκρασία ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας*, and *ἀκρασία ἀπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς*, see note 89.

BOOK VIII.

CHAPTER I.

- (1.) Aristotle in this book discusses the social instincts of man apart from any notion of social or political obligation, which he has treated of in the fourth (ch. vi.) and the fifth book. While going through the principles and the phenomena of *φιλία*, he shews that *ἡθικὴ ἀρετή* secures the most perfect and enduring exercise of the social instincts, as he has shewn in the fifth book that it secures the due performance of social obligation.

The actual difficulties in this book are fewer than in any of the preceding, but it requires considerable attention and clearness to master and retain the details, and the relation in which the matters treated of stand to each other: such as the conditions of *φιλία* in general, and of true *φιλία* in particular,—the points of identity and difference between this true sort and the spurious imitations of it; and the relation between the several spheres of the social instincts,—domestic, social, political.

- (2.) 1. *ἀρετῇ τις*. For the proper development of one of the energies of the social instincts, the mean between *κολάκεια* and *ἀγρία*, see bk. iv. 6. 4.—*τηρῇθειῇ*, sc. *εὐημερία*.
- (3.) 2. *ἐν πενίᾳ τε*, al. *δέ*, as an emphatic reference to what goes before.—*βοηθεῖ*, sc. *ἡ φιλία*, al. *βοηθείας*, supported by a majority of MSS.: it must be taken as acc. plur. in apposition to *κατοφύγην*. The plural is used in this way in *Econ.* i. 3.—*σύν τε δ' ἐρχομένω*: *Il.* x. 224.
- (4.) 4. *τοῖς δὲ τὰς πόλεις συνέχειν ἡ φιλία*. In the fifth book *χρεία* is spoken of as the bond of society. Mankind there are viewed in their artificial, as here in their natural, state. The earliest bond of society is *φιλία*, of which *χρεία* supplies the lack or the deficiency. *φιλία* is natural *δικαιοσύνη*, *δικαιοσύνη* is artificial *φιλία*: but where *φιλία* exists there is no need of its artificial substitute; where *δικαιοσύνη* supplies its place as the formal bond of union, there is still a necessity for *φιλία* in a greater or less degree,—at the very

least in its shape of *δόμοια*.—*ἐχθραν*, al. *ἐχθράν*.—τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ, *the highest sort of δίκαιον seems to be founded on φιλία*.

- (5.) 6. διαμφισβητεῖται κ.τ.λ. These views of the nature of φιλία differ as it is supposed to be founded on καλόν, ἡδύ, or χρήσιμον: if either of the two former, identity of feelings and interests is the principle of φιλία, (ὁμοίος πρὸς ὁμοιον); if the latter, diversity, (κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ). See ch. viii. 6.
- (6.) 6. ὁθεν τὸν ὁμοιον: Od. xvii. 218.—κεραμεῖς: Hes. Opp. 25, καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτεῖ καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων.—ἀνώτερον, *more deeply*.—φυσικώτερον, *on physical principles*: Εὐριπίδης: Frag. ἀδῆλων δραμάτων, iv.—τὸ ἀντίξουν, *a surface with corresponding indentations*.—Ἡράκλειτος: cf. Plato, Symp. 187, A.—ἔριν: Eth. Eud. vii. 1, 'Ἡράκλειτος ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ ποίησαντι "ὥς" ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν ἔκ τε ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο."
- (7.) 7. This is the same practical principle on which he acts in his investigation of ἀρετή, where he says he does not discuss τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή.—καὶ τὰ ἕτερα: καὶ is *even*.—ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται. The meaning of this argument is, that those things which admit of change of degree do not differ in kind.—ἔμπροσθεν. Michelct approves of Zellius's reference to bk. ii. 8, where it is shewn that the extremes on either side of the mean do differ from the mean in kind, though they are also different degrees of the same πάθος.

CHAPTER II.

- (8.) The conditions of φιλία are:—1. φιλητόν. 2. φίλησις. 3. βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ or εὖνοια. 4. ἀντιφίλησις. 5. μὴ λανθάνουσα. 6. συζῆν.
- (9.) 2. ἀπλῶς, *in the abstract*.

CHAPTER III.

- (10.) 2. οὐχ ἢ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν, *not in respect of that which the person beloved is in himself*; al. φιλούμενος ἔστιν, *not, as in true friendship, where his mere existence, without*

further results, is the object of friendship. ἢ ἐστίν, al. ἢ ἔστιν, as above: but ἐστίν is here evidently the copula.—ὁ σπερ εἶστίν, whatever he may be, (e. g. good, ἢ ἀγαθός,) not for himself, but for what he is to them.

- (11.) 6. τελεία. φιλία is perfected by ἡθικὴ ἀρετή.—αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὁμοίαι, al. τοιαῦται ἢ ὁμοίαι, are of some particular sort, or like them; but the former reading is the better.
- (12.) 7. ταύτη δὲ ὑπάρχει κ.τ.λ., *herein exist all the above-mentioned requisites in the parties themselves*,—essentially, and not accidentally.—ταύτη ὁμοία, sc. τὰ εἶδη τῆς φιλίας. The other sorts of friendship are merely resemblances and shadows of this: al. ταύτη γὰρ ὁμοία, in this they are similar, &c.
- (13.) 8. τοὺς λεγόμενους ὅλους. Michelet quotes Cic. de Amicitia, c. 19, *Verumque illud est quod dicitur multos modios salis simul dandos esse ut amicitiae munere expletum sit.* End. vii. 2: εἰς παροιμίαν ἐλήλυθεν ὁ μέδιμνος τῶν ὀλῶν.
- (14.) 9. αὕτη, sc. φιλία κατ' ἀρετήν.—κατὰ τὸν χρόνον, in regard of duration.—ταῦτά, al. ταῦτα.

CHAPTER IV.

- (15.) 2. μηδέτερον, *he who is neither really good nor really bad* (neither ἐπικρής nor φαῦλος) *can be a friend to any sort of man.*—οἱ γὰρ κακοί κ.τ.λ. Mark the analogy between φιλία and φιλαυτία, which is more fully drawn out hereafter.
- (16.) 3. οὐδενί, sc. διαβάλλοντι.—ἐν τοῦτοις, sc. τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.
- (17.) 5. συνάπτουσι, *combine.*
- (18.) 6. ταύτη, sc. τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλίᾳ: ὁμοιοι being used as ὁμοίωμα, in sect. 1: or ταύτη in this respect, sc. χρεῖα or ἡδονή.

CHAPTER V.

- (19.) 3. ἀποδεχόμενοι, *taking to one another.*—οἱ μακάριοι. The word expresses here both virtue and prosperity.
- (20.) 5. ἡδεῖ. The common reading is εἶδε, but it seems difficult to make any sense of this word; and the reading in

the text (ἡδεῖ) is not much better. βουλήσει is by some taken to mean τῷ ἀγαθῷ, in which case ἡδεῖ would do very well; but this seems doing violence to the word βουλήσει. I would suggest ἔργῳ, which is not a violent alteration.

CHAPTER VI.

- (21.) 4. μᾶλλον ἔοικε φιλία κ.τ.λ., that friendship is most like friendship. I should be inclined to read φιλική.
- (22.) 6. εἰ μὴ καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχεται κ.τ.λ., *unless he (ὁ ὑπερέχων) be surpassed in virtue. If this be not the case, he does not, by being in his turn inferior, (ὑπερεχόμενος,) preserve an analogous equality.* If the one who is superior in one point is inferior in another, there is, analogously, an equality between them.
- (23.) 7. τοιοῦτοι, sc. ὑπερεχόμενοι. Those in power are not wont to look on themselves as ὑπερεχόμενοι τῇ ἀρετῇ.—αἱ εἰρημίαι, the three sorts of φιλίας.—βούλονται, sc. τὰ αὐτά.—καὶ μένουσιν, sc. καὶ ὅτε ἦτον μένουσιν.—κακείνῃ, sc. τῇ κατ' ἀρετὴν φιλίᾳ.

CHAPTER VII.

- (24.) He now examines the nature and operation of the social instincts, where the parties are not on absolute, but only on a relative, footing of equality; where there is not an exact interchange of feelings, but such an interchange as answers to the relative position of the parties.
- (25.) 2. ἐπεικὴς φιλία, *such as is seemly*; answering to ἐπεικεια in justice,—not strictly φιλία, but such as suits the circumstances.
- (26.) 3. ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μέν κ.τ.λ. In φιλία each does not consider the exact rights of himself and the other; he does not think how much he is bound to give, but how far his abilities go. In δικαιοσύνη the main question is that of rights: he does not think how much he has power to give,

but how much the other has a right to claim. If *φιλία* and *δικαιοσύνη* were conceived to be at the opposite points of a line, then as *φιλία* degenerated into *δικαιοσύνη*, the *πόσον* would be exchanged for the *ἀξία*; as *δικαιοσύνη* was replaced by *φιλία*, the *ἀξία* would be lost sight of in the *πόσον*.

φιλία ——— *ἀξία* ——— *πόσον* ——— *δικαιοσύνη*.

In proportion as the question of *ἀξία* is forced upon us in the *φιλία ἐν ὑπεροχῇ*, the character of *φιλία* is lost.

- (27.) 5. *ἀφαιρουμένων*: many of the points of friendship being destroyed by inequality.—*μένει*, sc. *ὁ φίλος*, or *ἡ φιλία*.—*χωρισθέντες*, sc. *τοῦ φίλου*: al. *χωρισθέντες*, in which case we must supply *μένουσι*.
- (28.) 6. *ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντι*, *to him as a man*. Whatever goods belong to humanity: hence not such as pertain to the gods.

CHAPTER VIII.

- (29.) 1. *ὑπερεχόμενος*, *in an inferior condition*.—*τοιοῦτος εἶναι*, al. om. *εἶναι*.
- (30.) 4. *ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν*. He is speaking of the *φιλία ἐν ὑπεροχῇ*.
- (31.) 5. *ὁμοιότης* (sc. *ἐστὶ*) *φιλότης*—*ἐπιτρέπειν*: the common reading has *ὑπηρεῖν* after *ἐπιτρέπειν*, but the reading in the text is the better, supplying *ἀμαρτάνειν*.
- (32.) 6. *φίλητοὺς ὄντας*. This accusative depends on *δεῖ* in *ἀξιώτεον* = *δεῖ ἀξιοῦν*: Gr. Gr. 613, Obs. 5.

CHAPTER IX.

- (33.) He now discusses the nature and operation of the social instincts in domestic and political life.—*ἐν ἀρχῇ*, sc. ch. i. 4. Some persons have argued from this expression, here and elsewhere, (bk. viii. and ix.,) that these chapters do not properly belong to the Nicomachean Ethics: but there is no reason

why *ἐν ἀρχῇ* here may not mean "the beginning of this part of the subject;" and there are other passages in these books where the words *ἐν ἀρχῇ*, used somewhat differently, imply connection with the earlier parts of the Ethics.—*φιλία* δέ: δέ is emphatic; Gr. Gr. 761, 2.

- (34.) 1. *καθ' ὅσον κ.τ.λ.* As *δίκαιον* is the substitute for *φιλία*, it follows, that wherever there is *φιλία* there might be *δικαιοσύνη*; wherever there is *δικαιοσύνη* there might have been *φιλία*; so that either can be brought to prove the possible or actual existence of the other. Both depend on *κοινωνία*, wherefore, in whatever social relation there is *δίκαιον*, there must be a possibility of *φιλία*.
- (35.) 3. *αὐξεσθαι κ.τ.λ.* The nature of *φιλία* and *δίκαιον* is such that they vary in degree in a common ratio. Wherever the claims of *φιλία* are strongest, the claims of *δίκαιον* are so too. On the other hand, we must remember that where *φιλία* ought most to be, there *δίκαιον* ought least to be: but still, looking at it practically, as *φιλία* is so much set aside, the position in the text is perfectly true,—that where *φιλία* has most right to look for mutual good offices, there *δίκαιον* lays down the claims of each most authoritatively. For the use and progress of *δίκαιον* from a state of *φιλία*, see bk. v. ch. 8, note.
- (36.) 3. *πᾶσαι*, al. *πᾶσι*, wrongly.—*τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ*. So in the fifth book he speaks of *χρεία* as the bond of social union. The social instincts which bind man to man do generally assume their lower form of *φιλία* διὰ *χρήσιμον*, which differs but little from *δικαιοσύνη*, except that this latter is more definite. *φιλία* proper is a higher bond of union in the abstract, but practically does not work when the society grows from a family to a state. In the early Church we have an instance of an attempt to frame a society on the purer principle of *φιλία*, individual rights being for a time forgotten in the common interest,—the *ἀξία* merged in the *πόσον*; but individual rights soon made themselves heard, and complaints from individuals that their claims were neglected reintroduced *δίκαιον* into the Church: and surely, if there ever could be a society in which *φιλία* might have held her (abstractedly) natural place in society, it was a body of Christians who had received the especial grace of God. Yet

human nature refused to obey, and fell back on the artificial system of *δικαιοσύνη*. See note.—*δοκεῖ*. Michelet observes truly, that Aristotle does not mean to give this bond of social union as the best and truest, but only as the practical and historical view of it.

- (37.) 5. *θυσίας τε ποιῶντες* at first sight seems to agree with the plural implied in *πολιτική* : but Michelet's observation is right, that *πολιτική* is an abstract noun, and therefore does not admit of this construction. See instances in Gr. Gr. 379, b. He refers *ποιῶντες* to *φυλέται καὶ δημόται*, making from *ἔναι* down to *βίον* in a parenthesis, to mark that he is passing from the *σύμφερον* to the *ἡδύ*, but that what he has advanced equally holds good. Grammatically speaking, *ποιῶντες* might be viewed as the nominative to *πολιτεύονται χάριν*.—*τοῦ παρόντος* κ.τ.λ., implied in *ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐφίεται*,—see Gr. Gr. 708, 1 ; but Michelet's way seems the best.—*οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος* κ.τ.λ. : politics does not merely provide for the points of common weal as they from time to time arise, but for every part of life ; not only for the actual *σύμφερον*, but for the *ἡδύ* as far as it is *σύμφερον* : hence all these associations which have *ἡδύ* in view come under politics, as well as those which look to *σύμφερον*.—*περὶ ταύτας*, sc. *θυσίας*.—*συνόδους* depends on *ποιῶντες*, making *assemblies for these*, i. e. for sacrifices.

CHAPTER X.

- (38.) He now examines the social instincts as they are developed in the political or domestic life. The subject is discussed at length in the third and fourth books of the Politics.—*πολιτείας*. A constitution may be defined as a system or arrangement (*τάξις* : see Pol. iii. 1.) which embodies the rights and duties arising from the relations in which the various parties in the state stand, or are viewed as standing, to each other ; and as the principle (*ἰδέα*) on which these relations are estimated varies, the constitution varies likewise. It is to be distinguished from a government which takes care that these rights and duties are performed and exercised without let or hindrance. A good constitution is that which fitly embodies

the really existing relations. A constitution is bad when it embodies relations which do not exist, or does not embody relations which do exist.

- (39.) 2. ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης, *not independent*.—τῖς εἴη βασιλεύς, al. ἡ βασιλεύς. There is about equal authority for each. If ἡ is read, we must supply μᾶλλον before it: Gr. Gr. 579, Obs. 3. If ἡ is omitted, then κληρωτὸς βασιλεύς is the same notion as we find in Pol. iii. 10, p. 102.
- (40.) 3. περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενοι τὸ πλουτεῖν. In oligarchy wealth is looked upon as an instrument of unconstitutional power. In timocracy it is a test of the relations in which the individuals of the state stand to each other; either of the amount of interest or stake which each person has in the common weal, or as a presumptive test of education and ability. Observe Aristotle's theory of revolutions.—βούλεται, *claims or pretends to be = is in theory*.
- (41.) 4. παραδείγματα, *models*.—πατρική, *patriarchal*.—αὕτη, sc. ἡ δεσποτική. It is right, because it truly embodies the relations which really exist between a master and a slave: the slave, viewed in the relation of a κτῆμα, has no rights or duties properly so called. The patriarchal authority, as set forth in Asia, is wrong, because the supposed relation between father and son, on which it is founded, as if they stood in the relation of master and slave, is not the true or real one.—διάφοροι: not merely different in species, but have a different character; are to be differently thought of; as in the cases just quoted.
- (42.) 5. ἀνδρὸς κ.τ.λ. Supply κοινωνία.

CHAPTER XI.

- (43.) 1. ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον: see note 34.
- (44.) 2. ἡ πατρική, sc. φιλία.—διαφέρει, sc. τῆς βασιλείας.—ἀπονέμεται, *attributes*.
- (45.) 6. ἐν οἷς μὴδὲν κοινόν: where there is no common interest the slave has no interest in what his master does,—no mutual relations.

- (46.) 6. οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον. The argument here is, "If there is *φιλία* there would be *δίκαιον*; there is no *δίκαιον*, therefore no *φιλία*." The absence of *δίκαιον* is a token, not a cause, of the absence of *φιλία*; the lack of *φιλία*, on the other hand, is a cause of the absence of *δίκαιον*.—ὠφέλειται μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. There is an *ὠφέλεια* between the parties, but still no *κοινόν*, therefore neither *φιλία* nor *δίκαιον*.—μὲν γάρ: there is no *δίκαιον*, "for these indeed are benefited:" it is almost equivalent to "for *though*."
- (47.) 6. ἢ δοῦλος. Aristotle seems never to have been able to get rid of the fact that every man had *some* claim upon his fellow-men, by virtue of his humanity: he was obliged to recall to his mind the artificial view of individuals as slaves, in order to justify what he says as to their position.
- (48.) 7. δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι κ.τ.λ. This is the *ἀπλῶς δίκαιον* of the fifth book.
- (49.) 7. καὶ φιλίας δῆ. καὶ δὴ (*φιλία*) πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι φιλίας:—unless the proper reading be καὶ *φιλία* δῆ. Michelet suggests that *φιλίας* depends on τί, supplied from *τι δίκαιον*.

CHAPTER XII.

- (50.) 1. πᾶσα φιλία. He is here speaking of *πολιτικαὶ φιλίαι*, or *φιλίαι κατ' ἀξίων*.—ἀφορίσεις δ' αὖτις κ.τ.λ. One might perhaps eliminate or exclude from this definition the friendship of relationship and companionship, which might be viewed as arising from the *φυσικὴ φιλία* mentioned in chap. xiv. 4, from a similarity of feelings (*ὁμοπαθεῖς*), or of character (*ὁμοῦθεις*), rather than from any community of interest between the parties. Eudem. vii. 10, λέγονται δὲ φιλίαι, συγγενική, ἑταιρική, κοινωνική, ἢ λεγομένη πολιτική.
- (51.) 2. ἐκείνῳ, al. ἐκείνων δὲ οὐδενί, sc. *to none of these is the possessor an object of interest*; but the new reading is by far the better.
- (52.) 3. τῷ ἐξ αὐτῶν πεφυκεναί. Cf. 1 Ep. St. John 5.—ταῦτὸν αἶμα: Il. ζ. 211. ῥίζαν: Eur. Ion. ix. 76.—καὶ ἐν διηρημένοις, *in the separate branches*.—εἰσὶ, sc. αἶμα καὶ ῥίζα.

- (53.) 4. ἡλιξ γὰρ ἡλικά, sc. τέρπει.—συννοικεῖωνται, are connected.
- (54.) 5. ὥς πρὸς θεούς. Observe his notion of the care of the Divine Being for man.
- (55.) 6. ἡ τοιαύτη φιλία, sc. ἡ συγγενική.—τῶν ὁθνείων, sc. τῆς φιλίας.—ὁ βίος κ.τ.λ., *their daily lives have more in common*.—μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἐπεικίσι: that is, where there is ἀρετή.—ὑπάρχουσι στέργοντες. Supply εἰσὶ before οἰκειότεροι; al. ὑπάρχοντες στέργουσι.
- (56.) 7. εἶς πρότερον κ.τ.λ. In the Politics he speaks of the πόλις as πρότερον τῇ φύσει: in that passage he is speaking *naturæ intendentis*.—πόλις, οἰκία, ἄνθρωπος; the ἄνθρωπος being formed with a view to the family, the family with a view to the state: in this passage he is speaking *naturæ operantis*, (ἄνθρωπος, οἰκία, πόλις,) as in order of development the individuals form themselves into families, and families become states.
- (57.) 7. ἡ πῶς δίκαιον, sc. συμβιώναι. The requirements of φιλία are the same as those of δίκαιον, though on different principles: as the relations differ, so will the δίκαιον; and hence also the φιλία must be different.—ταῦτόν, sc. δίκαιον.

CHAPTER XIII.

- (58.) 2. ἀμύνεται, al. ἀμείβεται.
- (59.) 6. συναλλάξωσι: neuter. See Lidd. and Scott ad v.
- (60.) 6. φιλικὴν δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει, *but it admits of a friendly delay*: φιλικόν, Bekker; *but friendship admits of delays*: cf. Plat. Legg. 915. But the former reading is the better, as the neuter adjective for the abstract noun requires the article τό: see Gr. Gr. 436, γ.
- (61.) 7. ὅτι δέ ποτε ἄλλο, *for whatever other services he does to the other, are as to a friend*: al. ἄλλω, sc. παρέχει. This is the old reading, but ἄλλο has MS. authority, and is better.
- (62.) 7. δυναμῖν. *If he is able, he must repay the debt*.—καὶ ἐκόντι, *and with good-will*.—ἄκοντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., *for we must not make a man a friend against his will, as we should be doing if we were to suppose that as friendship is not ἐπὶ*

ῥητοῖς, therefore we need not repay it,—that it was no debt. From κομίζεσθαι down to εὐεργετεῖσθαι we have the expectation of the benefactor, that though it is not a matter of debt, yet he expects to receive something in return; so that δυναμένη κ.τ.λ. refers to the clause ἢ δ' ἡθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς,—he is not to make a return unless he is able; and at the same time to the expectation of the donor,—he is to make a return if he is able. διαμαρτόντα may either refer to the act of repaying, (ἀποδοτέον,) the case being changed after ὥς, (see Gr. Gr. 703,) or may better depend on διαλυτέον below, (Gr. Gr. 613, obs. 5;) the clause οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου being evidently a parenthetical explanation of εὖ παθόντα ὑφ' αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔδει. In this interpretation ἐκόντι and ἄκοντα refer to different persons, one the agent, the other the recipient of the apodosis; and καὶ ἐκόντι has not the emphasis which it evidently is meant to have. It is better to take both for the same person, making ἐκόντι to refer to the will of the recipient, as δυναμένη does to the power of the agent, and making it depend on ἀποδοῦναι in ἀποδοτέον, (Gr. Gr. 613, 3,) and not on the passive verbal notion. “A return is to be made to him who did the benefit, if the person benefited is able to do it, and if he is willing to receive it; for one must not make a man a friend against his will,” which would be the case if you were to treat a man as if he had done you a service as a friend, while he declares he did not do it as your friend, that he has no such claim upon you: as where a person had accidentally benefited another, without the least notion of doing him a service, or done it from friendship to some one else. In such a case the person benefited ought not to have received the benefit, and all he has to do now is to allow the matter to be settled, (διαλυτέον,) as if it had been ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς; in which case, as no mention of return was made beforehand, no return would be expected afterwards. This gives καὶ ἐκόντι its emphatic force, and gives the two conditions of the ἀνταπόδοσις, viz. the ability of one party and the willingness of the other; and moreover describes a case which is perpetually happening in every-day life. A man refuses to accept a return for a benefit conferred, because such acceptance would imply a friendship which does not exist, and was not implied in the original act.

- (63.) 9. ὁ μολογήσας ἂν; κ.τ.λ. As the words καὶ ἐκόντι are explained by ἄκοντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., so here we have an explanation of

the condition *δυναμένῳ* :—"Any one would allow that he ought to repay it, if he is able; if not, no one would expect it;"—*al. ὁμολογῆσαι*, which is not right; *al. ὁμολόγησε δ' αὖ*, which would favour the former of the two interpretations, by shewing that the *ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς* refers to the *ἀπόδοσις* to which he would have agreed beforehand, and not, as suggested in the second interpretation, to there being no bargain for an *ἀπόδοσις*, and therefore no case for it.

(64.) 11. *ἐπαρκεῖ*, *sc. ἕτερος*.

CHAPTER XIV.

(65.) 3. *εἰς χρήματα κ.τ.λ.*, by him who is on the debtor side with respect to money or to excellence.—*ἀνταποδιδόντα* depends on *δεῖ* in *ἀνταποδοτίον* = *δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀποδοῦναι*.

(66.) 4. *οὐδὲις γάρ κ.τ.λ.* Observe here again his notions of the gods.—*ὀφείλοντα*, same construction as *ἀνταποδοτίον* above.—*ὑπερβάλλοντος*. *sc. υἱοῦ*.—*τῷ δὲ φευκτόν*, *sc. υἱῷ* *μυχθρῷ* *ὄντι*.—*εὖ πάσχειν*, the father cannot hope for any benefit from a very bad son, and men do not usually benefit those for whom they cannot hope for some return.

BOOK IX.

CHAPTER I.

(1.) ARISTOTLE in this book considers certain questions connected with our social instincts, their development and operation.—*καθάπερ εἴρηται*, *sc. viii. 1 & 4*.

(2.) 2. *ὁ ἐρώμενος*, *sc. ἐγκαλεῖ*.—*ἐπαγγελλόμενος*, *sc. ὁ ἐραστής*.

(3.) 3. *ἡ τῶν ἡθῶν*, *sc. ἡ ἠθικῇ*.

(4.) 4. *κισαρφιδῶ*, *Plut. Fort. Alex. c. i*. Dionysius is said to have answered a poet who claimed a promised reward, that he had repaid him by the pleasures of hope which his promise had given him.

- (5.) 5. ταῦτα, sc. ἃ ἔχει, al. ταῦτά, sc. *of the same value*.—ἐκείνου χάριν, sc. ὡν δεόμενος τυγχάνει.—προλαβόντος, sc. *he who was the first recipient*, as προίχοντα below.—Πρωταγόραν: Plat. Prot. 328, B.
- (6.) 6. μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ εἰρημένος ἄρκιος ἔστω, Hes. Opp. 368.
- (7.) 7. δι' αὐτούς, *those who benefit their friends for their own sake*, i. e. δι' ἀρετήν.
- (8.) 8. τὸν προίχοντα, *he who first received the benefit*.—ἀντιλαβών, sc. ὁ ἕτερος.
- (9.) 8. ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις, *in shops*. The buyer fixes the price he will give according to the benefit or pleasure he thinks the article will give him, and will not give more; whereas the seller tries to get as much as he can. The need of the buyer gives the article its marketable value; and the person who has been benefited in the same way ought to fix the value, as it was his need which determined it.
- (10.) 9. ἐκονσίων συμβολαίων: see v. 2. 13.

CHAPTER II.

- (11.) He now considers some questions of casuistry. The logical description of casuistry would be, where the particular minor or fact being realized, a deliberation arises as to what major premiss or principle we should refer that known particular. Honest casuistry is where the doubt implied in such deliberation is real. Dishonest, or casuistry in its usual acceptance, is where the proper major is really known, but it is attempted to refer the minor to some more palatable principle, and thus escape from an inconvenient conclusion or disagreeable duty.—ἡμοίως, sc. πότερον.
- (12.) 5. ἐαυτοῦ, *than himself*. He ought rather to ransom his father, than procure his own liberty.—τὴν προὔπαρχήν, al. εἶρον προὔπαρχήν, al. ἐταίρον.—τῷ δ' ἐ refers to the same person as ὁ μὲν, while the nominative to οἶται is supplied from σπουδαίον.—οἶονταί, δ' ἐ, but they suppose it so.
- (13.) 8. τροφήν ἐπαρκεῖν. For gen. see Gr. Gr. 535.

CHAPTER III.

- (14.) 1. ἐν ἀρχῇ, ch. i. 4. These words seem frequently to have the sense of "before," unless we choose to adopt the notion of their denoting that the Ethics are made up of a number of separate treatises, so that the beginning of each one may be referred to as the ἀρχή.
- (15.) 3. γίνηται δὲ μοχθηρὸς καὶ δοκῇ, al. ἢ καὶ δοκῇ. — οὕτε δέ, om. al.

CHAPTER IV.

- (16.) He here commences an analysis of our social nature, and its connection with self-love.
- (17.) 1. προσκεκρουκότες, *those who have met with some offence*;—they continue friends, even though they look for no return.
- (18.) 2. τοιοῦτοι, sc. ἐπεικείς.—μέτρον, the standard whereby the perfection or right operation in human affairs is estimated; so that in the case of φιανρία he is most perfectly φιαντος who is σπουδαίτατος.
- (19.) 3. τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ. It is the property of the good man, that he aims and works out his highest good, and for the sake of that which is most properly himself,—his reason: he aims at a rational existence; and hence, as this is the highest good of man, he is most truly φιαντος who develops it.—τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα: these coincide. *The good presents itself as good to him.* There is no double-mindedness in him, no difference between his abstract idea of good, and his practical appreciation of it.—τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ, sc. ἀνθρώπου.
- (20.) 3. τοῦ διανοητικοῦ χάριν. The good man lives a life of reason, not of sense, according to the κυρίως, not the αἰσθητική, ἐπιστήμη: even those parts of his sensual nature which enter into his life are governed by, or rather leavened by, reason. Cf. ch. 8. 6, sqq., whence it is clear that by διανοητικοῦ here he means the practical, not only the scientific, intellect.
- (21.) 4. ἑκαστος δ' ἐαυτῷ βούλεται κ.τ.λ. The point he wishes to prove is, that the good man, as most completely

realizing his nature, or personality (*ἐκαστότης*), i. e. that which we properly call ourselves,—is most truly fond of himself, and most truly wishes good to himself, and hence is most truly *φίλαυτος*.

The good of every creature depends on its personality (*ἐκαστότης*), i. e. must be suitable to, and be the development, or energy of, that living being which each man calls himself. He proves this—

1. By the fact that when a living being, (man, for instance,) having a distinct personality and nature, by virtue of which he wishes himself a particular sort of good, partially throws off this personality, and assumes a fresh one, (*γενόμενος ἄλλος*), as if he were to become an animal, as Circe's swine, or to live a mere animal life, he would not be content that his new nature (*ἐκείνο τὸ γενόμενον*) should be his all in all, (*πάντ' ἔχειν*); retaining an instinctive consciousness of his former nature and personality, he has desires suitable to it: so that hence we see that a man's notion of his proper good, and his possession of it, depends on his proper personality.

2. The Divine Being has some good; but even this is by virtue of some nature or personality unknown to us, (*ὧν δ' ἔστι ποτ' ἔστι*), to which this good is suitable.

So that, if in proportion as any one realizes and develops his personality or true nature he wishes the truest good to himself, it follows that a good man, leading a life of reason, (which is the *ἐκαστότης* of man,) wishes most truly good to himself.

(22.) 5. τῷ δὲ ἢ πρὸς ἑαυτόν—ὑπάρχειν. Dative of proof: see Gr. Gr. 609, 5.

(23.) 5. εἰναί τι δοκεῖ, seems to be something real: τι is emphatic. So Plato, *Phædr.* 242 E, *σεμνύνεσθαι ὥς τι ὄντε*.

(24.) 6. ταύτη, *here*.—τὰ εἰρημίνα, the above-named conditions of friendship, viz. *ἑαυτοῖς συνδιαγεῖν βούλεσθαι*; *συνλαγεῖν* and *συνήδεσθαι*: or some take them to be those named in the beginning of the chapter, but not so well; others (and among them the author of the *Eudemian Ethics*, (vii. 6,) and the *Paraphrast*) interpret it, "Friendship towards a man's self can exist in the degree in which a man has in himself two parts or principles, viz. the *ἄλογον* and *λόγον ἔχον*." In the *Magna Moralia*, p. 18, we find both interpretations.

- (25.) 8. *ἐτέρων μὲν κ.τ.λ. ἐπιθυμοῦσιν* (the sensual desire); *ἀλλὰ δὲ βούλονται* (the rational desire); so that their senses and their reason differ.—*δοκοῦντων*. This word here implies *δόξα*, a definite act of the reason.—*μισοῦσιν τε καὶ*, al. *μισοῦνται* without *τε καὶ*: both have about equal MSS. authority. The Paraphrast evidently read *μισοῦνται*.—*μοχθηρίαν* may refer to what goes before, as in the text, or to what follows.
- (26.) 9. *διασπῶντα* agrees with *τὸ μὲν*—*τὸ δέ*.
- (27.) 10. *εἰ δὲ μὴ οἶόν τε κ.τ.λ.* If the pleasure and pain cannot be coincident, at all events (*ἀλλά γε*) pain follows very quickly on the pleasure.—*οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλετο—γίνεσθαι*, and he would not wish that these pleasures should (again) be his.

CHAPTER V.

- (28.) 1. *πρότερον*, viii. 2.—*διάτασιν*, intentness, earnestness.
- (29.) 3. *οὐδὲν μᾶλλον*, not a whit the more for that reason.—*ἀλλ' ὅταν*, except when.—*οὐκ ἔοικεν εὐνοὺς εἶναι*. The object of *εὐνοία* is another; when the *χρήσιμον* or ἡδύ of one-self comes in, it is rather spurious *φιλαυτία*.

CHAPTER VI.

- (30.) 1. *ὁμόνοια*, harmony of feeling, sympathy.
- (31.) 2. *πᾶσι δοκῇ*, when by common consent it is agreed.—*ἄρχειν Πίττακον κ.τ.λ.* Pittacus, leader of the Mityleneans, is related by Diogenes Laertius (i. 75) to have had this privilege granted him, and to have exercised it for ten years, on account of certain victories gained by him.—*οὐ γάρ ἐστιν κ.τ.λ.* *ὁμόνοια* does not consist in identity of feeling, but identity of feeling for the same object, and in the same circumstances.
- (32.) 3. *ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες*, "being, so to say, in the same ship,"—*ᾧσπερ Εὐριπός*. The tides of the Euripus, the *παλίρροθι Αἰολίδος τόποι*, are used as emblems of inconstancy both in Greek and Latin writers.
- (33.) 4. *ἐξετάζει*, "watches," enquires into.

CHAPTER VII.

- (34.) 1. οἱ δ' ἐπεργέται. This is an unusual introduction of an *ἀπορία* by stating it as a fact.—There is a conjunction wanting here. γινόμενον is in apposition to the sentence: *and this being so, &c.*
- (35.) 1. Ἐπίχαρμος. These words may be an actual quotation of the end of an iambic from Epicharmus, or may only represent his meaning.—ἐκ πονηροῦ: either “*from the bad part of human nature,*” or *from a bad point of view.*
- (36.) 2. φυσικώτερον, to be more founded on the nature of the thing.—φυσικώτερόν τε, al. τῷ.—περί, *in the case of.*—καὶ μὴ δὲν ᾧσι—γίνονται. The conjunctive points to the present, the opt. to the future. (Cardwell.)
- (37.) 4. ἐσμὲν δ' ἐνεργεῖα. This observation is founded on a profound knowledge of the human mind. It is the principle which stirs men up to activity and toil where no definite advantage is to be gained by it.
- (38.) 4. ἐνεργεῖα δὴ—ἔστι πως, exists as it were in his energy. Michelet takes τὸ ἔργον as the nominative, and reads ἐστὶ πως; and this interpretation is recognised by the Paraphrast. The argument is, that the act of benefiting another is an act of existence, is a realization to us of our existence, and therefore pleasant; while the act of being benefited is something passive, and does not realize to us our existence, as we do not co-operate in it, but we are simply recipients of the act of the agent.—ὁ γὰρ ἐστὶ δυνάμει: that which has a virtual, in *posse* (δυνάμει) existence, is set forth actually in *esse* (ἐνεργεῖα) by its act or result.
- (39.) 5. χαίρειν ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, so that he to whom this pertains feels pleasure. — οὐδὲν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι. The words καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι must be taken together: *the feeling of καλόν which exists in the agent.*
- (40.) 6. ἀνάπαλιν. In the benefactor the memory of the καλόν is sweet, and he therefore dwells with pleasure on his act and its object. In the person benefited the remembrance of the σύμφερον is less vivid; and he rather looks forward to some new benefit, than backwards to what he has received. It is in this sense that gratitude has been defined

as a lively sense of favours to come.—*ποιήσει*, a productive act. *τῷ πάσχειν*, a passive act: the former produces feelings of *στέργειν ὥσπερ τέκνα*: *εὐεργετῆιν* gives a notion of *ὑπεροχή*,—*εὐεργετῆσθαι* a notion of *ὑπερίχθαι*; hence also the benefactor loves his act for the feeling of superiority which it gives him.

- (41.) 7. *τῶν παραλαβόντων*, than those who inherit it.—*μᾶλλον ἴσασσι*, i. e. *more than the children know them as the authors of their being, or than the fathers know the children to be theirs.*

CHAPTER VIII.

- (42.) 1. *δφ' ἑαυτοῦ*, losing sight of himself and his own interests.
- (43.) 2. *οἷς ὁ φίλος ὁρίζεται*, which are the characteristics of friendship.
- (44.) 4. *προσηγορία*, "appellation."
- (45.) 5. *σπουδάσοι*, al. *σπουδάξει*, which is quite as good. The indicative signifies the every-day fact of a good man's zeal for right; the optative denotes that he may be viewed as greedy of right action.
- (46.) 6. *ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριώτατῳ*, his most essential part.—*πόλις*, the state (= the citizens in their corporate, not their individual, capacity,) is the most essential, and most to be considered in the commonwealth, as every other compound body (*πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα*) is most to be considered when taken as a whole, and not in its several parts: so in human nature, the whole of the parts together is the most proper essence of man, and more to be considered than each or all of the parts separately.
- (47.) 6. *τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν*, sc. *ἑαυτοῦ τὸ κυριώτατον*.—*δρίγασθαι*, al. *δρίγισθαι* ἤ.
- (48.) 7. *ἀποδέχονται*, welcome.—*πάντων δ' ἀμιλλωμένων*. This brings to mind what Butler says of the tendencies of virtue, part i. ch. 3. The public as well as the individual good would be secured by true *φιλαντία*.
- (49.) 8. *πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς*. The reason, when not perverted and

overwhelmed by the passions, as in the case of the *ἀκόλαστος* or *πεπηρωμένος*, chooses the highest good: perhaps even in these desperate cases the good is occasionally perceived by the reason, though not even in wish acted upon.

- (50.) 9. *ἀληθὺς δὲ περὶ σπουδαίου*, al. *τὸ περὶ σπουδαίου*, *what is said of the good man*.—*ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι*, *those who die for their country or friends*.—*ἐφ' ᾧ λήγουσται*. See Grammar, 836, 5, c.

CHAPTER IX.

- (51.) 1. *ᾧθεν τό κ.τ.λ.*: Eur. Orest. 667.
- (52.) 2. *ἐντυχούτων οὖς*, sc. *διομένων*. *οὖς* in attraction to *ποιήσουσιν*.
- (53.) 4. *ἐπεισακτοῦ ἡδονῆς*, *adventitious*.
- (54.) 5. *ᾧτι γίνεται*. If the word *ἐνέργεια* had not preceded, this passage might have been correctly translated, *is an energy* (*γίνεται*), and not a state, (*ὑπάρχει*): it is an active process, not a passive state, and therefore requires to be, as it were, in perpetual motion; and this is attained, even though we are unable to energize continuously in ourselves, by the cognate energies of our friends, which are, as it were, our own feelings and actions reproduced in others.—*ἔστι δὲ τὸ οἰκεῖον*, and that which belongs to ourselves is classed among things pleasant.—*ἐαυτούς*, ourselves: Gr. Gr. 654, 2, b.
- (55.) 5. *ἄμφω*, sc. *τὴν ἐνέργειαν*, and *τὸ οἰκεῖον*.
- (56.) 7. *ἄσκησις*, *discipline*.—*Θέογνις*. *Ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐσθλὰ διδάξει*, "He διὲ κακοῖσι συμμίσησ ἀπολείς καὶ τὸν ἔοντα νόον."—*Φυσικώτερον*: looking more into the principles and reason of the matter,—psychologically.
- (57.) The argument here used seems to be simply this:—To live is pleasant to the good man above all others. This life consists in the energies of Perception and Intellect, and the pleasure arises from the consciousness, whether perceptive or intellectual, of such energies: in proportion, then, as this consciousness is increased, the pleasure of the good man is increased likewise; and the good man so deeply sympathizes

with the energies of his friend's life, his acts of perception and consciousness, that he feels his own life, as it were, in his; and therefore, if he had no friends, he would be deprived of no small part of his pleasure in living.

- (58.) 7. τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὁρίζονται. Life is defined (by calling it), in the case of animals, the power, &c. ὁρίζεσθαι is to give its definition, i.e. to state the difference or essence. That the acts of αἰσθησις and νόησις, not the mere power thereof, constitute human life, is proved in what follows.

- (59.) 7. ἡ δὲ δύναμις—ἀνάγεται. The power is referred to its operation, i.e. the power has no value or real existence except when viewed in its development; therefore the real value of the human δύναμις τῆς αἰσθήσεως and νόησεως depends on the acts of perception and thought. A man is not man by virtue of possessing the power, but by having further the power and opportunity of exercising it.—τὸ δὲ κύριον, and essence of the human ζῶν is in the acts of αἰσθησις and νόησις.—τοῖς κ.τ.λ. τὸ ζῆν, then, seems to consist not merely in the power, but in the acts, of αἰσθησις and νόησις,—the same conclusion as before, but arrived at differently.—ὁρισμένον γάρ, for there is something settled and defined in it, which is of the nature (and therefore one of the tests) of good; while that which is ἀόριστος is made up of a variety of unsettled, shifting particulars,—καὶ τῷ ἐπεικεῖ, sc. ἐστὶ ἀγαθόν.

- (60.) 8. οὐδ' ἐν λύπαις, nor one overwhelmed with sorrow.—τὰ ἐπαρχοντα, its circumstances and details.

- (61.) 9. εἰ δ' αὐτό κ.τ.λ. The apodosis is difficult to see. Some make καὶ ἡδύ the apodosis, supplying ἐστὶ; but that would be only a repetition of what is said above. Michelet better places it at καθάπερ οὕτω, taking the clauses between as a series of parentheses; but this is a long way off: and it may be placed at τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῆ, which would make very good sense, as this is a consequence from the εἰ δ' αὐτό κ.τ.λ., and δὲ is used to take up the sense interrupted by a parenthesis, (see Gr. Gr. 767, 4); and the words φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζῶν is a repetition of the protasis, in consequence of the long parenthesis.—βίος, life; ζῶν, existence. Mark the difference between these two,—βίος referring rather to external circumstances, ζῶν to internal constitution and state.—ποοῦν

μεν ὅτι νοοῦμεν: Met. xi. 9, p. 255, νόησις ἐστὶν νοήσεως νόησις: i. e. thought consists in the intellectual perception of thought.—τὸ δὲ ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν ὅτι ἐσμέν. This perception, (τὸ δὲ) ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, is really a perception ὅτι ἐσμέν, and therefore every such consciousness is a consciousness of our being living beings, and therefore brings pleasure.

- (62.) 10. ὥς δέ κ.τ.λ. The rest of the argument is clear enough, that a man receives these impressions of his own existence from seeing them in his friends.

CHAPTER X.

- (63.) 1. μήτε πολύξεινος: Hes. Op. et Dier. 713.
 (64.) 3. οὔτε γάρ κ.τ.λ. This is a curious dogma, when illustrated by modern history; but the real fact is, that except where the representative principle is admitted, which it was not in antiquity, it seems to be true.—τὸ δὲ πόσον. The exact quantity is not one point in all, but varies, according to circumstances, between two given points, which mark the too much or the too little.
 (65.) 5. συμπίπτειν, *happen coincidently*.
 (66.) 6. ἐν δυσι λέγονται: Pylades and Orestes, &c.—πλὴν πολιτικῶς, *except politically*, i. e. as members of the same state, or belonging to the same party.

CHAPTER XI.

- (67.) 2. τὸ λεχθέν, *sc. κομφίζοντας οἱ λυπούμενοι*.
 (68.) 3. αὐτὸ—τὸ δρᾶν, *the very sight of one's friends, &c.*
 (69.) 4. συλλυπεῖν, *al. συλλυπεῖσθαι*.—ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυπίᾳ. *ὑπερτείνῃ* depends on ἀνδρώδης, implied in ἀνδρωδεῖς: Gr. Gr. 390, 1, b. The meaning of this is, that if he is not excessively callous to painful impressions, he cannot bear the sight of his friends grieving for him. The Paraphrast and Thomas Aquinas give another interpretation: "Unless the friend out-

weighs their grief by his own *ἀλγία*, they do not bear to communicate their grief to him;" but this is very forced.

- (70.) 5. *ἄλλῃς ἰγὼ δυστυχῶν*. Cf. Eur. Orest. 239; Soph. Œd. Tyr. 1061.

- (71.) 6. *τὸ μὴ ἀξιόσαντας*. The common reading is *τούς*. *τό* here equals *τοῦτο*, (Gr. Gr. 444. 5,) and refers to *τὸ ποιεῖν*: "and those who do claim it."—*δόξαν ἀηδίας*. We must take care, when we decline the sympathy of a friend from a reluctance to give him pain, that we do not give him an impression that we are acting from a dislike to his company.

CHAPTER XII.

- (72.) 1. *ἄρα*. He sums up what he has said:—*Is not then, &c.?*
 (73.) 1. *ἡ αἴσθησις ὅτι ἔστιν*, the perception of existence.
 (74.) 2. *τούτων κοινωνοῦσι κτλ.*, share (with them) these things whereby they think to live.
 (75.) 3. *ἀπομάττονται*, they take impressions from one another.
 See Lidd. and Scott ad v.

BOOK X.

CHAPTER I.

- (1.) As Aristotle had, in the end of the seventh book, treated of pleasure and pain as the motive causes of human action, as the subject-matter, in the regulation of which consisted the several habits of *Σωφροσύνη*, *Ἐγκράτεια*, *Ἀκρασία*,—how far it was an admissible motive, how far to be suppressed and eradicated,—so here he considers pleasure in its immediate connection with the Good, or Happiness; how far it differs from, how far it agrees with it: and he shews that, while pleasure is an universal object to

man, the highest pleasure results from the best energies, and that, therefore, the highest pleasure generally attainable by the *compound* being man arises from the *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετήν*: and hence pleasure itself, as a simple tendency of our nature, bears witness to the happiness of man, *as man*, being developed by *ἡθικὴ ἀρετή*.

- (2.) 1. *πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἡθους ἀρχήν*. Either the starting-point in the formation of the moral character, or the first step in moral action, viz. the choice of the particular act, of the *τὸ πρακτόν*. It is equally true, whether it be taken of the one or the other. *ἀρετήν* is the common reading.
- (3.) 3. *μή ποτε—λείγεται*. See Grammar, 873, 4; 814, a.—*τοιαύτην οὔσαν ἀπασαν*: as if it were all *αἰετόν*.
- (4.) 4. *διό, because they are believed*.—*τοὺς συνιέντας, those who comprehend them*.

CHAPTER II.

- (5.) 1. *Εὐδοξος* represents the doctrines afterwards held by Epicurus. He lived about B.C. 366.—The arguments in favour of pleasure, as stated here, are—
1. Its being the common desire and end of human nature.
 2. From contraries.
 3. From its being a final and complete end.
 4. From its increasing all other goods in degree, when added to them.
- (6.) 1. *ἐπεικίς*: here simply *good*.—*καὶ τὸ μάλιστα, and that which is most so*.—*κράτιστον, the best, or bravest*, as our old authors use the word.
- (7.) 2. *αἰξέσθαι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ, change of degree, not of kind*. This is necessary to the argument. If it were a change in kind, it might be argued that the thing added to was good, while that which changed it was less so; but if the universal characteristic of pleasure is that it enhances every good, however different in kind, it would seem to have the *good* in itself.
- (8.) 3. *τῶν ἀγαθῶν, of the number of goods*.—*Πλάτων*: in the *Philebus*, 20, E, sqq.—*ἀναίρει, argues destructively*.—*οὐ*

δενδς προστεθέντος κ.τ.λ., *by no addition is good made better*.—δῆλον δέ κ.τ.λ. This is not Aristotle's own argument, but from Plato, Phileb. 20, E. Aristotle, in bk. i. 7, 8, contemplates the possibility of εὐδαιμονία being increased in degree. See also i. 11, 12.

- (9.) 4. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον. οὖν, as Michelet rightly observes, has here an adversative sense, (Gr. Gr. 737, 4,) marking an objection to Plato's doctrine; not, however, as he would have it, a direct objection to his *idea*: it is rather, against his notion, that any good which is capable of increase in degree by the addition of other good things, cannot be *the good*. *What is there such?* It can only be an abstract idea, not anything οὗ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν: and this is a further requisite (ἐπιζητεῖται) to what we are looking for, that, in addition to the other characteristics of good, it should be κητὸν καὶ πρακτὸν ἀνθρώπων.—ἐνιστάμενοι, *objecting*; by the logical form ἐνστασις.—μὴ λέγωσιν. See Grammar, 873, 4; 814, b. λέγουσιν, Michelet.
- (10.) 4. ὁ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' εἶναί φασιν. Remark the epigrammatic brevity of this great principle of his philosophy.—ταύτην τὴν πίστιν, sc. ὁ πᾶσι δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ.—εἰ γάρ: Michelet, ἢ γάρ.—ὠρέγεται, al. ὀρίγεται.—τὶ φυσικὸν ἀγαθόν: the dictates and reproofs of conscience; the shadowy sense of καλόν, which is perhaps never wholly obliterated.—κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὐτά, *above and better than their evil state*. It may be said that the wholly bad desire ἡδύ as ἡδύ, not as ἀγαθόν. The answer is, that even these people have unconsciously instincts towards ἀγαθόν, which are really their motive causes, though apparently ἡδύ alone animates them. See. vii. 13. 6.
- (11.) 5. οὐκ ἔοικε. See vii. 13. 2.—οὐ γὰρ φασιν, *they deny*.—ἄμφω τῶ μηδετέρῳ, *both these two evils are opposed to that which is neither*, i. e. to the μέσον. The argument here, as in bk. vii., is, that as each of the extremes is opposed, not only to the mean, but to the other extreme, it cannot be argued ἐξ ἐναντίων, that if one thing is evil, that which is opposed to it is good, for it may be the other opposed extreme, which is evil. There are two sorts of opposition,—good and evil, and evil and evil,—and the opposition between pleasure and pain

may be of the better sort. Aristotle answers this by saying, if both were evil, both would be *φευκτά*.

- (12.) 5. *μηδετέρων δέ*, sc. *δύτων κακῶν*.—*μηδέτερον*, sc. *εἶναί φευκτόν*,—*ἡ ὁμοίως*; or, at all events, whether they were avoided or not, both must be either avoided or pursued alike.

CHAPTER III.

- (13.) 1. A *ποιότης* is that whereby a thing can be defined, its nature and essence set forth, (*Cat. vi.*, τὰ γὰρ δεδγεμένα αὐτὰς ποῖα λέγεσθαι κατ' αὐτάς: cf. *Met. v. 2*, p. 112); and the notion advanced in the major premiss is, that every thing which is a good defines and sets forth the nature and essence of that to which it is attached; while, to say that a thing is pleasant, or the contrary, defines nothing of its real nature, for it may be applied indifferently to various things differing in nature. The major premiss is clearly a dogmatic assumption, which Aristotle quickly destroys by giving instances to the contrary, as a being or thing would be not defined by saying its operations were right, or that it was happy; and yet both these are confessedly goods.

- (14.) 1. The arguments against *ἡδονή* being an *ἀγαθόν*, are:—

All *ἀγαθόν* is *ποιότης*:

ἡδονή is not a *ποιότης*:

ἡδονή is not an *ἀγαθόν*.

To the major premiss of which Aristotle brings an *ἐνστασις*, using *ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι* and *εὐδαιμονία* as the middle terms.

- (15.) 2. Nothing which admits of degrees is a good, for the *ἀγαθόν* is something definite and fixed, (*ὥρισμένον*); while every thing which admits of degrees is indefinite and shifting, (*ἀόριστον*).

ἡδονή admits of degrees:

ἡδονή is not a good.

- (16.) 2. *ἀγαθὸν ὥρισθαι*. The moral fact that good, viewed *absolutely*, does not really admit of degrees, is curiously embodied in the grammatical fact, that the comparative of good, in most, if not in all languages, is irregular. A thing, to be good, must be perfect. "Why callest thou Me good? there

is none good but one, that is, God." (St. Matt. xix. 17.) When we speak of things being more or less good, we mean that they approach more or less nearly to the absolute standard.

- (17.) 2. *ἡδεσθαι*, middle verb: *the* (being in a) *state of pleasure*; pleasure in the concrete, viewed as residing in a subject.
- (18.) 2. *καὶ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κ.τ.λ.* If pleasure is viewed in the concrete, so that it may properly be said that a man is more or less pleased, it may so be said of justice and the other virtues, that a man is more or less just, &c.; and yet this does not exclude justice, &c. from the category of Good.—*κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς*, in respect of the several virtues.
- (19.) 2. *εἰ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς*, if (they judge this indefiniteness to exist) in pleasures in the abstract: it is true that they, too, in a certain fashion and in a certain sense, admit of degrees, even as health does. Pleasure, viewed by itself, and not in combination with any object in which it might reside and work, (*ἀμυγής*), may be something absolute and definite, not admitting of degrees; so that any degree short of this abstract point is not pleasure, but only an approach to it; though, at the same time, when residing in a subject and combined with other elements, (*μικραί*), it may, in regard of the state of that subject, be said to be a greater or less degree of pleasure: so that, being in its own nature a single definite point, it is in this way capable of degrees; just as health, being in itself an absolute and perfect freedom from disease, and the perfect well-being of the body, yet is said to exist more or less in individuals,—individuals are said to be in a greater or less state of health. So likewise, though pleasure in the concrete does admit of degrees, pleasure in the abstract, the simple idea of pleasure, does not; and therefore the argument, whatever be its value, is answered.
- (20.) 3. *ῥοπισμένη οὐσα*: being a fixed absolute point, not admitting of degrees.—*συνμετρία*, the same common measure; the same degree in all the subjects in which it may reside.—*ἀλλ' ἀνεμείνη κ.τ.λ.*, but falling short of its abstract perfection, it still exists up to a certain point,—differing in different subjects. A man may not be in absolutely perfect health, and yet one would say he was in good health.—*δια-*

φέρει τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. The measure of health differs in coming more or less near to the abstractedly perfect health.—τὸ περὶ ἡδονῆν, *the case with pleasure*.

- (21.) 4. τέλειόν τε κ.τ.λ.

ἀγαθόν is τέλειον:

ἡδονή is not τέλειον, for it is a κίνησις or γένεσις:

ἡδονή is not ἀγαθόν.

τέλειον, perfect in itself.—ἀτελεῖς, not ending in themselves,

—πάσῃ γάρ κ.τ.λ. Every κίνησις has τάχος or βραδύτης:

ἡδονή has not:

ἡδονή is not κίνησις.

πρὸς ἄλλο: if not absolutely, at least relatively.

- (22.) 4. ἡσθῆναι, passive: *to be put into a state of pleasure*, (μεταβάλλειν εἰς τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχέως καὶ βραδέως).—ἡδεσθαι, middle: *to be in a state of pleasure*, (ἐνεργεῖν κατ' αὐτήν). A person may receive impressions of pleasure more or less rapidly, but the pleasure itself has no notion of quickness or slowness.

- (23.) 5. γένεσις, *a transition state*.—δοκεῖ γάρ κ.τ.λ. This is one of the formal, abstract arguments of the schools, or rather porticos, of Athens, which Plato delighted to use, and which carried great weight in the philosophy of the day, though to us it may seem to be scarcely worthy of the notice of such a mind as Aristotle's. The argument, however, such as it is, stands thus:—Any γένεσις, which we may take, does not arise from any chance subject-matter, (οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος τὸ τυχόν γενέσθαι), but that from whence it rises is the same as that into which it is resolved when it ceases, (ἐξ οὗ γίνεται εἰς τοῦτο διαλύεσθαι), so that if ἡδονή is a γένεσις, there would be ἡδύ, (ἐξ οὗ γίνεται,) ἡδονή, (γένεσις,) ἡδύ again, (εἰς ὃ διαλύεται); whereas the real order is—ἡδύ, ἡδονή, λυπηρόν, λύπη, (οὗ γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή τοῦτον ἡ λύπη φθορά).

- (24.) 6. εὐδαιμον τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, the lack or want of that which nature requires, and pleasure the supplying thereof: so that ἡδονή, if thus viewed, is a γένεσις.—οὐ δοκεῖ: the mind, and not the body, is the seat of pleasure; bodily pleasures are mental sensations arising from the body.—ἀλλὰ γινομένης κ.τ.λ. The ἀναπλήρωσις is the γένεσις of

which ἡδονή is the coincident result.—ἡ δὲ δόξα κ.τ.λ. From the accidental connection of ἡδονή and ἀναπλήρωσις in bodily pleasures, they argue their identity; whereas there are many pleasures, not bodily, which are in no ways connected with ἀναπλήρωσις.

- (25.) 10. ἡ τῷ εἰδέει, or, admitting that the above-mentioned really are ἡδοναί, must we divide ἡδοναί into right and wrong, and denying good of the latter, assert it of the former?
- (26.) 11. ἡ διαφόρους εἰδέει, sc. τὰς ἡδονάς.
- (27.) 12. οὐδέεις κ.τ.λ. There is a manifest difference between the pleasure of the child and of the man.—οὐδέι χαίρειν, the pleasure arising from bad sources is evidently not αἰρετών, but the contrary.—μηδέποτε μίλλων λυπηθῆναι, though he were never likely to smart for it. See Bishop Butler, Tendencies of Virtue.
- (28.) 12. περὶ πολλὰ κ.τ.λ. In some things pleasure is the final cause, while in others it is not; as the pleasure of seeing, &c.: hence, too, pleasures differ from each other.

CHAPTER IV.

- (29.) 1. ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσι: having considered the common opinions on the subject, and their difficulties and solutions, *retracing our steps, and beginning the subject afresh*. He shews—
1. *What it is not*:—it is not a κίνησις.
 2. *What it is*.
- (30.) 1. τελεία εἶναι. Take any point in any prolonged energy of sight, the act of sight so taken is perfect in itself, though no other act of sight had preceded it, and none were to follow.—ἄλουν τι, *indivisible*.
- (31.) 2. ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις. Α κίνησις is a progression from one state to another,—from that which is ἐν δυνάμει to that which is in ἐντελέχεια, (see Phys. iii. 1;) and therefore involves not merely a *point* of time, but a *space* of time: when that space of time is ended the κίνησις ceases, the τέλος towards which it was a κίνησις being arrived at: wherefore ἐν χρόνῳ πᾶσα κίνησις.

- (32.) 2. ἡ ἐν ἀπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ ἐν τούτῳ. This is the major premiss of a disjunctive syllogism, one alternative of which has to be supplied. If a κίνησις is τελεία, it is so either ἐν ἀπαντι χρόνῳ ἢ ἐν τούτῳ, or not at all. The first step is to give the characteristics of κινήσεις ἐν μέρεσι, viz. that they are ἕτεραι τῷ εἶδει and ἀτελεῖς. This latter disposes of the claim of the κινήσεις ἐν μέρεσι to be τέλειαι, and he then goes on to enlarge upon the point of their specific difference, with a view to prove that the whole κίνησις thus made of specifically different portions is not τελεία. You must view κίνησις either in its totality, extending from the δύναμις to the ἐντελέχεια,—and then it is ἐν ἀπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ in its whole duration,—or in any of the various parts of the whole, and then it will be ἐν τούτῳ in that particular space of its duration. Michelet reads ἡ ἐν ἀπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ, confining the view of κίνησις to its whole duration; but this destroys the argument given above.
- (33.) 2. καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἶδει κ.τ.λ. As the several κινήσεις differ from one another, and from the whole which they together constitute, it is clear that they are several independent κινήσεις rather than one whole: though they result in one end, yet they are not continuations of one another, but are ἕτεραι τῷ εἶδει; and therefore the whole κίνησις cannot be viewed as τελεία, for each of the independent parts has passed away before the whole is complete. That this is what he has in view in shewing the several κινήσεις to be ἕτεραι τῷ εἶδει, is clear from the end of section 3.
- (34.) 2. ῥαβδώσεως, fluting: Lidd. and Scott.—κρηπίδος, basement.—τριγλύφου, a three-grooved tablet, placed at equal distances along the frieze. Id.
- (35.) 2. καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. If a κίνησις be taken at any point of its duration, it is imperfect, inasmuch as it has relation to what has preceded and what is to follow, and without these it has no real existence: if perfection can be predicated at all of a κίνησις (ἀλλ' εἴπερ τελείαν δεῖ λέγειν), it must be viewed in its whole duration, from the moment when it begins to the moment when it ceases (ἐν τῷ ἀπαντι, sc. χρόνῳ). This is another way of stating the disjunctive premiss above, (note 32,) one of the alternatives (the ἐν τούτῳ χρόνῳ κινήσεις) having been eliminated.—καὶ ταύτης: particular κινήσεις are also specifically different.

- (36.) 3. οὐ μόνον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The act is not merely a motion across a point, but across a point with the accident of locality attached to it, which is sufficient to make one such act differ from the other, (ἐν ἑτέρῳ, sc. τόπῳ αὐτῇ ἐκείνης).—δι' ἀκριβείας: Phys. iii. 1.
- (37.) 3. ἐν ᾧ παντὶ χρόνῳ, in its whole duration. A κίνησις is not really perfect and complete in its whole duration, for the very same moment that it is completed it ceases to exist as a κίνησις: when viewed as a whole it is merely a succession, or series of imperfect κινήσεις, specifically differing from each other, (ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ καὶ διαφέρουσιν τῷ εἶδει,) inasmuch as each starts from a specific point, and tends to a specific and special end, (εἴπερ τὸ πῶθεν ποῦ εἰδοποιῶν). We must supply the conclusion of the disjunctive syllogism: "therefore a κίνησις is not τελεία."
- (38.) 4. τῆς ἡδονῆς θ' ἐν ὁποῦν τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. Each sort of pleasure, and each several one of a succession of pleasurable emotions, (i. e. of a state of pleasure,) is perfect and complete in itself; each several emotion is not a step in an imperfect process, as in the case of κίνησις, but in itself, and by itself, realizes a definite notion: so that if there was nothing either before or after, yet its notion and definition (εἶδος) would be complete.—τῶν ὅλων καὶ τελείων, belongs to the indivisible and perfect.
- (39.) 4. τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι. A κίνησις does not exist merely in present time; it has a before and an after, without which it has no meaning; whereas an emotion of pleasure implies no notion of time, except just so much as is implied in present existence: and that which can exist perfectly in the minutest portion of time, to the notion and perfection of which time is not necessary, is of the nature of things whole and indivisible.
- (40.) 4. τῶν μεριστῶν: such things as are made up of parts imperfect in themselves, none of which has separately an existence independent of the whole of which it is a part. It is true that a state of pleasure may be divided into its successive pleasing emotions, but each of these is in itself a whole, and capable of existing independently of the whole state of pleasure, just as the portions of a divided crystal are in themselves perfect crystals.

- (41.) 4. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεως κ.τ.λ. *ὄρασις* is ὄλον τι; for if a being were only to enjoy his sight for a single moment of time, the act of sight would for that moment be as perfect an act of vision as if it were continued for an hundred years: it cannot be divided into energies so minute, but that each is in itself perfect and complete.
- (42.) 5. αἰσθησεως κ.τ.λ. Having now shewn what ἡδονή is not, he now proceeds to say what it is. To every act of the senses, or of the active or contemplative intellect, there is an ἡδονή attached, (κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησιν ἔστιν ἡδονή—ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν,) arising from and upon the realization and attainment of the object of sense or intellect; i. e. pleasure follows on the sensual reception of the object of sight, or on the intellectual conception of whatever object in the world of thought the intellect is for the time employed. The higher and more perfect the being, and the object on which it is employed, the higher and more perfect will the energy be, and the higher and better the pleasure; and therefore the highest pleasure will result coincidentally on the realization and completion of the highest energy of the highest being. See Butler, Sermon on "Love of our Neighbour."
- (43.) 5. αἰσθησεως δὲ πάσης κ.τ.λ. Every sense is directed towards some object as its end, in which it rests; and every act of sense is an energy towards such an object. The most perfect energy is that of the most perfect sense, or of the sense in the most perfect state, working towards the best object which falls under its powers.
- (44.) 5. αὐτὴν δέ κ.τ.λ. The psychological question whether the sense itself works and energizes towards its object, or the being in whom the sense resides, is foreign to the present question.
- (45.) 5. αὐτὴ δ' ἂν εἴη κ.τ.λ. He here anticipates a conclusion which properly can only be drawn after the next clause, (κατὰ πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν ἔστιν ἡ ἡδονή,) and lays it down that that energy which is most perfect would also bring with it the highest pleasure, as every act of sense or intellect has its pleasure; and that pleasure will be the highest which results from the highest and most perfect energy, as before defined; i. e. the energy which works towards its highest and best object.

- (46.) 6. *τελειοὶ δὲ ἐνέργειαν κ.τ.λ.* Pleasure crowns and perfects the energy, not as a producing or instrumental cause, but as a result; as health is the perfection of, or perfects, the body, but not in the same way in which the instrumental causes, such as the physician or medicine, perfect it. The *αἰσθητόν* is an ingredient in the completion of the energy, as being the object on which it works; the *αἴσθησις* perfects it as being its instrument; the *ἡδονή* perfects it as being its result,—just as beauty is the perfection of the prime of youth, without being necessary to its existence, or in any way producing it.
- (47.) 7. *τοιούτων δὲ ὄντων κ.τ.λ.* If the *αἴσθησις* and *αἰσθητόν* are good of their sort (*τοιούτων*), *ἡδονή* will always follow, as being the result of the realized correspondence between the *αἴσθησις* and the *αἰσθητόν*: if the energy is incomplete, so that the *αἴσθησις* fails to realize the object, *ἡδονή* will not follow; but when they are adapted one to the other, and the *αἴσθησις* works towards the *αἰσθητόν* on the one hand, and the *αἰσθητόν* satisfies the *αἴσθησις* on the other, then pleasure is the result. —*αἰσθανόμενον* is here “*that which is to receive the impression,*” = *αἴσθησις*.
- (48.) 7. *ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ ποιήσοντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου.* The generic sense of *ποιεῖν* and *πάσχειν* when thus opposed, is of things or persons standing in the relation of agent and patient, subject and object, active and passive: their specific or particular signification varies according to the subject-matter of the context. Thus in the fifth book the former signifies *the producer*, the latter *the consumer*, (see bk. v. note 61;) and in this passage, as the context relates to the mental energies or acts, these words would relate—the one, to some active energy of the mind, the other, some passive impression. Hence the sense seems to be, “It naturally is a condition of pleasure arising from the correspondence between the *αἴσθησις* and the *αἰσθητόν*, that there should be some being who has a capability of the active energies of *αἴσθησις*, (*τοῦ ποιήσοντος* = *μέλλοντος ποιεῖν*), and a capacity for receiving the passive impressions of sense, (*τοῦ πεισομένου* = *μέλλοντος παθεῖν*).” The *αἰσθητόν* might clearly exist without producing any pleasure, if the active *αἴσθησις* were wanting, and the *αἴσθησις* would produce no pleasure if the *αἰσθητόν*

were lacking ; but even where they both exist, that in which they exist must be in such a state, both actively and passively, as to allow of their being called into being. Thus the *αἴσθησις* exists in sleep, and the *αἰσθητόν* likewise ; but as the capacity of active energies of *αἴσθησις*, and the passive impressions receivable from *αἰσθητόν* are suspended, no pleasure is produced.

- (49.) 8. οὐχ ὥς ἐξίς κ.τ.λ., *not as an ingredient*, but as a result and crown. This is the practical difference between Eudoxus and Aristotle. The former would say happiness is a result of the highest pleasure ; pleasure is an essential ingredient of happiness : Aristotle, that pleasure was the result of happiness ; happiness could exist without it.
- (50.) 8. ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων. Being similar, and there being the same correspondence and adaptation (*πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχόντων*) between the active energies, (the *κρῖνον* or *θεορῶν*), τοῦ ποιητικοῦ and the qualities of the object thereof, (the *νοητόν* or *αἰσθητόν*), τοῦ παθητικοῦ, the same result, viz., *ἡδονή*, follows, as in the case of the simple *αἴσθησις*, (*ταὐτὸ πέφυκε γενέσθαι*) : τὸ κρῖνον is here the active energy, which has *νοητόν* for its subject-matter ; and *αἰσθητόν* is here the subject-matter of *θεωρία*, which is a highly intellectual *αἴσθησις*,—the perception of things, their qualities, laws, &c. It is possible that ποιητικοῦ may mean the *αἰσθητόν* which produces (*ποιεῖ*) the impression, and παθητικοῦ the faculty which receives it, (*πάσχει*) ; but on the whole it seems better to adopt the sense given above.—*διὰ ταῦτό, for the same reason*, sc. because we are weary of it.—*διὰ ταῦτα*, al. *for these reasons*, sc. which have just been mentioned.—*παρὰ κίληται, is excited*.
- (51.) 9. ἡ κάμνει. Michelet follows the old interpretation, by taking this as an answer to the preceding question, *πῶς οἶν κ.τ.λ., is it that he is weary of it?*
- (52.) 10. τελειοῖ is the *τέλος* of—the perfection—crown ; it is a necessary result.—*τοῦ ἐνεργείν*, in which life consists ; and therefore of life itself.

CHAPTER V.

- (53.) 1. *ῥθεν*, sc. from its connection with *ἐνέργειαι*: as the *ἐνέργειαι* are different, so must the pleasures which result from and crown them be different. The contradictory opinions about pleasure being or not being a good, arise from there being different sorts of pleasure, and one party looking at one sort, the other at another sort. And again, if there are different sorts of pleasure, true pleasure may arise from the pure intellect, and the moral nature, and even from the mere senses; each being a true pleasure in its kind and degree.
- (54.) 2. *ἐπιδιδόασιν*, gain ground and are improved. This is one of the final causes of pleasure.
- (55.) 5. *ἐξακριβοῖ*, perfects.
- (56.) 6. *καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι*, the desires which arise from definite feelings and passions, and whence spring definite emotions of desire, (*ἡδῆς*;) while *ἡδονή* is the more general, indefinite love of enjoyment,—the general tone of mind, which, up to a certain point, regulates and directs the *ἐπιθυμίας*.—*ἡ δοναί*, the emotions of pleasure which are the result of the *ἐνέργειαι*, of sense or reason. We must distinguish between *ἡδονή* as a motive cause preceding, and as a result following on, the action.—*ἡ γὰρ κατὰ κ.τ.λ.*, sc. *ἐστὶν οἰκεία*.
- (57.) 6. *αἱ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμέναι κ.τ.λ.* The *ἡδῆς* may precede the *ἐνέργεια* by a long time. It differs from it in its nature as much as the act *in posse* differs from the act *in esse*, while the pleasure arising from any energy is so closely connected with it as to be almost identical.—*σύνεγγυς*, co-incident.
- (58.) 8. *ἡ γὰρ κατὰ κ.τ.λ.*, sc. *ἐστὶν οἰκεία*.
- (59.) 10. *εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον*, sc. *τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ εἶναι κυρίως ἡδῆς*.—*εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται*. If pleasures then differ in excellence according to the *ἐνέργειαι* whence they arise, and the good man is the true standard, then the *ἡδονή* of *ἀρετή* is the highest *ἡδονή* of man.—*ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἢ τοιοῦτος*, i. e. in respect of his *ἀρετή*, as far as he has *ἀρετή* he is the standard of excellence.

- (60.) 11. ἀλλὰ τούτοις, *except to individuals*.—εἴτ' οὖν μία κ.τ.λ, the energy or energies of the man who has arrived at the highest happiness, the greatest perfection of which he is capable, have the highest and most perfect pleasures attached to them.

CHAPTER VI.

- (61.) He now proceeds to sum up his book by stating that towards which he has been throughout working,—the nature of human happiness;—and first, happiness being an energy and τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ αἰπεῶν, what energies apparently of this class are nevertheless not εὐδαιμονία.
- (62.) 2. οὐκ ἔστιν ἑξῆς: bk. i. 7.—ἀναγκαῖαι, *necessary as means*.—αὐτάρκης, *self-contained*. It needs not pleasure nor anything else to complete or perfect it. It would be what it is if nothing were to be joined with it. Of course, if other good things are added to it, it is increased in degree, just as youth is rendered more desirable by the beauty which accompanies it; but it is youth still, even though there be no beauty superadded. So pleasure is not essential to it, though necessarily joined to it as a coincident result. It is in its essence always αἰπεωτέραν, compared with everything else; but if it has other goods, as accidents and results, it is αἰπεωτέρα αὐτῇ εαυτῆς. See bk. i. ch. vii. note 112.
- (63.) 3. εὐδαιμονιζομένων, *of those who are thought happy*.
- (64.) 7. ἡδῆ, *ipso facto*.
- (65.) 8. εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον, *external life; social life*:—they have ζῶν, but not βίος. The slave has no existence of his own: his daily life, and all in which it consists, is his master's.

CHAPTER VII.

- (66.) In this chapter he lays down the conclusion of his whole treatise, that εὐδαιμονία is the energy of the highest excellence of man; that in itself the ἐνέργεια and ἀρετὴ κατὰ νοῦν is the

highest energy, looking upon man merely in respect of his intellect as an intellectual being; but looking upon man as a compound being, his highest good, being what he is—a moral being,—is a life according to moral virtue.

- (67.) 1. κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν, *according to its proper perfection.*
- (68.) 2. καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς (κράτιστος) τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν (ἄριστα) περὶ ὃ νοῦς. Of subjects of knowledge, the subjects of νοῦς are the best.
- (69.) 3. εὐλογον διὰ τοῖς εἰδόσι κ.τ.λ. It is reasonable that life should be more agreeable to those who are in possession of knowledge than to those who are only seeking after it. It is assumed that all men are either searching after knowledge or in possession of it.
- (70.) 6. παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι, *besides and beyond the mere energies of political life.*
- (71.) 7. ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία. In itself, and looked upon as the highest energy which the nature of man admits of, the energy of the pure intellect is εὐδαιμονία,—of which it in every respect realizes the idea, and fulfils the condition; but as man is a compound being, such an energy would not be the energy of man, but as partaker of a nature above humanity. It is a perfection which every one ought to aim at and realize as far as possible, but it is the perfection of ἀθάνατος rather than the θνητός.
- (72.) 8. κατὰ τὴν ἁλλήλην ἀρετὴν, moral virtue; ἐνέργεια (τοῦ θείου διαφέρει) ἐνεργίας τῆς κ.τ.λ.—κατὰ τοὺς παλαινοῦντας, *according to moralists.* Either Theognis, or Solon, or Epicharmus. Cf. Rhet. ii. 21.
- (73.) 9. δόξεει κ.τ.λ. The essence of the life of the rational creature, man, is reason, wherefore it is but reasonable that he should try to develope and realize this wherein his life essentially consists.
- (74.) 9. τὸ λεχθὲν πρότερον, *sc. about ἀρετή and ἡδονή.*

CHAPTER VIII.

- (75.) 1. δευτέρως. Secondly, and viewed as the proper energy of the compound being, man, εὐδαιμονία consists in ἡθικὴ ἀρετή.
- (76.) 3. εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαί. ἡθικὴ ἀρετή, supposing it to be formed, τὸν σκόπον ὁρθὸν ποιεῖ, (see bk. vi. 12), and thus supplies the ἀρχαί of action to φρόνησις as the deliberative faculty in moral action. See bk. vi. note 133.—τὸ δὲ ὁρθεῖν, and the direction of moral actions is the function of φρόνησις.
- (77.) 3. τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον, with the passions in the compound being.—αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθετοῦ ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρώποι καὶ κ.τ.λ. He thus reconciles the Platonic theory, which is founded on the abstract excellence of θεωρία, with his own, which is founded on the actual practical nature and position of man.—ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κερχωρισμένη, sc. from the passions.
- (78.) 4. ἐξουσίας, liberty, opportunity.
- (79.) 7. ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι, to play his part as a man.—τοὺς θεούς. This is not the language of a man who disbelieved in a Divine Being.—αἱ δὲ σώφρονες, sc. πράξεις. εἰ δὲ σώφρονες, al.
- 80.) 8. οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, not in its accidental results.
- 81.) 9. δεήσει κ.τ.λ. A being such as man requires external goods for perfect happiness, for even θεωρία looks for some of these as conditions and pre-requisites.—οὐ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Here is the same distinction drawn between μακάριον and εὐδαιμονία as in bk. i.—οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ. He here passes away almost insensibly from the abstract happiness of θεωρία to the political happiness of πράξις.—τὸ αἵταρκες, the sort and degree of external goods necessary to θεωρία.—ἡ πράξις, the action of moral virtue which requires external things as its subject-matter. Hence the real meaning of the passage, "Neither θεωρία nor ἡθικὴ ἀρετή require an excessive amount of external goods."
- (82.) 12. πιστεῖν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Observe the practical character of Aristotle's mind.
- (83.) 13. εἰ γὰρ τις ἐπιμέλεια κ.τ.λ. Here again is a distinct recognition of Divine Providence.

CHAPTER IX.

- (84.) 1. οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς. Here he is speaking of the result of the whole of the preceding treatise, as τὸ θεωρῆσαι καὶ γινῶναι. He has been giving, not merely practical directions for virtue, but laying down and proving a theory of virtue and happiness; not an abstract theory with no further result, (οὐ θεωρίας ἔνεκα, bk. ii. 2.) but a practical theory, with a view to right action, and to the system of politics which has human good for its end. His theory of virtue so far agrees with Plato's, that he holds intellectual energies to be in themselves the highest excellence of a being possessing intellect; but he has *proved* that the ἔργον, and hence the excellence of man as a compound being, is realized by ἡθικὴ ἀρετή. Though his Ethics necessarily have a practical bearing, yet their object is mainly γνῶσις τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; but the τέλος of this γνῶσις is πράξις. See bk. i., note 46.
- (85.) 3. Θεογνιν. Theognis, 532.—ποιῆσαι δὲν, *might or would make*. Gr. Gr. 429, 1.—κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, *possessed by, occupied by*; αἱ κατακώχιμος. Il. β. 669, ἐφίληθεν ἐκ Δίος.
- (86.) 5. κατελημμένα, *possessed by*; much the same as κατακώχιμος above.
- (87.) 6. μὴ ποτ' οὐκ ἰσχύῃ: Gr. Gr. 814.—προδιδιργάσθαι, *to be cultivated beforehand*.
- (88.) 7. συνείη, *take it in*.
- (89.) 8. στέργον τὸ καλὸν κ.τ.λ. This is φυσικὴ ἀρετή.
- (90.) 9. ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτά, sc. τροφήν καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν ὀρθήν.
- (91.) 9. λόγος δὲν κ.τ.λ. Observe this definition of law.—ἀπὸ τινος φρονήσεως, *proceeding from a particular sort of φρόνησις*; that which takes cognizance of human good in general: bk. vi. 5, 5, 8. 1.
- (92.) 13. μετ' ὀλίγων, *with a few others*. See i. 13. 3.—κυκλωπικῶς: Od. ix. 114.
- (93.) 17. δντινα γὰρ οὖν; *quemvis; any one*.—προτεθίνα, *committed to one's care*. Some refer it to νόμον.

- (94.) 18. *παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν*; i. e. "Is it a matter of διδασχῇ?"—*δυνάμεων*: properly, organic sciences or art; here, opposed to *ἐπιστήμη*, *arts*: see bk. i. note 22.—*οὐ πολιτικούς ποιοηκότες*: see Plat. Protag. 166, sqq.
- (95.) 19. *οὐ μὴν μικρόν γε* κ.τ.λ. This formula, *οὐ μὴν γε*, refers to the question stated above,—“Is it matter of διδασχῇ?” (*ἡ παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν*;) and when this has been discussed by stating and examining the opposite question, (*ἡ οὐχ ὅμοιον* κ.τ.λ. —*φιλάτοις*;) he resumes the subject by *οὐ μὴν γε*: “But truly, at all events, (*γέ*, however this may be,) experience seems to contribute not a little, otherwise (*οὐ γὰρ ἂν* κ.τ.λ.) men would not have become politicians from political practice.”
- (96.) 20. *τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ*: see Rhet. i. 2.—*ὡς περ οὐδέ* κ.τ.λ. *ὡς περ* = *δοκούντες*: Gr. Gr. 703.
- (97.) 21. *λαθεῖεν*, sc. *ἔκαστοι*.—*ἐκάστους*. *ἐκάστου*, Michelet; sc. *θεραπείματα*.
- (98.) 22. *παραλιπόντων*. This is interpreted to mean that no one had treated of it with sufficient accuracy.—*αὐτοὺς*, *ourselves*.
- (99.) 23. *πρῶτον μὲν* κ.τ.λ. Michelet observes that *πρῶτον μὲν* refers to the Politics i. 11; *εἰτα*, to iii.—vi.; *Θεωρηθέντων*, to vii., viii.
- (100.) 23. *ἀρξάμενοι*: having made this *ἀρχή* or introduction. The true view of the Ethics is, that it is the introduction or grammar of the Politics.

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ERRATA.

Page [25](#), *for* note [138](#) read [183](#).

— [37](#), note [49](#), *for* [τριά](#) read [τρία](#).

— [55](#), note [45](#), *for* [βουλησις](#) read [βούλησις](#).

— [56](#), note [55](#), *for* [ἄριστος](#) read [ἀρίστος](#).

— [68](#), *for* note [112](#) read [121](#).

— [100](#), *for* note [55](#) read [53](#).

ERRATA.

Of the following, some will be seen at once to be mere misprints; others are more serious errata, arising from an illegible MS. and a too hasty correction of the press.

Bk. i. note 1, for "ὅ πάντα" read "οὗ πάντα."

Bk. ii. note 10, for "ὁμοίως" read "ὁμοίωσιν."

Bk. iii. note 1, for "second chapter" read "sixth chapter."

— — 99. In the end of the note the words ἡδονή and λύπη have got transposed. ἡδονή of course arises from the sense of καλόν, and λύπη from the sense of αἰσχρόν.

— — 171, for "ἀκολασία" read "δειλία."

Bk. iv. note 96, for "to grieve for them," read "to grieve them."

Bk. v. note 30, for "αὐτή" read "αὐτήν."

Bk. vi. note 69, for "which contemplates the former," read "which contemplates the latter."

— — 71, for "φιλόσοφος" read "φιλόσοφοι."

Page 153, line 9, for "as first dormant" read "at first dormant."

Bk. vii. note 123. For the last paragraph substitute, "The clause beginning *ἐπεὶ* καὶ *ὅτι* *ἀνεν* *λύπης* belongs to the clause ending with *ἡδεῖα* *εἰσιν*, so that from *ἔστι* δ' *ἡ ἐνέργεια* down to *φύσεως* is in a parenthesis; and before *ἐπεὶ* καὶ *ὅτι* *ἀνεν* *λύπης* κ.τ.λ. we must supply, *But all are not of this sort.*"

Page 183, under ἀκρασία α., for "intellectual" read "ineffectual."

Bk. viii. note 26, for "φιλία—ἡξία—πόσον—δικαιοσύνη," read "φιλία—πόσον—ἡξία—δικαιοσύνη."

— — 39. The reference for κληρωτός should be Rhet. ii. 20. 4.

— — 44, for "attributes" read "attributed."

— — 52, for "πεφυκεναι" read "πεφυκέναι."

— — 66, last line, for "for whom" read "from whom."

Bk. ix. note 71, line 3, for "those who do" read "those who do not."

Bk. x. note 11, for "better sort" read "latter sort."

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